Mechanistic Causation and Constraints: Perspectival Parts and Powers, Non-Perspectival Modal Patterns (original) (raw)
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Talk of levels is ubiquitous in philosophy, especially in the context of mechanistic explanations spanning multiple levels. The mechanistic conception of levels, however, does not allow for the kind of integration needed to construct such multi-level mechanistic explanations integrating observations from different scientific domains. To address the issues arising in this context, I build on a certain perspectival aspect inherent in the mechanistic view. Rather than focusing on compositionally related levels of mechanisms, I suggest analyzing the situation in terms of epistemic perspectives researchers take when making scientific observations. Characterizing epistemic perspectives along five dimensions allows for a systematic analysis of the relations the scientific observations made from these different epistemic perspectives. This, in turn, provides a solid foundation for integrating the mechanistic explanations that are based on the scientific observations in question.