Breaking down consciousness: hints for a conceptual clarification of the notion of “altered states” from psychedelics studies. (original) (raw)
Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and Opportunities
International Journal of Neuropsychopharmacology, 2021
Psychedelic substances produce unusual and compelling changes in conscious experience that have prompted some to propose that psychedelics may provide unique insights explaining the nature of consciousness. At present, psychedelics, like other current scientific tools and methods, seem unlikely to provide information relevant to the so-called "hard problem of consciousness," which involves explaining how first-person experience can emerge. However, psychedelics bear on multiple "easy problems of consciousness," which involve relations between subjectivity, brain function, and behavior. In this review, we discuss common meanings of the term "consciousness" when used with regard to psychedelics and consider some models of the effects of psychedelics on the brain that have also been associated with explanatory claims about consciousness. We conclude by calling for epistemic humility regarding the potential for psychedelic research to aid in explaining the hard problem of consciousness while pointing to ways in which psychedelics may advance the study of many specific aspects of consciousness.
On the Varieties of Conscious Experiences: Altered Beliefs Under Psychedelics (ALBUS)
PsyArXiv (preprint), 2020
How is it that psychedelics so profoundly impact brain and mind? According to the highly influential model of "Relaxed Beliefs Under Psychedelics" (REBUS) (Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2019), wherein 5-HT2a agonism is thought to help relax prior expectations, so making room for new perspectives and patterns. This model is contextualized within the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference framework, as well as the associated neuronal processes theory of hierarchical predictive processing. More specifically, excessive excitation of deep pyramidal neurons is thought to cause paradoxical desynchronization, so "flattening" (Bayesian) "belief landscapes" by attenuating large-scale complexes of synchronous neural activity, particularly at alpha frequencies. Here, we introduce an alternative (but largely compatible) perspective, in that while such effects may be both real and important, these alterations may primarily correspond to a rare (but potentially pivotal) regime of very high levels of serotonin 2a receptor (5-HT2aR) agonism. We suggest an opposite effect may occur along much of the dose-response curve of 5-HT2aR stimulation, in which synchronous neural activity becomes more powerful, with accompanying "Strengthened Beliefs Under Psychedelics" (SEBUS) effects. We believe that REBUS effects are indeed crucially important aspects of psychedelic experiences, but suggest these exist alongside SEBUS effects in various combinations. As such, we propose a larger integrative perspective for understanding "Altered Beliefs Under Psychedelics” (ALBUS). The ALBUS framework provides a rich account of cognition based on predictive processing, which we believe provides a means of fruitfully integrating across theories of psychedelic action ranging from REBUS, to “thalamic gating” (Preller et al., 2019), to the newly suggested “cortico-striatal thalamo-cortical” model (Doss et al., 2021). Towards this end we demonstrate the utility of ALBUS by providing neurophenomenological models of psychedelics focusing on mechanisms of conscious perceptual synthesis, as well as hippocampally-orchestrated episodic memory and mental simulation. We further discuss cognitive diversity (including psychopathology) through the lens of these models. We consider the potential significances of modifications of the default mode network and alpha rhythms for creativity and various states of consciousness, including with respect to fundamental alterations in sense of self through ego dissolution. Finally, we survey a broad range of psychedelic phenomena and consider potential explanations, implications, and directions for future work.
How to define consciousness – and how not to define consciousness (2009)
Routledge eBooks, 2016
Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical commitments (about the nature of consciousness, mind and world) have intruded into definitions. Similar problems can arise in the way a "conscious process" is defined, potentially obscuring the way that conscious phenomenology actually relates to its neural correlates and antecedent causes in the brain, body and external world. Once a definition of "consciousness" is firmly grounded in its phenomenology, investigations of its ontology and its relationships to entities, events and processes that are not conscious can begin, and this may in time transmute the meaning (or sense) of the term. As our scientific understanding of these relationships deepen, our understanding of what consciousness is will also deepen. A similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs with basic terms in physics such as "energy", and "time." 1 I have given a detailed critique of this aspect of Dennett's position that I do not have space to repeat here (see Velmans, , 2009 chapter 5) chapter 5); see also Zahavi (2007), Beenfeldt (2008). 2 See Gallagher, 2007, Zahavi, 2007 for recent reviews of European phenomenological approaches. Note however that classical Indian conclusions about the nature of consciousness arise largely from altered conscious states consequent on prolonged periods of meditation, and this can be an additional source of confusion when comparing Eastern and Western understanding of everyday conscious phenomenology. The pure, contentless consciousness said to be experienced in such states is, in various writings, thought to underly all of Nature, which makes this a claim about what in the West is sometimes referred to as "the ground of being" or, in Kantian terms, "the thing in itself," rather than a claim about the forms of "phenomenal consciousness," that are more usually investigated in modern consciousness studies.
Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Consciousness
Anthropology of Consciousness, 1994
Consciousness refers to a range of phenomena at the crux of life, awareness, perception, interactional and organizational capabilities, knowledge and the unique representational capacities of humans. This paper reviews the definitional meanings, etymological roots, scientific uses, and interspecies and cross-cultural manifestations of consciousness to elucidate the domains encompassed by the term. The definitions, linguistic roots, and uses of the word consciousness delineate a range of phenomena which illustrate that it is a general concept encompassing a wide range of organismic capabilities derived from physical, personal, social and mental awarenesses. Psychological, philosophical and cognitive science uses and meanings expand the semantic domain of consciousness and further delineate humans' unique cognitive capabilities. The focus on uniquely human traits in defining the conditions of consciousness limits their ability to encompass the broader domain of the phenomena and experiences denoted by consciousness. The exclusive claims to defining consciousness made by these rationalistic traditions are untenable, since their concerns reflect only a partial range of the phenomena of consciousness. The concept of the unconscious is briefly reviewed to illustrate the multifaceted and non-rational aspects of human consciousness. Studies of ape cognition also illustrate nonlinguistic aspects of consciousness, including some which apes alone among the animals share with humans. Crosscultural studies of altered states of consciousness further delineate the range of experiences which represent the phenomena of consciousness. Eastern and Asian mystical, philosophical and contemplative traditions illustrate a wide range of manifestations, states and levels of consciousness, extending the traditional Western and scientific conceptualizations and phenomenological data of consciousness. These analytical systems describe a spectrum and range of experiences and capabilities which illustrate many manifestations of human consciousness from the primary structural (neurophenomenological) features to the more developed, complex and refined states and experiences.
Consciousness: A four-fold Taxonomy
This paper argues that the many and various conceptions of consciousness propounded by cognitive scientists can all be understood as constituted with reference to four fundamental sorts of criterion: epistemic (concerned with kinds of consciousness), semantic (dealing with orders of consciousness), physiological (reflecting states of consciousness), and pragmatic (seeking to capture types of consciousness). The resulting four-fold taxonomy, intended to be exhaustive, implies that all of the distinct varieties of consciousness currently encountered in cognitive neuroscience, the philosophy of mind, clinical psychology, and other related fields ultimately refer to a single natural phenomenon, analysed under four general aspects. The proposed taxonomy will, it is hoped, possess sufficient clarity to serve as a sound theoretical framework for further scientific studies, and to count as a significant step in the direction of a properly formulated unified concept of consciousness.
Academic psychology, both in research and theory, focuses mainly on rational consciousness. If it speaks about other forms of consciousness, these are foremost conceived of – and hence marginalized – as 'altered states of consciousness.' The term 'altered states of consciousness' consistently reproduces: 1. the positing of rational consciousness as a primal given; 2. the fixation on a (consciousness)process as a state; 3. the mistake to characterize something which is defined by constant alteration as 'altered;' 4. a dichotomization of 'normal' and 'altered', which conceals the ongoing reproduction of rational consciousness; and 5. the suggestion that non-rational consciousness is epistemically inferior, if not deviant. This paper aims to circumvent these problems by focusing on central aspects of autopoietic systems theory and, in particular, on the fundamental term liminality, which are then combined to a new theory of non-rational consciousness. In this paper, the term 'liminal consciousness' will be used to refer to forms of psychic systems that are less defined by points of reference but instead rather converge to the limit of (temporary) omission of its autopoiesis. 'Liminal consciousness' is not conceived as one side of a dichotomous category (with 'rational consciousness' as its counterpart), but rather as a continuously increasing omission of the reproduction of self-referential structures. Three basic possibilities which can evoke liminal consciousness are identified: focussing on self-referentiality, focussing on hetero-referentiality, or a short-circuit of concentration by focusing on the occurrence of thoughts. Within this framework, many forms of consciousness, e.g. those 'invited' by ecstatic or meditative practice, can be conceptualized without relying on religious, reductionist or mystical discourses. Finally, instead of 'altered states of consciousness', the term 'liminal consciousness' is suggested in order to improve the connectivity of communication within the scientific system.
States of Consciousness and State-Specific Sciences
The extension of scientific method to the essential phenomena of altered states of consciousness is proposed. Our culturally molded state of consciousness, "normal" consciousness is one of several possible states, each of which has good and bad points. Here it is proposed that essential science - observation, theorizing, prediction and open sharing of all steps - be carried out in a variety of states for wider perspectives.