Four Years After: The " Long March " of Justice-Sector Reforms in Ukraine (original) (raw)
Related papers
Promise of Reform Falls Short in Ukraine
Ukraine‘s political and socioeconomic circumstances have become the subject of various debates across Europe and the United States. The focus of these discussions has been the decreasing optimism among Ukrainians about the limited progress the government has made over implementing structural reforms, which were announced after parliamentary elections in October 2014. These reforms promised to bring changes to the judicial, health care and pension systems, as well as a decentralization of the state and closer relations with the European Union and the West. This article argues that, if reforms are not implemented in the near future, another revolution might be on the horizon for Ukraine.
Revolution and Reform in Ukraine: Evaluating Four Years of Reform
PONARS, 2018
In February 2014, Ukraine grabbed the world’s attention with its second revolution in a decade. The corrupt and increasingly authoritarian administration of President Viktor Yanukovych was overthrown. After the revolution, Ukraine embarked upon a wideranging series of economic and governance reforms. In this volume, we assess the progress of these reforms and analyze the main factors that explain the successes and failures we see. Rather than attempt a comprehensive review of all areas of reform, we focus on a number of key areas—economic reform, governance and anti-corruption, security and criminal justice and language policy. Each of these areas is of fundamental importance for the development of Ukraine as a prosperous, independent and democratic state and so is worthy of attention in its own right. However, by focusing on these areas in particular, we also observe variation in the extent of the progress that has been made, allowing us to understand the key factors that have either driven reform forward or hindered it. We discuss the progress and challenges in each area. In each policy domain, there have been difficulties that reformers have struggled to overcome and many challenges remain. In no single policy domain that we analyze here has the promise of the revolution been fully and irreversibly realized. Nevertheless, there are areas, notably in economic reforms and governance and anti-corruption, where substantial progress has undeniably been made and the environment has been transformed compared to before the revolution. However, progress in the areas of security and criminal justice and language policy is much less clear. The key to understanding patterns of relative success and failure, we argue, lies in understanding the interaction between Ukrainian civil society and the international community. We develop the idea of the “sandwich model” in which domestic civil society plays a crucial role in elaborating policy ideas and in policing progress in implementation, while the international community presses an often reluctant political elite into adopting reforms. The most progress in reforms has been made where cooperation between domestic civil society and international actors has been close and well-coordinated. In other areas, progress has been more limited. The “sandwich model” represents a new way of understanding how international and domestic actors can contribute to reform in a context where neither the government nor the opposition are unambiguously supportive of essential reforms. Unfortunately, the conditions for success of the “sandwich” are rather stringent and rare. As a result, the battle for reform in Ukraine goes on and is far from won.
Judicial Reform in Ukraine : Mission Possible ?
2017
This policy report covers period from March 2014 till December 2016. This policy report is prepared within the framework of the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) European programme initiative’s in-house project ‘Implementation of select reform commitments under Association Agreement’. The project is implemented within the Open Society Foundations’ network effort to assess and report on the progress made by Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in the implementation of political commitments of Association with the EU. The views, opinions and statements expressed by the authors and those providing comments are their only and do not necessarily reflect the position of the IRF. Therefore, the IRF is not responsible for the content of the material. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE REFORM OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN UKRAINE IN 2014–2019: MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS
Юридичний науковий електронний журнал, 2020
The article provides an analysis of the current state of the procedural legislation of Ukraine in the context of the judicial system reform carried out in 2014-2019. The drastic changes in this direction, which began with the tragic events in the life of Ukraine in 2014, radically reversed the three components of national justice – judicial system, status of judges and legal procedure. The key issue of the judicial reform in Ukraine is the implementation of the principles of the organization and administration of justice, the main of which is the supremacy of the law. The essential principle in terms of the strategic vision of the key results of the judicial reform in Ukraine was the improvement of such principles as political and economic independence of justice. In accordance with constitutional amendments, a reauthorization took place between the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine and the new constitutional body – the High Council of Justice. The power to review disciplinary cases against all judges, taking decisions on temporary suspension of judges from the justice fall within the competence of the latter. The Higher Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine is solely responsible for selection of judges, qualification assessments, holding competitions to fill the vacancy for judges. The second principle of the organization and implementation of the judicial power in Ukraine was the principle of accessibility of justice, which is traditionally viewed as a lack of excessive judicial expenses, lack of judicial corruption, complex judicial procedures and excessive length of the judicial process. The primary change reflected in all procedural codes is the introduction of effective protection of rights the rights of a person. Particular attention is paid to ensuring the activities of the Supreme Court and implementing mechanisms that ensure the unity of law enforcement practice within the framework of a unified cassation proceedings. An important step in the implementation of the justice reform was the reformation of legal institutions related to the judicial system (advocacy, court enforcement action, reform of legal education, etc.).
Reforms, New Elites, and Old Structures How to Win the Battle for a New Ukraine
2016
In the two years since its " Revolution of Dignity " – also known as Euromaidan – Ukraine has launched important reform initiatives. Most of them are still in the inception phase, however, and much remains to be done to ensure their sustainability. The past two years have made clear the enormity of the challenge Ukraine faces in its transformation. At the same time, it has also shown unprecedentedly strong determination on the part of new reform-minded actors to overhaul the old system. Ukraine today can best understood as a battlefield: the old system and its structures are fighting for their survival, as new actors – from both within the system and outside it – push for a new social contract. This struggle is taking place on an everyday basis at different levels, national and local, in a number of different reform areas. External actors can best contribute by giving stronger support to reformers while promoting development of institutions that limit the space for vested interests to persist. Special attention should be paid to enforcing and implementing already adopted decisions and new laws that change the rules of the game.
