‘Skepticism’, in M. Gagarin (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece and Rome, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. (original) (raw)
Related papers
Ancient Greek Skepticism, 2019
https://www.iep.utm.edu/skepanci/ A Priori and A Posteriori Ancient Greek Skepticism Art and Epistemology Belief, Aim of Benedict de Spinoza: Epistemology Brain in a Vat Argument, The Cicero: Academic Skepticism Coherentism in Epistemology Confirmation and Induction Consequentialism Epistemic Contemporary Skepticism Contextualism in Epistemology Defeaters in Epistemology Disagreement, Religious Doxastic Voluntarism Dummett, Michael Dynamic Epistemic Logic Epistemic Circularity Epistemic Closure Principles Epistemic Entitlement Epistemic Luck Epistemology Epistemology and Relativism Epistemology of Perception, The Epistemology of Testimony Epistemology, Infinitism in Ethnoepistemology Evidence Evidentialism Evil Demon Problem, The New Evolutionary Epistemology Fallibilism Feminist Epistemology Foreknowledge and Free Will Foundationalism Gettier Problems Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology Justification, Epistemic KK Principle (Knowing that One Knows) Knowledge Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description Knowledge Norms Language, Knowledge of Memory, Epistemology of Metaepistemology Middle Knowledge Moral Epistemology Naturalistic Epistemology Objectivity Omniscience and Divine Foreknowledge
Oxford Bibliographies Online, 2011
The skeptical tradition originated in the Hellenistic period of ancient philosophy. After mostly lying dormant through much of the medieval era, it was revived and—to some extent—transformed in early modern philosophy. Determining to what extent there is a single view shared across the different periods is complicated by the fact that at least some of the main figures in the tradition said quite explicitly that they did not have any view at all. But if there are no theoretical commitments binding all of the different skeptics together, then what allows us to say that there is in fact a single tradition? There are at least two relevant considerations. The first is that the later figures in the tradition make use of many of the arguments originally formulated by the ancient skeptics—and, indeed, given their centrality to epistemology, those arguments are likely to be an enduring legacy of the skeptical tradition. The second consideration is that many of the later skeptics—Hume is a good example—arrived at their philosophical outlook through profound reflection on the earlier figures in the tradition. It is a matter of controversy whether key aspects of ancient skepticism have been retained or lost—for example, some scholars of ancient philosophy have argued that modern skepticism is in certain ways a watered down version of its ancient predecessor, given that the ancient skeptics focused on what we ought to believe and the modern skeptics focus, supposedly, only on whether we have knowledge. But, whether or not this is true, it has become increasingly clear that there is much to be learned about skepticism through study of the tradition as a whole. Given that so much of philosophy has been shaped by both skepticism and anti-skeptical responses to it, the importance of the history of skepticism cannot be overstated.
Is Ancient Scepticism Practically Coherent?
This essay presents some of the key facts of ancient scepticism and what is more important, it tries to respond to the question whether ancient scepticism is practically coherent. It gives a brief description on the historical and philosophical context on that time, what was before that, who are the main leaders of ancient scepticism and what every philosopher intended to say. On that time, there were two big school of scepticism: Academic and Pyrrhonian. The paper also discusses the main differences between them and how each one replies to the Apraxia Charge (whether sceptics can act if they do not hold any belief) and other objections.
Review of R. Bett, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism
Philosophy in Review , 2010
Ancient scepticism' is a term that standardly encompasses two philosophical traditions stretching from the third century BCE to approximately the second century CE: Pyrrhonism, named after its eponymous founder Pyrrho of Elis (360-270 BCE), and Academic scepticism, a sceptical movement which arose in the Platonic Academy around 268 BCE, when Arcesilaus of Pitane (316/5-241/0) became its head. The positions and arguments of these two traditions were widely discussed and criticized in antiquity, and historians of philosophy sometimes argue that it was the rediscovery of ancient scepticism in the sixteenth century that shaped the course of modern philosophy. Some of their argumentative strategies still occupy an important place in contemporary debates in epistemology (a typical example are the Agrippan modes). This volume is designed to provide a comprehensive view on the main protagonists, the central issues of contention in recent scholarship, and the transformation of sceptical traditions beyond antiquity.
THE ANCIENT SCEPTIC ATTITUDE AND DISAGREEMENT
KRITERION (Revista de Filosofia. Publicación de: Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da UFMG), 2023
It is argued that a philosophical “sceptic attitude”, found originally in the Socratic approach and arguably in the Pyrrhonist’s treatment of disagreement, should be taken to be an epistemically positive attitude in the sense that it fosters a serious philosophical examination of what is taken to be true, without entailing the radical scepticism often associated with it. We argue that if the two sides of a disagreement are equivalent (at that moment, given the evidence available), it doesn’t require one to consider the disagreement as undecidable without qualification and so to suspend judgment indefinitely. If this is so, we claim, the Pyrrhonian disagreement-based position will be significantly restricted as a form of scepticism and should instead be seen as promoting an epistemically propitious sceptic attitude.