Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs (original) (raw)
Related papers
A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy: Iran and the (New) EU-US Sanctions Debate
On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe, 2018
Europe and Iran have had important political, cultural and commercial relations that date back several centuries, but these relations have been steadily strained since 2002 when the uncertainty with regard to Iran's nuclear program became an issue of international concern. In the attempt to demonstrate its role as an important foreign policy actor capable of taking the lead in resolving a global crisis, through the leadership of France, United Kingdom and Germany (EU3) the European Union spearheaded efforts to obtain a solution to the deadlock between Tehran and the international community over Iran's nuclear program. Nowadays, after the nuclear agreement with Iran was sealed, the EU can move beyond its exclusive nuclear focus with Iran, and shift to a relationship based on engagement, not containment. However, this goal encounters an unforeseen obstacle: the new American Administration, who wants to shift the US policy on Iran toward aggressive containment and away from the diplomatic openings created by the precedent one. Therefore, it looks that the divide between Europe and the US is set to deepen over Iran, as long as the Trump Administration's heated rhetoric and actions will continue. The EU made it clear, through its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy statements that it will continue to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Furthermore, the European leaders understood that a constructive relationship between Iran and the EU is essential for the latter, and it could help to achieve its common security and defense objectives while safeguarding its commercial and energy interests. This article aims to present the relation between Europe Union and Iran post-JCPOA and the European agenda on Iran and to explain how and whether the nuclear agreement could become the reason of a European-American cleavage.
A Last Line of Defence: A Strategy for Europe to Preserve the Iran Nuclear Deal
Rome, IAI, June 2019, 24 p. (IAI Papers ; 19|14), ISBN 978-88-9368-106-3, 2019
One year since the US's unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, the EU-Iran relationship hangs in a balance. Europe's attempts at limiting the impact of renewed US sanctions have thus far had negligible results. Iran has taken note and scaled back compliance with its nuclear obligations. Not all is lost, however. Europe has a limited window of opportunity to prevent the end of the deal, which would severely harm the non-proliferation regime and Middle Eastern stability. Europe should delegitimise a policy of regime change or destabilisation, facilitate EU-Iran trade, increase assistance to ordinary Iranians, fight against US extraterritorial sanctions, and wage a sustained diplomatic campaign in favour of the JCPOA in Tehran and Washington.
Transatlantic Relations: The Case of Iranian Nuclear Program
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies (under review), 2017
The objective of this paper is to highlight the shift of transatlantic relations from divergence to convergence; leading to a strong transatlantic unity, as it is has been formed by the positive for the international community progress of the nuclear program of Iran. In fact, the European Union (EU) did persuade the USA to restart its negotiations with Iran, after years of refusing it, which has strengthened the unity between the two parts. The EU has followed a more soft-power approach; while on the other hand, the USA has always been following a more hard-power approach. It is worth mentioning that not only has the USA been imposing economic sanctions to Iran, but it has also been threatening it with its military strength. The election of Ahmadinejad as Iranian President had deteriorated the EU- Iran relations, leading the EU to adopt a hard - power approach. During the Obama period, the EU-USA relations were in the best era ever, while most of their policies and preferences on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program were significantly converging. Thus, the transatlantic cooperation regarding Iran's issue has been closed and extensive. Both the EU and the USA had been negotiating with Iran for almost ten years until the Iran Deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA; July 14, 2015) was achieved. The efforts of the EU and the USA to address the Iranian nuclear dispute had a plurality of conceptions which was characterized as “multilateralism”. Furthermore, this paper highlights the success of the EU policy as a significant international actor. As the USA was still having no diplomatic relations with Iran, the EU did play a prominent role, as it was the only negotiator. The EU managed to convince USA to negotiate with Iran, despite the fact that the bilateral relations between the two parts had been disrupted since 1979. Moreover, the EU obtained the support of the USA, Russia and China for its initiatives regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. In general, EU’s attitude played a key role in the international negotiations which led to an agreement that ensures Iran’s nuclear program can be solely used for peaceful purposes.
Journal of European Studies, 2022
Though Iran claims that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes, yet it may decide to pursue nuclear weapons while taking into consideration the complex geostrategic matrix of the region-a situation that may result in further horizontal proliferation. The permanent five UN Security Council members and Germany (P5+1) signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2015 with the objective to curtail its nuclear ambitions. Since then, it has become a challenge for the European powers-France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (E3 + 1) to maintain trust and keep the deal going. Coercive measures like sanctions on the part of the US against Iran have created a huge trust deficit and resultantly have put the new administration of Joe Biden in a situation of few choices to revive the deal to tackle the Iranian nuclear issue. Sanctions also bittered American European allies especially France, whose companies have big business interests in Iran. This article aims at addressing the issues of the Iranian nuclear program, its nature, purpose, and interests. It also deliberates the European and the US concerns before and after the deal.
Alarmist announcements have set the tone of the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme. The UN Security Council has presented Iran with a 30-day ultimatum. In Israel, the number of people calling for the destruction of Iran's known nuclear facilities is growing. The Iranian government is threatening to break off relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In France, the United Kingdom and Germany, discussions are being held as to whether military measures against Iran should be ruled out or left on the table as a potential threat to increase the pressure on Tehran. Despite these reports, however, there is little material cause for hurried decision-making and rash action. The current crisis has been precipitated by the collapse-at least for the time being-of European-led negotiations and the likely collapse of Russia's parallel efforts. The next constructive step on the road to a peaceful resolution would be to expand negotiationsin terms of both participants and agenda. This is the only way to sound out options for resolving the conflict that would improve regional security while avoiding a potentially dangerous stigmatisation of Iran.
The Transatlantic Dimension of Europe's Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran: 2003-21
Rome, IAI, May 2021, 27 p. (IAI Papers ; 21|21), ISBN 978-88-9368-195-7, 2021
European nuclear diplomacy with Iran has always had a transatlantic dimension at its core. Facilitating US-Iranian engagement is instrumental to securing European long-term interests in supporting the non-proliferation regime and preventing a major military confrontation in the Gulf. Over the years the Europeans have made a number of tactical adjustments in pursuit of this strategic goal. They succeeded in turning initial transatlantic divergence under Bush into a fairly solid transatlantic consensus under Obama, when the Iran nuclear deal or JCPOA was signed. After Trump pulled the US out of the deal, Europe fell back on conflict management, which was barely enough to keep the JCPOA on life support. With Biden the pendulum has shifted back to transatlantic re-engagement, with a view to revive the nuclear deal. Convergence with the US remains indispensable, but it may require a degree of leverage over Washington that Europe has lost.