Henry Sidgwick's Practical Ethics: A Defense (original) (raw)

Utilitas, 2006

Abstract

Henry Sidgwick s Practical Ethics offers a novel approach to practical moral issues. In this article, I defend Sidgwick s approach against recent objections advanced by Sissela Bok, Karen Hanson, Michael S. Pritchard, and Michael Davis. In the first section, I provide some context within which to situate Sidgwick s view. In the second, I outline the main features of Sidgwick s methodology and the powerful rationale that lies behind it. I emphasize elements of the view that help to defend it, noting some affinities it has with those of the later Rawls. In the third section, I indicate how it promises to help alleviate some difficulties facing modern practical ethics. In the fourth, I respond to Bok s objections. I argue that her own work on practical ethics has some similarities to Sidgwick s which should make them friends, not enemies. In the fifth section, I respond to Hanson, Pritchard and Davis.

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