Marxism and the Dialectic (original) (raw)

If we define " theory " as a series of abstract rules that connect facts in a predictive or apodictic relation by means of experiments, then it is obvious that no " theory " will ever be able to achieve such a relation by means of a " method " because each experiment is, by definition, a unique " experience " whose outcome cannot be " formalised " in isolation from the actual experience. Furthermore, for what concerns the connection of theory with facts, whether in the physical or in the social sciences, first, the selection of " facts " is itself arbitrary from a " theoretical " viewpoint in that it is the " theory " that selects the " facts " , which means that the theory itself must be " arbitrary " from an " objective theoretical " or " scientific " viewpoint " ! (Cf. Windelband, " Thus, in the scientific sense, 'fact' is already a teleological concept, " [History and Natural Science, p.181]. We do not share, of course, the artificial dichotomy of the Marburg School of neo-Kantian philosophers between " natural sciences " [Natur-wissenschaften] and " social sciences " [Geistes-wissenschaften]). And second, no amount of theorizing will ever be able to establish any " causal links " between " facts " independently of the human interest involved in isolating a particular " chain of causality " among an infinity of other " causal chains " (the point was first established by Nietzsche from as early as Uber Wahrheit und Luge, and then elaborated by Weber [cf. his Objektivitat]). After Nietzsche, we ought to know that there is no ordo et connexio rerum et idearum; after Heidegger, we know that there is no adaequatio rei et intellectus. So it is certainly not because of a superior " methodology of economics " that Marxian social theory presents this " chemical " fusion of fact and theory (or hypothesis) against the " mechanical " incongruence of bourgeois economic theory. But why, then, does Schumpeter believe that when it comes to the analysis of capitalist industry and society " Marx's mixture [of facts and theory] is a chemical one " whereas that of orthodox bourgeois economics is only " mechanical " ? To find out the answer, let us look at it in reverse, that is to say, let us see why it is that bourgeois economic theory has no need for " facts " to support it, and then we will be able to deduce at least negatively what we must not do if we do not wish social theory to be entirely detached from reality. If we take human beings as isolated individuals and we then ascribe to them " self-interests " that are insatiable and also absolutely incommunicable and incommensurable with one another, and if we then assume that they initially " possess " given " endowments " which they are only able " to exchange " with one another – then it is entirely obvious that we will be able to come up with a " science of exchange " (Walras's equilibrium or Hayek's catallactics or Mises's praxeology) that will be the exact replica of Newtonian mechanics in which there is either a unique solution (Walrasian equilibrium) or else an ex post facto rationalization (Hayek, Mises) for all the possible " exchange ratios " between all such individuals and for the optimal distribution of their original endowments to maximize their individual self-interests.