Can Ukraine Achieve a Reform Breakthrough
2016
Ukraine’s weak institutions and its experience of 25 years of misrule since independence place an extraordinary burden on reformist forces. The pressures driving reform at present marginally outweigh those impeding them. However, the struggle of the ‘new’ against the ‘old’ is playing itself out slowly and painfully, making it impossible to judge definitively at this point whether Ukraine’s reforms are destined to succeed or fail.
No Illusions, No Regrets: The Current Struggle to Reform Ukraine
First published by the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies The 2013–14 Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine created much admiration and hope among Ukrainians and the international audience. Both Ukrainian civil society and international partners have voiced their high expectations of the meaningful changes in the economy, the political system, and public institutions. This paper argues that positive changes depend on a clear escape from the Soviet legacy, which provokes political populism and stalls reforms. Despite the immense challenges of the Russian military intervention and the declining economy, Ukraine has made progress with its ambitious reform agenda. This paper discusses the achievements and setbacks in four policy areas: decentralisation, energy, the civil service and anti-corruption. It includes firm evidence that proves that the results of many of the reforms are already helping the Ukrainian economy to recover from the crisis. In the long run, the success of a new prosperous and democratic Ukraine will depend on several components of the reform process: vision, leadership, communication, political consolidation and Ukrainian ownership. The EU can and should help in this endeavour, but the national government must maintain the critical share of responsibility.
Systemic corruption has been the dominant problem of an independent Ukraine for more than two decades. The takeover of the state by a political-business group led by Viktor Yanu-kovych had been one of the principal causes for large-scale street protests during the Revolution of Dignity. Following the 2014 power shift, slogans calling for combating corruption and cleaning up the elites have featured among the most important priorities announced by President Petro Poroshenko and two consecutive prime ministers – Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Volodymyr Groysman. Moreover, the fight against corruption remains the West's main condition to support Ukraine. It is difficult to make an unambiguous assessment of the achievements of the past three years. The frequently expressed view that the anti-corruption reform has failed cannot be accepted. Complex socio-political processes should not be measured in the short-term perspective. In a legal and institutional sense, much more has been done in the field of combating corruption than over the whole period of Ukraine's independence. On the other hand, the actual results of anti-corruption activities are few in number. The Ukrainian leadership has lost its initial zeal for reform and the parliamentary majority frequently adopts legislation that hampers the fight against corruption. Resistance of a major portion of the political elite and of various interest groups has been increasingly evident. They fear that the anti-corruption reform will disable them from doing business according to former methods. The principal success involves the establishment of two independent institutions: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP). This is accompanied by the systemic involvement of civil society in the fight against corruption. In both 2015 and 2016, drastically low number of court rulings regarding corruption-related crimes did not increase. However, in recent months, for the first time in history, several prominent politicians and officials have been arrested. This has triggered serious concern in influential political and business groups which, in response, have stepped up their efforts to fight independent anti-corruption institutions. Ukraine has neared a critical moment when the first high-ranking officials may be convicted of crimes. However, this is a very uneven fight since it is being waged only by those employees of the anti-corruption institutions, who are ready to break the 'old ties' with support from the international community and non-governmental organisations.
2015
From a public opinion point of view, corruption has been the gravest problem of today’s Ukraine, excepting the armed conflict in the east of the country. The government might be able to delay certain key reforms such as the constitutional reform or the reform of local government structures, however, without stepping up measures to combat corruption they would face the risk of losing social support which has already been weak. There is no single strategy for combating corruption in Ukraine. What has been implemented is a series of often contradictory concepts and actions (initiated by the president’s office, the government, civil society institutions, or launched to meet the requirements of donors). The successes of the new government have included efforts aimed at fighting corruption at the middle level of government and the introduction of legislative changes in compliance with international practice. The main weaknesses, on the other hand, have been the lack of efficient mechanism...
Review of Central and East European Law 47 (3-4), pp. 298–321, 2022
Since the Euromaidan events of 2014, Ukraine has embarked on a reformist trajectory to ‘Europeanize’ the country and deliver the promise of good governance to its citizens. The series of legislative and public policy reforms that followed had financial and ideological support from Ukraine’s Western partners. To date, studies have focused on documenting and analyzing the course of international donors’ involvement in Ukraine’s reforms. What is lacking, however, is an analysis of the many different domestic responses to external pressure from donors to implement reforms. Examining Ukraine’s Constitutional Court case law on judicial self-government and anti-corruption from 2020, this article examines this court’s legal response to the politics of reform led by international donors and domestic actors in Ukraine. It reveals the problematic nature of constitutional decision-making in a country that has recently been facing considerable pressure from political incumbents and civil society. The article identifies a pattern that characterizes the political process (a ‘troubled nexus’) around the reforms in Ukraine and draws a parallel between Ukrainian developments and the situation in Moldova and Georgia, two countries that have been confronted with similar reform challenges since the enactment of the respective Association Agreements with the EU in 2016.