The Theoretical Quandary of Subjectivity: An Intellectual Historical Note on the Action Theories of Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz (original) (raw)
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[Doctoral Thesis] - In Search of a Theoretical Synthesis: Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action
In Search of a Theoretical Synthesis: Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action, 2022
The present thesis aims to provide a theoretical reconstruction of the theory of action, understood here as a kind of general frame of reference, but also as a research program in the human sciences. The problem of investigation here addressed is that of clarifying the extension and limits of such theory. The general argument of the thesis is that this intellectual tradition goes back further than Parsons immediately pointed out during his first tentative synthesis and that it can be traced back at least as far as to Kant’s critical philosophy; from the point of view of its developments, it extends forward into contemporary sociology, but it also finds limits there due to its primary focus on the instrumental-normative divide, thus demanding some further reformulations. In order to support this argument the present thesis is divided into four chapters: (1) the first one addresses the issue of metatheory in order to situate the procedures and the goals of the present reconstruction; (2) the second one deals with the intellectual origins of the theory of action, which covers the contributions coming from classical sociology, especially Durkheim and Weber, and its Neokantian frame of reference; (3) the third one reconstructs in further details the development of the first major synthesis in the theory of action, the so-called “voluntaristic” theory of action, as first proposed by Talcott Parsons; (4) the fourth and last chapter analyzes some developments in action theory and the challenges coming from recent debates that were carried out by authors like Alexander, Münch, Joas, and others.
Action, system and norm in the action frame of reference: Talcott Parsons and his critics1
The Sociological Review, 1983
currently under way. It may be asked, however, in what respects the current critiques differ from their predecessors? The themes appear to be the same: his neglea of power (Burger 1977), his over-empiiasis on norms (Warner 1978), the break between the early voluntarisdc theory of action and the later structural-functionalist theory of systems (Bershady 1973), and his misinterpretations of the sociological tradition (Pbpe 1973; Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pbpe 1975; Pbpe, Cohen and Hazelrigg 1975; Camic 1979).
The action as the concept of existence. Subjectivity between praxis and public space
Categories such as public space , citizenship and identity are based , in their complexity, on the question of the constitution of the subject, in fact the problem of defining the content and structure of subjectivity is the horizon within which they move into the above categories and which must be included. My contribution wants to analyze briefly this issue , identifying a common background to the various conceptions of the subject acting as an epistemological horizon , where the idea of the subject corresponds to a foundation of the contents of the existence of a practice that states it procedurally. In addition, we want to discuss how this way of working doesn't exhaust the question of the foundation of subjectivity by the practical activity, but it raises delicate questions about the original nature of the subjective condition and its value. I would like to take this path by analyzing especially the first phase of Foucault's thought , where the construction of the subject is conceived in relation to an original root now placed beyond the horizon of understanding of the subject and the social structures and Honneth's theory of recognition, where intersubjectivity pushes the subject to overtake the practical and functional relationship with the object and distinguish the inner value of subjectivity itself.
The Problem of Subjectivity: Dieter Henrich’s Turn
2013
Contents 1.Subjectivity as Self-Consciousness 2. Non-mediated Self-Reference 3. The Body as a Whole 4. The Principle of Consequence, Practical Self-reference, and Self-determination 5. Some Conclusions References The German philosopher Dieter Henrich has worked on the problem of subjectivity since the 1950s years. In his lecture at the “Kolleg Friedrich Nietzsche der Stiftung Weimarer Klassik” (2003 he has reformulated the problem of subjectivity in the context of a revisionary approach. This is worth emphasizing, since Henrich’s analysis is focused on the limits of the position of subjectivity in the world. He calls his turn a revisionary metaphysics because he sees subjectivity not as self-grounded but as part of an All-Einheit (all-unity), thus evoking a motive of Plato’s philosophy. In the present article, I will first deal with Henrich’s turn to the question of subjectivity. Secondly, I re-interpret his analysis of conscious self-reference (subjectivity) which starts from the condition of primary self-consciousness as immediate consciousness. Henrich also claims to give an answer to the mind-body problem in the context of the much changed questions of philosophy of mind since the 1950s. Thirdly, I consider Henrich’s view of the body (Leib) as a position in the world which goes along with subjectivity. Fourthly, this leads me to his discussion of the principle of consequence and of free choice as well as to the interplay between subjectiv-ity and practical self-reference considered as self-determination (Selbstbestimmung ) and self-relationship (Selbstverhältnisse). Studying the philosophical work of Henrich again I read it, in the current philosophical context, as a contribution to an existenzial phenomenology, given from the subject’s point of view. This is close to Henrich’s claim to connect transcendental philosophy with Existenzphilosophy, yet slightly different. I will finally say something about that from the viewpoint of my own system-theoretical background.
Consciousness and Subjectivity Edited by Sofia Miguens and Gerhard Preyer
Issues of subjectivity and consciousness are dealt within very different waysw in the analytic tradition and in the idealistic phenomenological tradition central to continental philosophy. This book brings together analytically inspired philosophers working on the contintent with English-speaking philosophers to address specific issues regarding subjectivity and consciousness. The issues range from acquaintance and immediacy in perception and apperception, to the role of agency in bodily 'mine-ness', to self-determination (Selbstbestimmung) through (free) action. Thus involving philosophers of different traditons should yield a deeper vision of consciousness and subjectivity; oe relating the mind not only to nature, or to first-perso authority in linguistic creatures Questions which, in the analytic tradition, are sometimes treated as exhausting the topic but also to many other aspects of mind's understanding of itself in ways which disrupt classic inner/outer boundaries.
Philosophical Explorations, 2018
This paper traces the intellectual trajectories of the first stand-alone theories of action, understood as both axiologically neutral and quasi-scientific from a methodological point of view. I argue that the rise of action theory of this kind corresponds to a particular moment of dissatisfaction within Western thought, and as such, it tells us far more about the history of philosophy than the subject itself. I conclude by explaining why subsequent failures to provide an acceptable theory of action are not accidental. On the contrary, such failures owe themselves probably to the fact that formulating a theory of action is neither propitious nor useful. Thus, the most valuable lesson we can learn from philosophical desires for a theory of action is that we should take co-action as the starting point in our normative investigations, rather than positing action simpliciter as a problem to solve. That is, instead of postulating a theory of action, we should think of a paradigm shift, whereby we move away from a representational paradigm in philosophy towards a co-actional one.
Two Dogmas of Contemporary Philosophy of Action
Davidson’s seminal essay “Actions, Reasons and Causes” brought about a paradigm shift in the philosophy of action. Before Davidson the consensus was that the fundamental task of the philosophy of action was to elucidate the concept of action and the concept of event. After Davidson it has been assumed that the fundamental challenge for the philosophy of action is to answer not the conceptual question “what does it mean to explain something as an action?”, but a metaphysical question, namely, “how is causal over-determination by the mental and the physical possible?” I argue that the two main considerations Davidson provides for construing the question posed by the action/event distinction in metaphysical rather than conceptual terms are inconclusive. To the extent that Davidson’s essay was responsible for this paradigm shift, contemporary philosophy of action may well be said to rest on two unexamined dogmas.