Nietzsche's Theory of Multiperspectivism Revisited (original) (raw)
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Nietzsche's Conception of Truth and Perspectivism
The vein in Nietzsche’s account of truth pertains mostly to its value as an ideal, and the accompanying will to truth. Let us begin by recognizing that Nietzsche does not use the term ‘truth’ consistently throughout his works, or even within the same work. For him truth does not have a universal meaning or definition, on the contrary he attempts to locate the different senses that it has been traditionally employed, and proceed with his critique. Yet, it does not seem likely that Nietzsche wishes to abandon the concept of truth altogether. Rather, he is better construed as discarding particular conceptions of truth in order to make room for his own alternative conception, which he thinks is the only sustainable one. While not conforming to traditional theories of truth, he wants to reclaim truth from the exclusive labour and produce of reason. Nietzsche wants to recover and redefine truth, to bring it back within life’s bosom; his notion of truth springs from this world, from his perspective, which he does not attempt to veil. What follows is an attempt to explore these themes in what could be thought of as his genealogy of truth, and the notion of perspectivism.
Nietzsche and the Value of Truth
Adam Widawski, 2019
This is a postgraduate essay wherein I present Nietzsche's revaluation of the value of truth as internally consistent. In it I seek to resolve two tensions: First, between Nietzsche's critique of 'the will to truth', and the value of his own truth-seeking. Second, between Nietzsche's virtue of intellectual integrity and his positive evaluation of self-deception. I justify Nietzsche's critique on grounds of it being intentionally self-directed: the apparent contradictions in Nietzsche's argument stem from his sincere recognition of his inability to escape the very paradigm which he critiques, so there is no way for him to be exempt from his own critique. Where his greatest contribution to philosophy lies, however, is in the exposing of the unconscious metaphysical motivations which underpin the modern secular-scientific mindset.
Truth as Value: Nietzsche’s Escape from Nihilism
1967
Abstract Nietzsche's conception of truth provides the foundation for his entire philosophy. To clarify his view of what it means for a proposition to be “true,” this thesis considers Nietzsche's attacks (in his writings from 1885 on) on three previous conceptions of truth.
Nietzsche often gives the impression that all human beliefs are false. Some scholars, like Maudemarie Clark, believe that such a “falsification thesis” is unacceptable and try to limit Nietzsche’s commitment to it, claiming that he abandons it in his very last works. Others, like Lanier Anderson and Nadeem Hussain, take it in ways that make it true and locate it in all. I argue that the view that is common to both approaches—that Nietzsche held that thesis in the first place—is unjustified. To that end, I interpret the texts where these scholars claim to find the thesis in a way that shows that they do not commit Nietzsche to it, and I offer some reasons for thinking that this is a more fruitful way of interpreting his views on the importance of truth—and falsehood—and their function in the economy of human life.
An exploration of Nietzsche's conception of truth with a lowercase t. Nietzsche found the human obsession with Truth with a capital T, some thing absolute, to be absurd. This paper explores Nietzsche's understanding of why truth with a little t was the only truth he was interested in.
Ontological Understanding of Truth, Perspective and Morality in Nietzsche the Anti-Relativist
Aletheia: Texas A&M Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, 2022
Nietzsche has a word to say in most of the areas of philosophy. In ontology, there is the idea of becoming, in epistemology he talks about perspectivism and truth, and his ethics has the morality of the Overman. However, although enough has been said about Nietzsche’s philosophy in general, not much emphasis has been given to how his views about perspectivism, morality, and truth relate to the ontology of becoming. The aim of this paper is to shed light on this important connection. Accordingly, first, the paper examines his ontology of becoming and contrasts it with the Parmenidean ontology of being. Later, the paper follows Nietzsche’s footsteps in deconstructing the commonsense understanding of Truth and shows how he reconfigures the truths with his perspectivism in connection with the ontology of becoming. Towards the end, it presents Nietzsche’s criticism of morality as being-in-itself that—the paper argues—follows the Parmenidean ontology of being. Finally, by emphasizing the order of value differences in some valuations, meanings, truths, and focusing on Nietzsche’s denial of nihilism, the paper argues against the claim of Nietzsche being a moral relativist.
