2018 "Japanese and Chinese Infrastructure Development Strategies in Central Asia", Japanese Journal of Political Science (Cambridge University Press), 19:3, 1–20, (doi:10.1017/S1468109918000178) (original) (raw)
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Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2018
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2019
Ever since the so-called rise of China has started and particularly after Japan has lost a key Indonesian high-speed railway to China, Sino-Japanese relations have been increasingly posited on a geo-economic rivalry between both states. As a result, perspective on Chinese and Japanese infrastructure investment tends to place the state at the center of explanations and be guided more by what infrastructure projects are imagined to leverage, than what Southeast Asian countries have influenced. Taking issues from existing studies which have overly coalesced the discussion around geopolitical standpoint and norm-based approach, this study brings fresh framings of the political economy of Chinese and Japanese infrastructure regime in Southeast Asia. By using the case study of Indonesia, this study compares the pattern of agenda setting and political settlement that China and Japan have pursued to accommodate state transformation pertaining to the infrastructure development in Indonesia. ...
Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 2021
This paper analyses what consequences the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank's (aiib) formation brings to partnerships between the People's Republic of China and the post-Soviet states of Central Asiathe Republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Given that Beijing initiated this new multilateral bank's formation and controls its activity to a great extent, the aiib's concept and activity are examined in the context of China's global and regional objectives. According to this paper's conclusions, aiib has become a new tool for China to promote initiatives that serve its national interests. The post-Soviet Central Asian states have joined the bank and therefore accepted its principles. Using aiib for investment projects in Central Asia will bring China considerable benefits. Indeed, the bank's launch correlates with the first agreements on shifting part of China's industrial facilities to Central Asian countries. In any event, through aiib, Beijing is able to control the regional influence of its geopolitical rivals-Russia, the United States of America, Japan, India and the European Union, and of regional institutions they dominate in. Generally, aiib's formation shapes China's economic policy in Central Asia, making it more structural, active and unilateral, entirely serving Beijing's economic interests.
2019
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