The Cooperation between the British and Faisal I of Iraq (1921–1932) Evolution of a Romance (original) (raw)

(with Sattar al-Aboody) The Battle of Sha'iba, 1915: Ottomanism, British Imperialism and Shia Religious Activism during the Mesopotamian Campaign

This article analyses relations among the Ottoman Empire, British imperialism and Shia religious proto-nationalism in the period before and after the battle of Sha'iba of 1915, one of the pivotal engagements of the Mesopotamian campaign. It illustrates how the narrow victory of the British at the battle led them to draw a number of over-optimistic conclusions regarding their role in Iraq and their ability to co-opt the Arabs of the province against their 'Turkish' overlords. The victory at Sha'iba and in particular the ambivalent role played by a number of the Arab mujahidin volunteers led the British to conclude that there had never been any real enthusiasm for the jihad declared by the Ottomans against the British occupiers. However, this was based on the false perception that lack of commitment to Ottomanism could be equated with sympathy for British imperialism. In particular, the British failed to recognise that the Ottoman summons to jihad had strengthened the developing forms of Shia proto-nationalist consciousness led by various mujtahids influenced by the Iranian Constitutional Revolution.

BRITISH ROLE IN THE WAHHABI REVOLT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE POLICY OVER IRAQ

Wahhabism was one of the worst incidents annoying the Ottoman State, which firstly occurred in the Arabian Peninsula at the end of the 18 th century and later became a dangerous opponent for Iraq, Persian Gulf, Asia, and Iran. This Islamic sect –which was established so as to restore and rehabilitate Islam– later became a looter, a troublemaker, and a bloody-hand terrorist group in a short period of time, who started to kill the others who were not Wahhabi. On the other hand, the group got favourable results and occupied the strategically important areas in a short time. As a result, it attracted first Britain's and later the other European countries' attention, who later started to build good relations with this group. If they had good relations, they could have found a powerful but an illegal ally. Additionally, this relations could be a good trump against both France and the Ottoman State. British plan was to move France France and the Ottoman State from Iraq away. After this, they could establish a protectorate in Iraq. The members of Wahhabism also desired to be allied with one of the most influential countries in Iraq, they built a good relations in a short period of time. Yet, it was understood that this affair was completely against Wahhabism in Iraq even its surroundings. British used Wahhabi members for their interest but did not let them dominate the region. They got strong in Iraq by taking advantage of the political, economic and martial turmoil of the Ottoman State throughout the XIX. Century.

Glubb Pasha and the Arab Legion

2017

When the Second World War ended, Britain remained the predominant power in the Middle East. Given the end of France's mandate over Syria and Lebanon, Britain, which still held mandates in Palestine and Transjordan, was effectively the only external power with a formal political foothold in the region. The future of Britain's position in the Middle East was ominous, however. Its status as a world power was under threat from the two new global superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union; its economy was struggling; and the Arab-Jewish confl ict in Palestine had intensifi ed. In many ways Britain's relationship with Transjordan was reassuringly reliable. Abdullah had remained loyal to Britain throughout the Second World War, and the Arab Legion had proved a useful asset: assisting in overturning the Iraqi coup in 1941; helping defeat the Vichy French in Syria; and guarding vital installations in Palestine, such as British military stores and the Iraq-Haifa oil pipeline, thus freeing up British forces for action in Europe. 1 As a consequence of its wartime role, the Arab Legion underwent a radical transformation from an internal security force to an ad hoc army. It 'expanded from a strength of about 1,450, costing £186,000 in 1940, to a strength of nearly 6,000, costing over £1,600,000' by 1945, at which point the military units of the Arab Legion consisted of a Mechanised Brigade of three regiments (each containing 732 men) and sixteen infantry companies (containing a total of 3,152 men; approximately 200 per company). The Mechanised Brigade and all but one of the infantry companies were stationed in Palestine; and even that was 'used as a reinforcement and

British Policy toward the Iraqi Shiites during World War I

Journal of Contemporary Iraq & the Arab World, 15, 3: :285-304., 2021

The prospect that opened up in 1914 for the British Empire, of annexing Ottoman Iraq to British India, required an Islam policy. A century and a half of British imperialism in the Muslim world and of direct rule over millions of Indian Muslims had produced officers and bureaucrats with personal knowledge of Muslim society,, but it had also given rise to negative stereotypes, a kind of anti-knowledge that Said termed "Orientalism" that competed in British discourse with their genuine expertise. Here I will argue that Orientalist attitudes and premises were not mere cultural representations but practically guided policy, sometimes disastrously.

