A Cooperative Approach between Intelligence and Policymakers at the National Level: Does it Have a Chance (original) (raw)

The Challenging Relationship between Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers

The present article investigates the reasons why tensions and dysfunctions appear in the relationship between analysts and policymakers, the misunderstandings that cause intelligence reports to be either inadequate or discarded, the nature of the analysts and policymakers’ individual and respective jobs and the possible sources of incongruence. The aim of the article is to provide a better understanding of what each community could do to fluidise the process of analysis and decision-making, what responsibilities policymakers should assume and what characteristics intelligence reports should exhibit to be more useful and timely.

Intelligence and decision-making within the Common Foreign and Security Policy

In 2005, the European Union’s (EU) coordinator of counterterrorism policies quipped that: ‘You can’t get closer to the heart of national sovereignty than national security and intelligence services. Yet in Brussels we have these analysts working together for the first time’.1 Despite the inherent sensitivities that exist within the field, the EU has considerably increased its resources for intelligence sharing and analysis in the decade that followed this comment. Yet, this cooperation has largely gone unnoticed – within academia as well as in the public domain. This report analyses the organisation and process of European intelligence cooperation and the effect that this cooperation is having on European foreign policy. In the policy recommendations, it is argued that the EU intelligence system – following phases of boosting efficiency and legitimacy – should now be developed with an eye on the interaction between producers and consumers of intelligence.

Intelligence and Foreign Policy: A Review Essay

International Security, 1986

General Eisenhower pointed out that the U.S. Army treated intelligence as a "stepchild."1 This characterization applied to most countries, at least until the development of surveillance satellites and other technological marvels. Within the military, intelligence has been the "slow track"; aside from a few mavericks, officers were generally shunted into the area when they were deemed unfit for more important tasks. This is not surprising: the job of the military is to fight, and so positions that directly represent this function will have the greatest prestige. Foreign ministries, of course, carry out diplomacy, and so one might think that they would value intelligence more highly because of its closer links to this mission. But most diplomats have prided themselves on being generalists and have tended to believe, often correctly, that they can understand other countries better than can specialized intelligence officers. Furthermore, intelligence operators are often an unruly bunch, and intelligence operations, if discovered, create frictions between governments which complicate the lives of diplomats, as the recent "Pollard affair" has done between the United States and Israel. Top decision-makers are more likely to value intelligence. In World War II, Churchill referred to code breakers as his hens because they brought him golden eggs. But he, like most leaders, cared more about raw information than about the interpretation and analysis.

Intelligence in the National Security Enterprise: An Introduction: By Roger Z. George

Journal of APF Command and Staff College

Intelligence is one of the major aspects of national security decision-making. The last 50 years witnessed a significant growth of intelligence agencies. The United States of America has the largest and most complex intelligence system in the world. At present, the US intelligence system employs more than one hundred thousand people in sixteen intelligence agencies and spends more than USD 70 billion annually. The rumors and failures in its activities, i.e. illegal domestic spying, controversial covert action, a shock of terrorist attack, a faulty prediction of weapons of mass destruction dragged the US intelligence mission in controversy in the homeland and overseas. The underlying questions, i.e. why intelligence fails? Who is responsible for intelligence failure and its consequences? What is the relationship between the Intelligence Community and policy decision makers? are matters for strategic intervention are serious concerns and interests for strategic, political and academic communities across the world. In this background, the book 'Intelligence in the National Security Enterprise: An Introduction' by Roger Z. George, a former CIA analyst, and professor of intelligence and national security offers a descriptive and analytical view towards the critical role of the US intelligence community within the wider national security decision-making and political process. The book provides a clear explanation of the expanding US national security enterprise (NSE), in which intelligence operates and distinguishes among a range of intelligence functions that contribute to the National Security Enterprise. Moreover, the book enables an in-depth analysis of how intelligence serves the policymakers. With a brief description of what intelligence is and what intelligence agencies do, a three hundred forty-four-page book is divided into eleven chapters and each chapter begins with relevant quotes on intelligence that captures readers to continue concentration throughout the contents of the specific chapter. The first chapter 'how to use the book' explains the overall outline of the book. It is dedicated to the scope of intelligence in the United States and across the world. The beginning quote 'keep giving me things that make me think' by Henry Kissinger to Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, awakens readers to critically contemplate on what information is required for a strategic thinker (Page, 1). Kissinger's

Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2011

In all democratic systems, intelligence reform is a ''Gordian knot'' that incessantly tests decisionmakers. The onus is on them to develop and maintain intelligence systems that protect democracy and are democratically accountable, while, at the same time, engage in secret