What are Definitions of Life Good For? Transdisciplinary and Other Definitions in Astrobiology (original) (raw)
Related papers
Over the past 10 years, it has become unpopular to talk about definitions of life, under the assumption that attempts at a precise definition are counterproductive. Recent attempts have failed to meet strict philosophical criteria for definitions and have failed to reach consensus. I argue that provisional definitions are necessary for clear communications. Our current knowledge of biology justifies a number of universal claims about the category of life. Whether or not ‘‘life’’ represents a natural category, it maps to a number of important, observable processes. Given the importance of those processes and the extent of our knowledge, plural explicit definitions of life (and related categories) will be necessary for progress in astrobiology and origin-of-life studies as well as biology in general. I propose concrete categories related to, but not necessarily coextensive with, life for clear communication and hypothesis formation: Woese life, Darwin life, Haldane life. Astrobiology 15, 15–19.
Is defining life pointless? Operational definitions at the frontiers of Biology
Synthese, 2018
Despite numerous and increasing attempts to define what life is, there is no consensus on necessary and sufficient conditions for life. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the value of definitions of life and encouraged scientists and philosophers alike to discard the project. As an alternative to this pessimistic conclusion, we argue that critically rethinking the nature and uses of definitions can provide new insights into the epistemic roles of definitions of life for different research practices. This paper examines the possible contributions of definitions of life in scientific domains where such definitions are used most (e.g., Synthetic Biology, Origins of Life, Alife, and Astrobiology). Rather than as classificatory tools for demarcation of natural kinds, we highlight the pragmatic utility of what we call operational definitions that serve as theoretical and epistemic tools in scientific practice. In particular, we examine contexts where definitions integrate criteria for life into theoretical models that involve or enable observable operations. We show how these definitions of life play important roles in influencing research agendas and evaluating results, and we argue that to discard the project of defining life is neither sufficiently motivated, nor possible without dismissing important theoretical and practical research.
Moving Beyond Definitions in the Search for Extraterrestrial Life
Astrobiology
According to the 2015 Astrobiology Strategy, a central goal of astrobiology is to provide a definition of life. A similar claim is made in the 2018 CRC Handbook of Astrobiology. Yet despite efforts, there remains no consensus on a definition of life. This essay explores an alternative strategy for searching for extraterrestrial life: Search for potentially biological anomalies (as opposed to life per se) using tentative (vs. defining) criteria. The function of tentative criteria is not, like that of defining criteria, to provide an estimate (via a decision procedure) of the likelihood that an extraterrestrial phenomenon is the product of life. Instead, it is to identify phenomena that resist classification as living or nonliving as worthy of further investigation for novel life. For as the history of science reveals, anomalies are a driving force behind scientific discovery and yet (when encountered) are rarely recognized for what they represent because they violate core theoretical beliefs about the phenomena concerned. While the proposed strategy resembles that of current life-detection missions, insofar as it advocates the use of a variety of lines of evidence (biosignatures), it differs from these approaches in ways that increase the likelihood of noticing truly novel forms of life, as opposed to dismissing them as just another poorly understood abiological phenomenon. Moreover, the strategy under consideration would be just as effective at detecting forms of life closely resembling our own as a definition of life.
The Definition of Life: A Brief History of an Elusive Scientific Endeavor
In spite of the spectacular developments in our understanding of the molecular basis that underlies biological phenomena, we still lack a generally agreed-upon definition of life, but this is not for want of trying. Life is an empirical concept; and, as suggested by the many unsuccessful efforts to define it, this task is likely to remain, at best, a work in progress. Although phenomenological characterizations of life are feasible, a precise definition of life remains an elusive intellectual endeavor. This is not surprising: as Nietszche once wrote, there are concepts that can be defined, whereas others only have a history. The purpose of this essay is to discuss some of the manifold (and often unsatisfactory) definitions of life that have been attempted from different intellectual and scientific perspectives and reflect, at least in part, the key role that historical frameworks play. Although some efforts have been more fruitful, the lack of an all-embracing, generally agreed-upon definition of life sometimes gives the impression that what is meant by life's origin is defined in somewhat imprecise terms and that several entirely different questions are often confused. The many attempts made to reduce the nature of living systems to a single living compound imply that life can be so well defined that the exact point at which it started can be established with the sudden appearance of the first replicating molecule. On the other hand, if the emergence of life is seen as the stepwise (but not necessarily slow) evolutionary transition between the non-living and the living, then it may be meaningless to draw a strict line between them.
