Wittgenstein’s method of conceptual investigation and concept formation in psychology (original) (raw)
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This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Mieke Bal WORKING WITH CONCEPTS Interdisciplinarity in the humanities should seek its heuristic and methodological basis in concepts rather than in methods. Concepts are the tools of intersubjectivity: They facilitate discussion on the basis of a common language. But concepts are not fixed. They travel-between disciplines, between individual scholars, between historical periods and between geographically dispersed academic communities. Between disciplines, their meaning, reach and operational value differ. These processes of differing need to be assessed before, during and after each 'trip'. All of these forms of travel render concepts flexible. It is this changeability that becomes part of their usefulness for a new methodology that is neither stultifying and rigid nor arbitrary or 'sloppy'. This paper aims to explore the value of such unsettled concepts for interdisciplinary work in the Humanities.
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The "use" theory of meaning arose from the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. On this approach, language and meaning are public affairs and learnable from public sources. Wittgenstein's teaching to "look for the use" of language was partly aimed in criticism of Cartesianism and similar doctrines of modern epistemology-down to the early work of Bertrand Russell. Wittgenstein rejected the notion that we might start off with reference to private, indubitable ideas or impressions and build from them to justify our knowledge of the external world. Language, meaning and reference are first of all public in character; and there can be no purely private language with meanings and/or referents which could only be known to a single person. We learn the language used to describe the world and to ascribe mental states to self and others on the basis of publicly available usage and (defeasible) criteria of application; and linguistic usage is grounded and understood in relation to our ongoing cultural practices, interactions and activities. The commonalities of perceptual experience-and the general reliability of perception-arise from biological evolution, and common evolutionary descent; and these are the biological facts underlying the philosophical appeal, persistence and plausibility of empiricism. The commonalities of thought, in contrast, arising out of the plasticity of mind, depend on interpreting linguistic expressions in a common, publicly available, object-oriented language. The empirical lexicographers who formulate definitions for dictionaries follow and elaborate Wittgenstein's advice on meaning and usage. Dictionary definitions and entries are based on extensive empirical studies of usage. Moreover, along with consulting experts, the same empirical practice is also important in writing dictionaries of technical terms of use in the various sciences. This point is important in understanding the relationship between the "use theory" and the languages and practices of the sciences. Dictionary definitions, understood as common meanings, generally aim to classify, comprehend or encompass, unify and explain the empirical evidence of usage. As will be argued, this last point constitutes a departure from or development of Wittgenstein and the "use theory."