The Mind-Body Problem (original) (raw)

How do our mental states relate to the physical states of our body? Do our mental states arise from the physical processes of our body? Is it really the case that some of our actions are caused by our mental states such as our intentions and desires? Is there a significant difference between a physical state causing another physical state say the cutting of our skin causing the bleeding of our skin, and a mental state causing a physical state say desiring to raise our arm causing the rising of our arm? If we believe that there are such things as mental states that are over and above the physical states of our body then it is important to know how they relate to the physical states of our body. The investigation of the various philosophical issues connected to the relation between mind and body, or between our mental states (and processes) and bodily states (and processes), is the primary concern of what has been called in philosophy as the mind-body problem. The mind-body problem, as can be gleaned from the discussions of philosophers on this problem, has the following two types. The first concerns the ontological (or existential) relation between mind and body, where the inquiry focuses on how the existence of the mental states relates to the existence of bodily states-or the physical states of the body. I shall call this type of mind-body problem as the ontological mind-body problem. The second one, on the other hand, concerns the causal relation between mental states and bodily states, where the inquiry focuses on whether there is a causal relation between these two types of states, and if there is, on what type of causal relation is at work therein. I shall call this type of mind-body problem as the causal mind-body problem. In this essay, I examine the various solutions proposed by philosophers to the mind-body problem both in its ontological and causal form.

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