Dictators, Democrats, and Constitutional Dialogue: Myanmar's Constitutional Tribunal (original) (raw)
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The 2008 Constitution was introduced by the military to preempt a transition to constitutional democracy. 1 The military has controlled the political transition since 2011and from 1 February 2021 claimed to take power through constitutional state of emergency provisions, although their actions amounted to a coup. Myanmar (known as Burma prior to 1989) is home to a diverse group of peoples. The majority of the 51.4 million people are ethnic Burmans and Buddhist. 2 Historically, the country fought and lost three wars against the British and as a result, by 1885, becoming a province of British India. Burma was briefly ruled as a separate colony under the constitutional structure of the Government of Burma Act 1935. On independence in 1948, a new constitution drafted by elected representatives came into force. However, from the early years of independence, Burma experienced various insurgencies and ethnic armed rebellions. 3 A coup in 1962 installed a oneparty socialist system that was effectively dominated by the military. The façade of the socialist regime fell apart in 1988 and was replaced by direct military rule without a constitution. Demands for democracy, federalism and constitutional change persisted. In 1990, elections yielded a victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD)-the party led by Nobel Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi-but the military junta refused to cede power. Instead, in the 1990s, the military, known as the Tatmadaw, embarked on a process of negotiating ceasefire agreements with ethnic armed groups and facilitating a constitution-making process by establishing a National Convention. While some elected representatives from the 1990 election were permitted to participate in the National Convention, most participants were selected by the military. The core political and legal structure of the Constitution had already been predetermined prior to the National Convention and speeches were pre-scripted. In 1996, the National Convention broke down, with several NLD and ethnic representatives expelled from proceedings. It was not until 2003 that the National Convention was reconvened. The Constitution was ostensibly adopted based on a public referendum. In 2010, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) declared victory in fraudulent elections. In 2011, the USDP-led government officially took power under the 2008 Constitution. 1 Melissa Crouch (2020) 'Pre-emptive Constitution-making: Authoritarian Constitutionalism and the Military in Myanmar', 54(2) Law & Society Review 487-515. 2 The caveat to this census figure is that it excludes most of the Rohingya population of over 1.3 million people. 3 One broad account from the 1940s to 2000s is Ashley South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict (Routledge 2008).