Luminous Mind: Self-Luminosity versus Other- Luminosity in Indian Philosophy of Mind (original) (raw)
Related papers
Luminosity in the stream of consciousness
Synthese, 2018
Williamson’s (2000, Chapter 4) “anti-luminosity” argument aims to establish that there are no significant luminous conditions. “Far from forming a cognitive home”, luminous conditions are mere “curiosities” (2000, p. 109). Even supposing Williamson’s argument succeeds in showing that there are no significant luminous states his conclusion has not thereby been established. When it comes to determining what is luminous, mental events and processes are among the best candidates. It is events and processes, after all, which constitute the stream of consciousness. Judgment, for instance, is plausibly self-conscious. If I am judging then plausibly I must know that I am. Similarly, deliberation is plausibly self-conscious. To be deliberating about some matter I plausibly must know that I am. That one is judging and that one is deliberating are thus plausibly luminous conditions. Furthermore, I argue, Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument fails to speak against this suggestion. This reveals that Williamson’s argument is more limited in scope than has been thought—something likely missed due to a misplaced focus on mental states in the luminosity debate as well as in epistemology and the philosophy of mind more generally. For all Williamson shows, there may be luminous events and processes of a sort apt to constitute a cognitive home. I conclude by considering how the anti-luminosity argument might be reinstated in the judgment case and argue that the natural way to do so fails.
A familiar account of the debate between Buddhists and the brahmanical schools over the nature and existence of the self: the brahmanical schools accept the existence of the tman (the substantial self), while the Buddhists reject the tman, adopting a reductionist or irrealist account of persons. Thus while the Buddhists are similar to Hume, Locke, and Parfit, the tmavadins are, though diverse, basically Cartesian in their approach to the self. Yet, as a number of scholars have pointed out, this view of the debates on the nature of the self is far too simplistic. Indeed, as Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (2011) argues, there are (at least) two distinct debates going on. The first debate concerns the nature of the empirical person (pudgala) and the ego-sense (ahakra), whether the person (or ego) is constructed or ontologically fundamental, as well as questions of synchronic and diachronic personal identity. The second debate concerns the existence and nature of an 'impersonal subjectivity' which may constitute the (formal) ground of empirical personhood. In this debate questions such as the reflexivity, unity, and continuity of consciousness are emphasised. My concern here is with second type of debate over the nature of consciousness and its relation to tman. In particular, I want to examine the similarities and differences between the Advaitin notion of tman as pure consciousness, or sheer reflexive subjectivity and the Buddhist notion – found in some Yogcra, Yogcra-Madhyamaka, and tathgatagarbha texts and well developed in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition – that the deep nature of consciousness is non-dual reflexive awareness. Both traditions, I will argue, recognise the empirical and the transcendental aspects of consciousness, and both link the inherent reflexivity or luminosity of consciousness to its transcendental aspect. So, have the Buddhists smuggled in the tman through the back door? Or have the Advaitins so separated the tman (as pure consciousness) from the first-person perspective of the individual self that they have become proponents of no-self in all but name? To try to get a better grip on the distinction between these two views, I will discuss akara's critique of Buddhist theories of mind, paying special attention to his argument that recognition (pratyabhijñ) requires a robust notion of the diachronic unity of consciousness. Finally, drawing on ntarakita's account of luminous consciousness and Husserl's discussion of the complex temporality of consciousness, I will argue that a Buddhist view, properly modified, has the resources to respond to the Advaita critique. The view of consciousness as ever-present self-luminous awareness does not require a commitment to even the Advaitin's attenuated notion of tman.
Meirinhos, J. – Rodrigues, V. – Guerreiro, V. (eds.), A Filosofia em discussão, 3 volumes, (col. Ta pragmata), Praxis, Covilhã, 2022
This paper examines two interesting and seemingly trivial claims about phenomenal consciousness, about the relation between a conscious state (pain) and its phenomenology, the way in which the state is felt (the feel of pain). Here are the claims: (1) Pains are necessarily felt as pains; (2) Feelings of pain are necessarily pains. Claims (1) and (2), or something along the same lines, seem to be endorsed by Saul Kripke and David Chalmers and play a crucial role in the modal arguments they put forward against type physicalism, the view that every type of mental state is strictly identical to some type of state of the brain or central nervous system. Despite their looking like conceptual truths, both claims are arguably problematic. We distinguish two readings for each claim, which are labelled the epistemic reading and the metaphysical reading. We then argue as follows. If assigned the epistemic reading, claims (1) and (2) are problematic to the extent that they entail the ar- guably false view that phenomenal states are luminous (in Timothy Williamson’s sense). On the other hand, if assigned the trivial readings, claims (1) and (2) are problematic to the extent that they seem to clash with empirical evidence from neuroscience. Keywords: Pain; physicalism; modal arguments; consciousness; lumi- nosity; phenomenology
Luminosity in Late Indian Yogācāra: Is Reflexive Awareness Nondual? (presented at IABS 2014)
