Perché l'intelligence fallisce: Il caso dell'11 settembre (original) (raw)

2017, Quaderni di Scienza Politica

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 represented a crucial event in international politics. They took the world’s only superpower by surprise. How was it possible? Why did the US formidable intelligence system fail to prevent that catastrophe? Today a large empirical record is available on al-Qaida’s surprise attacks and the US response (in particular, from the work of the “9/11 Commission”) and allows us to interpret and evaluate those events, fraught with major consequences. This article investigates the causes of that resounding intelligence failure. The text refers to three complementary classes of factors: cognitive/psychological, organizational, and political. First, it examines cognitive and psychological factors and biases such as the «signal to noise ratio» problem, «crying wolf syndrome», «groupthink», wishful thinking and overconfidence. Second, it pays attention to organizational complexity and fragmentation, problems of cooperation and coordination, inter- and intra-organizational conflicts, and bureaucratic pathologies, with an emphasis on the role of the CIA and the FBI. Third, it looks at the responsibility of political decision-makers, by examining the problems arising from overcrowded political agendas, competing political priorities, and processes of intelligence «politicization». Finally, it focuses on the particular nature of the security threat posed by transnational terrorism.