Nietzsche's Pragmatism. A Study on Perspectival Thought
De Gruyter, Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung, vol. 72, 2019
During his late period, Nietzsche is particularly concerned with the value that mankind attributes to truth. In dealing with that topic, Nietzsche is not primarly interested in the metaphysical disputes on truth, but rather in the effects that the "will to truth" has on the human being. In fact, he argues that the "faith in a value as such of truth" influenced Western culture and started the anthropological degeneration of the human type that characterizes European morality. To call into question the value of truth is therefore necessary, if one wants to help mankind to find her way in the labyrinth of nihilism. In this new addition to Nietzsche scholarship, Gori explores the origin and aim of the philosopher's late perspectival thought by merging the theoretical with the historical approach, with a special focus on the epistemological debate that influenced Nietzsche. As a result, the book provides a contextual reading of the issue that supports the idea that Nietzsche’s attitude in addressing the problem of truth is, in a broad sense, pragmatic.
Nietzsche's Theory of Cognition: An Interpretation and Defense of Perspectivism
Friedrich Nietzsche has long been recognized as a pivotal thinker in the history of moral philosophy, but until the last quarter century his importance for our understanding of the concepts of truth and knowledge had been largely ignored in English-language scholarship. In my dissertation, I add to the growing discussion on Nietzsche’s theory of human cognition. While more attention has recently been given to this dimension of Nietzsche’s thought, several key aspects have been largely ignored or insufficiently treated including the effects that the ethical or evaluative domain have on the way we cognize the world, the role that radical skepticism plays in motivating Nietzsche’s theory, and the connections between Nietzsche’s views on cognition and his larger philosophical project. What is distinctive about my project is the connection I draw between Nietzsche’s critique of the unconditional will to truth in On the Genealogy of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil and his treatments of epistemological issues. Without understanding this connection, one cannot understand how Nietzsche’s distinctive positions on truth, knowledge, and cognition relate his overall project. My dissertation sets out to answer four main questions regarding Nietzsche’s theory of cognition, each question corresponding to a chapter of the completed work. In Chapter One I ask what the relationship is between Nietzsche’s views on truth, knowledge, and cognition and his larger philosophical project of overcoming nihilism. Here I argue that Nietzsche’s views on cognition follow directly from his analysis of the nihilism of post-Christian Europe and that his project of overcoming that nihilism requires a complete revaluation of human knowing. Chapter Two asks what Nietzsche’s viii relationship is with skepticism and to what extent can Nietzsche be labeled a skeptic. I show that Nietzsche can be squarely placed in the skeptical tradition in philosophy that includes the Ancient Greek skeptics and the modern heuristic skeptic, Descartes. Nietzsche, however, rejects Descartes attempts to escape radical skepticism, and so can be properly labeled a radical skeptic himself. The next chapter asks what Nietzsche’s model is for how human cognition functions given that it is not designed to aim for truth (as it is traditionally understood, i.e. correspondence). I explore the ways that his favored metaphors of textual interpretation and optical perspective function in elucidating what goes on when we think, highlighting these metaphors strengths and weaknesses. I ultimately conclude that cognition is a practical endeavor with theoretical objects, leading Nietzsche to reject the Kantian distinction between the practical and theoretical employments of reason. Finally I ask, given Nietzsche’s model of how human cognition functions, how should we evaluate competing knowledge claims between individuals? It has been argued that Nietzsche’s pespectivism leads to an unacceptable global relativism regarding, if not truth, then at least epistemic justification. I argue that Nietzsche does not need to abandon the most radical of his conclusions, and he can still account for how and why some positions on theoretical and philosophical matters are better than others, and so an unacceptable “anything goes” kind of relativism does not follow from his views. After answering these four main questions regarding Nietzsche’s views on truth, knowledge, and cognition, I look at how a metaphysics is possible for Nietzsche given his skepticism. I argue that one of the ways a philosopher can create the conditions for overcoming nihilism and affirming life is to create a metaphysics that is both ruthlessly honest to one’s cognitive commitments and an artistically creative outpouring of one’s abundant, healthy drives. I show in this final chapter how a metaphysics that is self-aware of its epistemic limitations fits into some of the contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche’s positive project.