The Moral Shadows of Shame and Contempt (original) (raw)

Shame and the Scope of Moral Responsibility

According to Peter Strawson’s reactive attitudes approach toward moral responsibility, reactive attitudes constitute the foundation of moral responsibility. The content of reactive attitudes determines the scope, i.e., its narrowness and broadness, of moral responsibility. When it comes to the question of which moral emotions are identified as reactive attitudes, it is well-accepted by Strawsonians that guilt is a reactive attitude, but many of them deny that shame is a reactive attitude even though shame and guilt are closely related. The main reason for denying shame as a reactive attitude is that they suppose that people are only morally responsible for things within their voluntary control, but people can feel ashamed of things that they have no voluntary control over. This paper argues that those who deny shame as a reactive attitude hold a narrow understanding of reactive attitudes and moral responsibility. The biggest issue underlying this narrow understanding of moral responsibility is that it commits to what Bernard Williams calls “the morality system” and its peculiar assumption, which distorts our ordinary understanding of moral responsibility. Based upon Strawson’s relatively less famous article “Social Morality and Individual Ideal”, this paper then develops an alternative account of reactive attitudes, i.e., reactive attitudes are emotional responses to the violation or fulfillment of social ethical expectations. This new definition of reactive attitudes covers shame as a reactive attitude and promotes a broader understanding of moral responsibility, which reflects our ordinary understanding of moral responsibility.

Shame, Love, and Morality (2022)

The Journal of Ethics, 2022

This article offers a new account of the moral substance of shame. Through careful reflection on the motives and intentional structure of shame, I defend the claim that shame is an egocentric and morally blind emotion. I argue that shame is rooted in our desire for social affirmation and constituted by our ability to sense how we appear to others. What makes shame egocentric is that in shame we are essentially concerned about our own social worth and pained by the perception of our self as socially worthless. In itself, shame entails no morally pertinent concern about others or understanding of what is morally significant. I contrast shame with the possibility of relating to others-and to oneself-with love and care. Indeed, I propose that love is essential for moral understanding and motivation. The argument of the article unfolds through critical appraisals of the main strategies for defending the moral value of shame. First, against the claim that shame entails respect for others, I argue that shame's sensitivity to the opinions of others is motivated by egocentric self-concern. Second, against the view that shame over failures to live up to moral values is morally valuable, I argue that regardless of whether the values guiding our shame are moral or not, the perspective of shame is oblivious to their moral meaning. Third, against the claim that shame is crucial for self-understanding, I argue that the desire for affirmation that drives shame is a powerful source of self-deception.

Shame and Philosophy: An Investigation in the Philosophy of Emotions and Ethics

"'Phil Hutchinson offers an incisive, insightful and deeply humane New Wittgensteinian critique of a number of influential accounts of the emotions, including shame. That too many philosophers have marginalized the 'person' in their accounts – that they have forgotten the place of the emotions in human lives and in the life-world – is the shame of philosophy.' - Katherine Morris, Oxford University 'A fine work: not only does it provide convincing answers to important questions, it also reveals the limitations - and cures some of the blindspots - of much contemporary research on emotions. The discussion of cognitivism is particularly subtle, while the perspicuous presentation of the lived experience of shame might help to resolve some crucial theoretical aporias about the nature and the significance of being a person.' - Anthony Hatzimoysis, The University of Manchester 'Hutchinson's book is a thoughtful, thorough and interesting work. He offers many striking reflections on emotion, language and, specifically, shame. In showing how different conceptions of emotions are based on problematic conceptions of language, he also goes much deeper than philosophers usually when they write about this subject.' - Ylva Gustafsson, Philosophical Investigations 'Shame and Philosophy is an engaging philosophical effort to explore reflection about emotion with its relevant connection to personhood. Phil Hutchinson offers a careful reflection that establishes a dialogue among current research both from the analytical and the continental traditions. This novel approach to philosophy of emotions provides, just like Hutchinson wants, a conceptual network for a better understanding of how emotions make up our world.' - Dina Mendonça, Metapsychology online Abstract In an important contribution to the burgeoning area of philosophy of emotions, Phil Hutchinson engages with philosophers of emotion in both the analytic and continental traditions. Shame and Philosophy advances a framework for understanding emotion: world-taking cognitivism. He argues that reductionist accounts of emotion leave us in a state of poverty regarding our understanding of our world and ourselves. The book contains detailed engagements with theorists of emotions such as Peter Goldie, Paul Griffiths, Jesse Prinz and Jenefer Robinson as well as a chapter on the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, which also contains a detailed critical engagement with Jacques Derrida's work. The Chapter on Griffiths' work also contains a detailed critique of the program of natural kind semantics. As the book progresses it becomes more and more concerned to meditate on shame as discussed by Primo Levi and other survivors of extreme trauma. The book moves towards conclusion by suggesting further directions for study."

Dirty Rotten Shame? The Value and Ethical Functions of Shame

Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 2016

Approaching the human condition of shame from an ethical point of view, this essay traces the problems involving the relationship between shame and guilt, and between shame and the social field. Drawing on a phenomenological approach to shame phenomena, the essay explores moral and philosophical theories of shame underpinning our humanistic and psychological appreciation of this most basic human experience, one that, as we suggest, has both positive and negative valences.

Bernard Williams and the concept of shame: What makes an emotion moral?

Labyrinth

The paper proposes a way to understand moral emotions in ethics building upon Bernard Williams' claim that feelings, emotions and sentiments are an integral part of rationality. Based upon Bernard Williams' analysis of shame we argue that the richness and thickness that it is attached to some emotions is the key to understand why some emotions have a distinct ethical resonance. The first part takes up Bernard Williams' philosophical assessment of the concept of shame (Williams 1993) establishing a general framework to show how recent developments in philosophy of emotions are in line with the far-reaching consequences of Bernard Williams' insights. Then we highlight the way in which there is both an historical relativity to emotions and an intemporal understanding of their ethical role, and use the concept of meta-emotion to reinforce the idea that what makes some emotions moral requires employing Williams' distinction between thick and thin concepts.

Shame as a Culture-Specific Emotion Concept

Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2018

On the assumption that shame is a universal emotion, cross-cultural research on shame relies on translations assumed to be equivalent in meaning. Our studies here questioned that assumption. In three studies (Ns, 108, 120, 117),shamewas compared to its translations in Spanish (vergüenza) and in Malayalam (nanakedu). American English speakers usedshamefor the emotional reaction to moral failures and its use correlated positively withguilt, whereasvergüenzaandnanakeduwere used less for moral stories and their use correlated less with the guilt words. In comparison with Spanish and Malayalam speakers’ ratings of their translations, American English speakers ratedshameandguiltto be more similar to each other.

Shame: From Defensive Fury to Epistemological Shifts and Political Change

Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues, 2017

In her chapter, Elisa Aaltola notes how “shame” and “guilt” are powerful moral emotions. They influence how we construct and construe moral values and norms and may motivate key normative outlooks on other beings. They are often treated synonymously, yet there are important differences between the two. Observing this, Aaltola investigates these differences and their impact on our moral agency in the context of interspecies ethics. Aaltola asks: what are shame and guilt, and what are their implications in how nonhuman animals are valued and treated? Using both psychological literature and philosophical analysis, she suggests that whereas shame can be quite destructive from the viewpoint of a morally inclusive approach to other animals, guilt can advance our moral ability in relation to the nonhuman world and may even be necessary for interspecies ethics.