Against Theory of Mind Accounts of Autism: Grandin, Williams (original) (raw)
The impairment of the autistic relative to the unimpaired would be that the autistic isn't able to maintain activity at the conceptual level long enough to become accustomed to the terrain, to bring things into clear focus. The terrain of intuitive thought has as its landmarks emotions and ideas, and also the interpretation of perceptions like pain and touch. The autistic only gets brief glimpses at the conceptual world before being cycled back into the simple sensory stratum, whereas normals are able to remain in the rarified environment of conceptual thought for a longer time between downward cycles of distraction. The autistic experiences feelings and ideas whenever he pops his head above the perceptual cloud, but can't sustain himself there long enough to embellish the delicate strands of incipient feeling which greet him in order to categorize and identify them intellectually, nor does he have the luxury most of us take for granted of quickly communicating the partially formed ideas and impressionistic observations which make small talk and casual socializing possible, because without the ability that normal memory gives to strengthen and expand those ideas enough for them to withstand the distracting task of communicating them, they will fade and be forgotten in a fog.
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