The career of Ozdemir: a Turkish bid for northern Iraq, 1921–1923

Middle Eastern Studies, 2017

From 1921 to 1923, Turkey and the United Kingdom, then the mandatory power in Iraq, contended for control of the Vilayet of Mosul, now known as northern Iraq. Although this crisis, known as the Mosul affair, was settled in 1925 in favour of Iraq, Turkey never totally relinquished its historical claim to this strategically important border region. Turkey's persistent claim to the area, and the fact that the region is predominantly inhabited by Kurds whose nationalism shows no signs of waning, make northern Iraq a potentially destabilizing factor in the region. This article will discuss the historical roots of Mosul frontier affairs, a legacy of colonialism in the Middle East. This international conflict has many dimensions, but the article confines itself to the study of the distinguished career of Ali Shafiq, also known as Ozdemir, a Turkish statesman and the architect of Turkish policy during the Mosul affair. 1 This is, to a large extent, a political history of the conflict and British and Turkish archival material and contemporary memoirs, journals, and relevant secondary sources in Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish, and English have been used. The Cairo Conference of 1921 and northern Iraq The Cairo Conference of 1921 was held by British officials in the Middle East to deliberate on policies to be pursued in Iraq and also aimed at securing Iraq's frontier against Turkish claims. To this end, a two-pronged policy was followed. On the one hand, the British fostered Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq in order to counter Turkey's pan-Islamic appeals to the Kurdish population. On the other hand, however, the British government attempted to reconcile the aspirations of Kurdish nationalists with the objectives of British policy in Iraq: the consolidation of King Faisal's government in Baghdad, and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Iraq so that it would become a viable state. British control over Iraq as a Persian Gulf state was deemed necessary by British imperial policy-makers in order to secure strategic routes to India, and in 1920, the British government secured a mandate over Iraq. 2 The outlines of British policy had been worked out at the Cairo Conference in March 1921. The losses incurred by the anti-British rebellion in Iraq in 1920 had resulted in increased demands from the British public that the government reduce its expenditure on commitments abroad. However, Turkey seemed to be an unrelenting challenge to the CONTACT Othman Ali

War on the Desert: The Militarization of the Sinai and its Greater Syrian Sacrificial Frontier during World War I

International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2024

, Ahmed Cemal Pasha departed Istanbul's Haydarpaşa railway station for Damascus. A few weeks prior to his departure-after the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary on October 29-Enver Pasha, the minister of war, invited Cemal Pasha to his mansion. At this meeting, Enver Pasha requested that Cemal Pasha, who was then minister of the navy, take up the post of governor-general of the Greater Syrian provinces and assume command of the Fourth Army. Cemal Pasha enthusiastically accepted Enver Pasha's offer to, in his words, "prepare for and carry out an attack on the (Suez) Canal, and also to maintain security and internal order in (Greater) Syria." 1 He secured his existing ministerial post in addition to gaining full authority as the commander of the Fourth Army and governor of the Greater Syrian provinces. Before his train departed from Haydarpaşa, Cemal Pasha addressed the crowd who had gathered there to see him, describing his mission as the "divine but extraordinarily difficult" duty of "saving Egypt from British invaders." 2 Upon his arrival in Damascus, Cemal Pasha devoted himself to "execute[ing] the Egyptian expedition along with the defense of Syria." 3 He wrote to Istanbul that he would personally command the campaign and do whatever necessary to address the issue of provisions for the army's march across the Sinai Desert; the same march that had thwarted the first expedition. 4 However, the Ottoman military expedition he commanded in January-February 1915 failed, leading the Fourth Army's Ottoman and German military leadership to conclude that any prospect of success would first require overcoming the Sinai Desert's inhospitable environment, climate, and topography in order to transport soldiers to the canal and supply them with water and food. Following the failed attack, the Ottoman army retreated from the Suez Canal to Beersheba. In what followed, Ottoman decision makers-Cemal Pasha first and foremosttogether with German and Austrian military colleagues, waged war on the desert from February 1915 to January 1917, between the failures of the first and second Suez expeditions. The war on the desert involved the militarization of the Sinai landscape through various modes of manipulation, including the construction of railways and motorways, the digging of

British military operation at Sheikh Sa'id in the First World War

2017

It is a difficult task to measure the importance of South West Arabia to the Ottomans and the British prior to and during World War I. Early history of imperial expansion in the area which followed by constant conflicts and involved a considerable amount of diplomacy and intrigues with the natives may suggest that South West Arabia was considered as equally as important to other areas within the empire. However from the beginning of the 20 th century South West Arabia was considered something of a backwater. It may also be observed that during the First World War the position of South West Arabia to these powers in relation to other war theatres remained practically the same except in the episodes of British action at Sheikh Said and the Ottomans advance at Lahej. The Indian authorities who believed that the Ottomans were contemplating a move to Sheikh Sa'id with the aim of acting against British Perim with the telegraphic communication, convoys and shipping, only two miles away...