In his Pith Instructions for the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitopadeśa), Ratnākaraśānti—also known as the Mahāsiddha Śāntipa—explicitly links the four yogas of Yogācāra with the four stages of meditation described in the commentarial literature for the Guhyasamāja Tantra. While his presentation of the four yogas in the Pith Instructions for the Ornament of the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa) does not make any direct reference to tantra, it closely follows the same pattern laid out in the former text. Crucial to his account of these stages is the notion of “luminosity” (prakāśa), an epithet or synonym for reflexive awareness (svasaṃvitti). Thus, for Ratnākaraśānti, reflexive awareness has two overlapping valences. First, it is an essential element of Buddhist pramāṇa theory; and second, it is a key facet of meditation—including tantric forms of meditation—on the nature of reality (tathātā). A question thus emerges in relation to recent engagement with the concept of reflexive awareness among Western-educated scholars of Buddhism, namely: in light of this relationship between pramāṇa epistemology and meditation, to what extent is an understanding of reflexive awareness as intentional, i.e. as structured by subject-object duality, intelligible? Whether or not one follows Williams (1998) and Arnold (2005) in maintaining that reflexive awareness is analogous to the Kantian unity of apperception, and therefore necessarily entails the existence of a transcendental subject, the dominant trends of contemporary interpretation generally cast reflexive awareness as an intentional or object-oriented feature of consciousness. Thus, as Coseru (2012, 264) writes, “Even assuming that Dignāga has in mind a nonobjectifying or intransitive type of experience when he describes [reflexive] awareness… it is still the case that this is an intentional experience… Even assuming, on metaphysical rather than phenomenological grounds, that there could be non-intentional modes of awareness, these could not serve as the basis for intentional experience.” However, as my paper will demonstrate, while such a view may be in accord with the insights of the Western phenomenological tradition, it is simply irreconcilable with the Buddhist understanding of the nature of the mind, at least as promulgated in Indian Buddhist pramāṇa theory and developed by the scholar-yogis of Vikramaśīla such as Ratnākaraśānti. Simply put, according to Śāntipa, not only can non-intentional modes of awareness (specifically, reflexive awareness) serve as the basis for intentional experience—they do form the basis of intentional experience. Moreover, it is precisely this non-intentional basis that forms the bridge between sūtra and tantra, since recognizing the nondual, luminous nature of experience ends up being the ultimate form of meditation on the nature of reality. As Ratnākaraśānti writes, “The experience of the luminous nature of all phenomena, empty of duality, is the authentic realization of the ultimate” (chos thams cad kyi gsal ba’i lus gnyis kyis stong pa myong ba gang yin pa de nyid don dam pa yang dag par rtogs pa yin). Dualistic or intentional interpretations of reflexive awareness therefore additionally fail to account for the key role svasaṃvitti plays in mediating between sūtric philosophy and tantric meditation.
Shadows of consciousness: the problem of phenomenal properties
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2014
The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a "reference to I" with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content of experience and from this the ground of the distinction between phenomenal and representational properties is identified.
On Consciousness and Beyond | An interdisciplinary Approach to Consciousness and Intentionality
For the last few decades, consciousness has been in the forefront of neuroscience as well as in the forefront of religious doctrines for further investigation. Indeed it is a vast subject, thus more specifically, what I will investigate and convey in this essay is the interdisciplinary correlatives between the scientific perspectives and that of Buddhist teachings. In regards to science, I will include neuroscientific perspectives without this constricting this essay to include other point of views that originate in different disciplines but nevertheless integrate well with science, such as psychological and philosophical perspectives. In regards to the Buddhist doctrine I will refer to fundamental principles of emptiness (Suññata) and dependent co-arising (paticcasamuppāda) to exemplify notions of experience related to consciousness. Passing through these contradictory disciplines in the past but cooperative at present, and taking in account important philosophies of science and Buddhism to explore “consciousness” in its broad and complex view, I will offer a perspective on what can be reasoned as ‘essence consciousness’ and 'Information Data'.
Transmission:The Journal of The Awareness Field,Vol 8 ,published April 11,2017, 2017
The phenomenology of the unfolding elaboration of our capacity to know Being directly and as well as our experience to know Being through beings is the focus of this paper. I will focus on the phenomenological elaboration of our knowing of mind; the phenomenological knowing of direct awareness and the consequent simultaneous intertwining of knowing through mind and through awareness. This union of our mind and our awareness allows the knowing of Being through beings and knowing the indivisibleness of beings and Being. As the Dakini said to Dudjom Lingpa " You and I are indivisible. " Our paper begins with a phenomenological elaboration of the Two Ways of Knowing. This is a necessary and a most useful distinction for our knowing of both beings and Being simultaneously. The Two Ways of Knowing: Mind Knowing Form and Awareness Knowing Being Mind Knows Form! Our mind knows forms, and things, both subtle and gross. Our mind knows beings and things. Our mind knows subject and our mind knows otherness. Our mind knows dualities .Our mind knows me and you, us and them and this and that. Mind knows time. Our mind knows the sense of the past, the sense of present and a sense of the future. The mind knows entities. Our mind knows difference. Our mind thinks conceptually, feels affectively, imagines through images, the mind senses sensation and the mind has memory. The mind always knows dualistically. Our mind thinks and knows through thoughts, our mind feels and knows through feelings, our mind has sensations, knows through sensation and our mind has fantasy and knows through imagination. The knowledge of our mind is mediated through conceptualization and representational thinking. Our mind can even know the mind of others. However, our mind cannot know Being and our mind cannot know the Being-ness of beings. Our mind cannot experience Being. Our mind cannot know Being directly. Awareness Knows Being! Our awareness directly knows Being and our awareness can directly know the Being-ness of beings. Being itself is not a being and Being manifests beings, infinite numbers of beings. Being manifests Being within beings as their own being. Being itself is not an entity and Being is not a being. Being is not a thing. Being is non-duality. Being knows the non-duality of everything and anything. Being is oneness and pervasiveness. Being is openness, and Being self-manifests as radiant light. Being is compassionate creative resonance. Being manifests presence. Our awareness can know the indivisible presence of the Being-ness of beings within beings and between beings. Being manifests duality, although Being is completely non-dual. By becoming aware of awareness, we experience primordial awareness which is the ground of being, which is Being itself. Awareness is Being. Awareness is Being knowing Being. Being knows Being and is the Being-ness of all the beings. Awareness can be timeless as well as awareness can be in time. Awareness can be timelessness and in time simultaneously.