"Children and the Limits of Paternalism" (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice) (original) (raw)
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The Routledge Handook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children, 2018
Debates on the nature and justifiability of paternalism typically focus only on adults, sometimes presuming without argument that paternalism towards children is a non-issue or obviously justified. Debates on the moral and political status of children, in turn, rarely connect with the rich literature on paternalism. This chapter attempts to bridge this gap by exploring how issues that arise in the general debate on paternalism are relevant also for the benevolent interference with children.
Paternalism and Moral Conflict
Paternalism involves exercising power over others, for their own good, and without their consent. In this paper, I will not try to show that paternalism as such is unjustifiable. Rather, I will argue that, even in those situations when it is justified, it comes at a moral cost. This is the case because paternalism is a form of power exercised over agents and done so without their consent. My argument, which focuses on parental paternalism, has the following three parts. First, if parents do act paternalistically towards their children, this is a prima facie moral wrong, even if in a given situation it is justified, all things considered, so as to promote the good of the children. Second, paternalistic power is exercised only over those capable of agency and, therefore, over those with rights of liberty. If parents' paternalistic power interferes with the liberty of their children this is a prima facie wrong even if it is justified, all things considered, as a means to promote the children's good. And finally, third, paternalistic interference with children's liberty is a prima facie moral wrong both when the children are competent and when they are incompetent.
In this paper, I try to develop a concept of paternalism that does not itself embody a decision regarding the justification of paternalistic actions and is morally neutral in this sense. For that purpose, I defend and modify a roughly Dworkinian reading of paternalism as it is developed by Dworkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Such a definition treats three features of an action as necessary and all of them taken together sufficient for rendering an action paternalistic. The first feature, coercion, should be understood in a broad sense in two ways. First, it should not only include coercion in the narrow sense, i.e. vis compulsiva, but also incorporate vis absoluta. Second, within vis compulsiva, it should allow not only for threats, but for offers as well. The second feature is the absence of consent, where consent should be understood in a narrow sense as including only actual consent. The third feature is the benevolence of the paternalizing agent towards the paternalized. Benevolence should make reference to the intentions of the paternalizing agent, not to the factual outcome of the paternalistic action. I think that a concept of paternalism developed along these lines is able to include those cases that are commonly treated as paternalism and to exclude other cases.
Introduction : Paternalism – Issues and trends
2013
Equally famously, critics have charged that Mill’s utilitarianism is inadequate to ground such an absolute prohibition. If there is a case for an absolute ban on paternalism, many have thus thought, it must be grounded instead in the fundamental importance of one of a family of considerations that includes liberty, freedom, and autonomy. However, it is unclear whether this move really helps, or so we will suggest. This mere snippet from the historical debate is enough to show that paternalism is a topic that engages deep philosophical issues in normative ethics and political philosophy, including the significance and nature of freedom and autonomy, and the relation between individuals and the state. But interest in the topic is of course not primarily due to its theoretical depth. Instead, it is due to practical considerations. A wide variety of policies and laws in the United States and elsewhere are considered paternalistic, and are controversial for just that reason. For instance...
The Normative Core of Paternalism
Res Publica, 2007
The philosophical debate on paternalism is conducted as if the property of being paternalistic should be attributed to actions. Actions are typically deemed to be paternalistic if they amount to some kind of interference with a person and if the rationale for the action is the good of the person interfered with. This focus on actions obscures the normative issues involved. In particular, it makes it hard to provide an analysis of the traditional liberal resistance to paternalism. Given the fact that actions most often have mixed rationales, it is not clear how we should categorize and evaluate interfering actions for which only part of the rationale is the good of the person. The preferable solution is to attribute the property of being paternalistic not to actions, but to compounds of reasons and actions. The framework of action-reasons provides the tools for distinguishing where exactly paternalism lies in the complex web of reasons and actions.
Behavioral Paternalism or the possibility of paternalism
In this article I address the question of the moral legitimacy of paternalism. Paternalism is considered illegitimate a) when it acts under false pretenses to satisfy the interest of the paternalist agent, b) when it violates the individual autonomy of the people interfered with and c) when it does not respect the equality between people by singling out those who are deemed unable to decide for themselves. Over the last decade, however, a new type of paternalism has emerged thanks to the groundbreaking works of some behavioral economists. This new type of paternalism, that has become popular through Sunstein and Thaler's Nudges, challenges the view that paternalism is unacceptable today. The aim of this paper is to assess its moral legitimacy (not exclusively focusing on the autonomy proviso).
The Problem of Paternal Motives
Utilitas, 2013
In this article I assess the ability of motivational accounts of paternalism to respond to a particular challenge: can its proponents adequately explain the source of the distinctive form of disrespect that animates this view? In particular I examine the recent argument put forward by Jonathan Quong that we can explain the presumptive wrong of paternalism by relying on a Rawlsian account of moral status. I challenge the plausibility of Quong’s argument, claiming that although this approach can provide a clear response to the explanatory challenge, it is only successful in doing so when it relies on the strength of its rival: the argument from personal autonomy. In doing so I illustrate that such responses are conceptually dependent on an account of respect for persons, and thus much of the relevant controversy is actually disagreement over how we respect other individuals.