Military Corruption in China: The Role of Guanxi in the Buying and Selling of Military Positions (original) (raw)
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze in detail the characteristics of bribe-taking by provincial and ministerial or senior-level officials. In this paper, we analyze the data concerning all provincial and ministerial level officials convicted of bribe-taking apart from army generals. We identify 110 cases between 1987 and the end of 2015, of which 76 cases involved bribery alone and the rest also involved other crimes. The achievements of China's economic reforms and opening-up over the last 40 years are obvious to all, but they have encouraged significant problems of corruption by senior party and government officials. Between 1987 and 2015 the number of officials convicted of corruption grew significantly and, sentences became more severe. Since 1987, the amount of bribery has increased steadily and the time span of corruption has increased. Corrupt officials mostly use traditional kinds of exchange of interests, and corruption in China has spread into every part of society. China still has a long way to go if it is to win the fight against corruption.
Guanxi-networks, lawyers and marketization of parochial corruption in China's courts (Working Paper)
In this article, I examine how privileged exchange opportunities in parochial corruption in China's courts become marketized and made accessible to those who do not enjoy a relational-tie. To that end, I first analyze the conceptual features of guanxi, a particularistic relationship between two (or more) individuals who share a dyadic non-transferable relational-tie, as well as the operational rationale of guanxi-based exchange. Then I proceed to investigate what has led to the marketization of guanxi-based parochial corruption. The answer lies in the emergence of professional "judicial brokers", particularly lawyers, who are best positioned to broker corrupt deals between judges and litigants. I also explain how a self-executable payment scheme, thanks to the asymmetry of anti-corruption measures, is developed to help solve the enforcement problem of illegal corrupt transactions. Finally, I provide some preliminary comparative reflections on guanxi and informal networks in other legal systems.
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