From Rules to Meanings: New Essays on Inferentialism (Routledge 2018 - Front Page + Contents) (original) (raw)
Related papers
Inferentialism and the Sceptical Solution to the Rule-Following Problems
The starting point for this paper is the acceptance of Kripke’s sceptic’s case for scepticism about semantic notions: ‘There can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word.’ (Kripke 1982: 55). The thesis is restated, shown to be logically coherent, and taken as an invitation to provide an explanation of linguistic phenomena that does not make use of semantic relationships. The criteria of adequacy for such an account are that it provide some insight into the phenomena that the notions of meaning and reference were traditionally evoked to explain, for instance the phenomenon of communication and certain correlations between the linguistic and non-linguistic environments. It is claimed that the alternative picture of linguistic phenomena presented by Kripke’s sceptic can fruitfully be seen as a variety of inferential role account, but as an inferential role alternative to an account of meaning, not an alternative account of meaning, for inferential role accounts of meaning just as surely fall pray to the sceptical argument as truth-conditional rivals. Finally, certain objections to the coherence of semantic scepticism are considered and shown not to apply to the form scepticism takes here.
Inferentialism without Normativity
ABSTRACT In this paper we argue that inferentialist approach to meaning does not, by itself, show that meaning is normative in a prescriptive sense, and that the constitutive rules argument is especially troubling for this position. To show that, we present the proto-inferentialist theory developed by Ajdukiewicz and claim that despite the differences between his theory and contemporary inferentialism rules of language in both theories function more like classificatory devices than prescriptions. Inferentialists can respond by claiming that in their theory meaning is essentially social and hence normative, but we claim that then semantic normativity becomes derivative of social normativity. KEYWORDS: Ajdukiewicz; Brandom; inferentialism; normativity of meaning.
Inferentialism on Meaning, Content, and Context
In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, I show how the distinction between the inferential potential and the inferential significance fits the standard distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance. Second, I show how the distinction could be used to explain ambiguity and free pragmatic enrichment from the perspective of normative inferentialism. The aim of this paper is to establish theoretical foundations that enable normative inferentialism to enter the discussions within the literalism-contextualism debate. As I argue, the biggest advantage of inferentialism is that it provides one general framework for the representation of meaning/content that naturally incorporates contextual information and so it can be used to represent meanings of various types of context-dependent sentences.
Inferentialism and its mathematical precursor (conference paper: Why Rules Matter?, Prague 2016)
Like every particular -ism that has become sufficiently established, Brandom’s inferentialism is difficult to circumscribe by mere verbal definition. This is because, besides the list of its essential features, it depends on a rather contingent and often heterogeneous list of particular philosophical problems, the philosophers who addressed them, and the types of solutions they offered. As for such a delimitation, Peregrin’s book Inferentialism, in its first part, combines both these approaches – i.e. an intensional and extensional one – and adjusts them, in the second part, by some technical results concerning the inferential foundations of logic. Throughout the book, many historical references are made tracing the origins of the inferentialist doctrine to the doctrines of the (relatively recent) past such as Carnap’s logical syntax or Lorenzen’s dialogical semantics, all of them in some way connected to the development of modern logic and the analytical movement in philosophy. In my contribution, I would like to deepen these historical remarks by pointing out that, within this tradition, there is an evident precedent to inferentialism: namely, so-called axiomatism, particularly in the form advocated by Hilbert. Per se, this will probably come as no surprise to anybody and might rather be seen as a contingent fact; however, as I will claim, this is not the case if you take into account the role that axiomatism has played in the development of mathematics. In this case, its kinship with Brandom’s inferentialism turns out to be rather substantial, and it will hopefully win the sympathetic eye of those who find inferentialism to be something that is hard-to-swallow while at the same time taking the idea of axiomatization as being a rather natural and unproblematic one.
Inferential Acts and Inferential Rules. The Intrinsic Normativity of Logic
Analyse & Kritik, 2016
We outline a pragmatic-normative understanding of logic as a discipline that is completely anchored in the sphere of action, rules, means and ends: We characterize inferring as a speech act which is in need of regulation and we connect inferential rules with consequence relations. Furthermore, we present a scenario which illustrates how one actually assesses or can in principle assess the quality of logical rules with respect to justificatory questions. Finally, we speculate on the origin of logical rules as a means of supporting our practice of inferring.
How can the inferentialist make room for the distinction between factual and linguistic correctness
Inquiry, 2023
Brandom (Citation1994) made inferentialism an intensely debated idea in the philosophy of language in the last three decades. Inferentialism is a view that associates the meaning of linguistic expression with the role said expression plays in inferences. It seems rather uncontroversial that the correct theory of meaning should distinguish between linguistic correctness and factual correctness. For instance, speaker S can be wrong in saying ‘I have arthritis’ in two distinct ways: (i) S fails to apply a word correctly to make a true statement due to having made a factual error, and (ii) S uses an expression incorrectly because they are wrong about its meaning. In this paper, I show that properly understood normative inferentialism can make room for such a distinction. I propose that linguistic correctness is a structural issue: linguistic mistakes stem from the improper or insufficient acquisition of an inferential role. Factual correctness, on the other hand, is a one-off issue of the correct application of inferential rules to a particular situation. I argue that, by tying the issue of correctness to the game of giving and asking for reasons, inferentialism can establish a reliable method for distinguishing between two types of correctness (and mistakes).
Blackwell Companion for the Philosophy of Language (Second Edition), 2015
This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits of logical inferentialism, chiefly with regards to the epistemology of logic, and consider a number of objections. §3 introduces and critically examines the most influential and most fully developed form of global inferentialism: Robert Brandom’s inferentialism about linguistic and conceptual content in general. Finally, in §4 we consider a number of general objections to IRS and consider possible responses on the inferentialist’s behalf.
A major characteristic of the linguistic theories of the twentieth century, which stemmed from logical empiricism, is that the notion of reference was placed at the core of semantics. As a result, the meaning of a noun was associated with the object or the entity to which it referred, and the meaning of a statement was correlated with the state of affairs or the possible world it was meant to designate. This representational conception, which corresponds to the definition of semantics proposed by Charles Morris in 1938 (semantics studies " the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable "), became, however, the target of a number of criticisms at the end of the last century. Linguists objected that it only reduces language to a world that does not correspond to the semantic interpretation performed by the speakers. In his book Making It Explicit (1994), Robert Brandom argued that this representational conception had to be replaced by one that restores the value of the notion of inference. But, for the semantic explanation, by proposing such a reversal of perspective in prioritizing the concepts of " reference " and " inference " , the respective role and scope of investigation of semantics and pragmatics were deeply modified. The aim of this paper is thence to retrace the evolution of the connections between semantics and pragmatics by comparing some representational and inferential approaches. First, we will analyse the referential conception of meaning and we will show how a semantics based on a theory of models can be open to what Wilfrid Sellars (1956) and Willard Quine (1969) have respectively called the " myths of the Given and of the Museum ". Then we will examine the inferential approach to meaning by underlining the various theoretical changes in orientation it induces (primacy of the proposition over subsentential expressions, holistic conception, ...). Finally, this analysis will lead to highlighting some consequences of the modification of the role of semantics and pragmatics. More specifically, we will stress the fact that certain parameters, which in a referential conception belonged to pragmatics, now belong to semantics, while from an inferential perspective, the taking into account of the referential dimension of languages is understood as a social practice which is part of pragmatics.