Consciousness's Epistemic Categories: The Phenomenology of the Integration of Knowledge in the Consciousness (original) (raw)

2018, The Scince of Consciousness April 2-7, 2018 Tucson, Arizona - Book of Abstracts

How would it be possible to constitute appropriate epistemological foundations for the research of the phenomena of consciousness? This perspective would need a basis capable of including a rather broad phenomenological spectrum. Somehow, this spectrum should include cognitive phenomena in general, altered states of consciousness, extra-sensory perception, and many others. Most likely, the epistemological basis of the science of consciousness is related to the roots of the primary construction of knowledge that enables the emergence of the very phenomenon of consciousness. This paper aims to propose a way of construction and the identification of categories of phenomena indispensable for the constitution of primary types of knowledge, supposedly part of what is thought to be the consciousness. The relevance of this proposal is the possibility of establishing a common research base for phenomena that are currently treated in different areas such as extra-sensory perception, cognitive sciences and phenomenology itself, among others. The term "epistemic category" is being proposed here as a concept encompassing real, hypothetical and functional elements in an attempt to identify the most elementary and generating categories of knowledge of the phenomenon of consciousness. The categories initially identified are already known in philosophy and science. But the challenge is to re-examine the relevance of the already-known categories and see if there are more categories in the same condition. For this purpose, the new proposal is the epistemic structuring based on two main aspects: (1) The epistemic unity or the fundamental entity for one or more categories (e.g. the mental image). (2) Criteria for forming the epistemic category. The phenomenon must meet the following criteria to be classified as epistemic category: (i) Category. It must constitute a clearly distinct function from others in the field of cognitive functions. For example, perception is not memory; memory is not imagination, among others. (ii) Sine qua non. It must refer to a function that without which knowledge does not constitute itself or cease to exist. For example, without perception no knowledge is constituted. (iii) Taxon. In the supposed category must be found an element with basic function in cognition and with the possibility of representing classification unit. The percept, for example, can be considered a taxon of real existence in the subtle cognitive physiology of consciousness. (iv) Attribute. The taxon must develop a function capable of attributing quality to the manifestation of consciousness. Perception, for example, is a consciential attribute that makes it possible to distinguish sub-phenomena. Perception, memory, and imagination may be examples of epistemic categories. Percepts, as perceived mental images, are the taxa of perception. The engram, as an archived mental image, is the taxon of memory. The represented mental image is the taxon of the imagination. Other categories can be reverified and others more identified. Other phenomenological entities may be identified. Scientific guidance through the epistemic categories seems to have the potential to signal priority problems in the research of consciousness.