Three Conceptions of the Logical Form of Exemplification (original) (raw)

My aim in this paper is to discuss the logical form of exemplification. In order to achieve this goal I analyze three views on the logical form of exemplification, namely logical realism, metalinguistic expressivism, and logical eliminativism. I start by examining the account advanced by Bergmann [1960], according to which the logical form of exemplification is represented by the juxtaposition of logical signs in a sentence. Then I consider two alternatives to Bergmann's realism, namely Sellars' metalinguistic expressivism [1962], according to which exemplification is a quasi-semantical relation that is accounted for at a meta-linguistic level; and Cumpa's molecular theory of exemplification [2014a] – which I will call logical eliminativism – according to which exemplification is an eliminable constituent of facts. I conclude that neither the account advanced by Sellars nor the one provided by Cumpa is preferable to Bergmann's account of the logical form of exemplification, while offering a defense of the latter.