Defining Life: Synthesis and Conclusions
Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres, 2010
The first part of the paper offers philosophical landmarks on the general issue of defining life. §1 defends that the recognition of "life" has always been and remains primarily an intuitive process, for the scientist as for the layperson. However we should not expect, then, to be able to draw a definition from this original experience, because our cognitive apparatus has not been primarily designed for this. §2 is about definitions in general. Two kinds of definition should be carefully distinguished: lexical definitions (based upon current uses of a word), and stipulative or legislative definitions, which deliberately assign a meaning to a word, for the purpose of clarifying scientific or philosophical arguments. The present volume provides examples of these two kinds of definitions. §3 examines three traditional philosophical definitions of life, all of which have been elaborated prior to the emergence of biology as a specific scientific discipline: life as animation (Aristotle), life as mechanism, and life as organization (Kant). All three concepts constitute a common heritage that structures in depth a good deal of our cultural intuitions and vocabulary any time we try to think about "life". The present volume offers examples of these three concepts in contemporary scientific discourse. The second part of the paper proposes a synthesis of the major debates developed in this volume. Three major questions have been discussed. A first issue ( §4) is whether we should define life or not, and why. Most authors are skeptical about the possibility of defining life in a strong way, although all admit that criteria are useful in contexts such as exobiology, artificial life and the origins of life. §5 examines the possible kinds of definitions of life presented in the volume. Those authors who have explicitly defended that a definition of life is needed, can be classified into two categories. The first category (or standard view) refers to two conditions: individual self-maintenance and the open-ended evolution of a collection of similar entities. The other category refuse to include reproduction and evolution, and take a sort of psychic view of the living. §6 examines the relationship between the question of the definition of life and that of the origins of life. There is a close parallel between the general conceptions of the origins of life and the definitions of life.
The definition of life in the context of its origin
Biogeosciences, 2006
Current life is a complex, multi-level phenomenon that is so diverse in its manifestations that a short and exhaustive definition of life is hardly possible. The high complexity of life, as well as a poor understanding of what life is in essence, are the obstacles to the elaboration of such a definition. Important characteristics of life, such as whole system-, ecosystem-, and information-defined characteristics, have been included in the definition of life only recently. Ecosystem-defined characteristics have been absent in models of the pre-biotic state for a long time. However, without an ecosystem context, the concept of the emergence of life cannot be complete. Interconnections between living and non-living components of a primordial evolving system are decisive for the period of transition from chemical to biological evolution. Information-defined characteristics of life are often reduced to storage and the expression of genetic information, yet the operation of such perfect processes in prebiotic and transitional systems is unlikely. Genetic information, as defined in terms of the Shannon theory of communication, represents only a certain "informational channel" specified with respect to the expression of the structural genes. However, recent findings concerning the molecular mechanisms of the differential regulation of gene activity, and in the genomics, postgenomics and proteomics control mechanisms, suppose a richer diversity of informational flows in the organism. Moreover, considering life in a more general context, other types of related, informational channels, in particular, regarding the differentiation of higher taxa, hiatus, and expansion processes, should be kept in mind. In many publications devoted to the origin of life, the terms "living", "life", and "living organism" are freely interchanged which proves the vagueness of insights about the different levels of the living system.
Towards a General Definition of Life
Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres, 2019
A new definition of life is proposed and discussed in the present article. It is formulated by modifying and extending NASA's working definition of life, which postulates that life is a Bselfsustaining chemical system capable of Darwinian evolution^. The new definition includes a thermodynamical aspect of life as a far from equilibrium system and considers the flow of information from the environment to the living system. In our derivation of the definition of life we have assumed the hypothesis, that during the emergence of life evolution had to first involve autocatalytic systems that only subsequently acquired the capacity of genetic heredity. The new proposed definition of life is independent of the mode of evolution, regardless of whether Lamarckian or Darwinian evolution operated at the origins of life and throughout evolutionary history. The new definition of life presented herein is formulated in a minimal manner and it is general enough that it does not distinguish between individual (metabolic) network and the collective (ecological) one. The newly proposed definition of life may be of interest for astrobiology, research into the origins of life or for efforts to produce synthetic or artificial life, and it furthermore may also have implications in the cognitive and computer sciences.
Explaining the Origin of Life is not Enough for a Definition of Life
Foundations of Science, 2011
Despite hundreds of definitions, no consensus exists on a definition of life or on the closely related and problematic definitions of the organism and death. These problems retard practical and theoretical development in, for example, exobiology, artificial life, biology and evolution. This paper suggests improving this situation by basing definitions on a theory of a generalized particle hierarchy. This theory uses the common denominator of the "operator" for a unified ranking of both particles and organisms, from elementary particles to animals with brains. Accordingly, this ranking is called "the operator hierarchy". This hierarchy allows life to be defined as: matter with the configuration of an operator, and that possesses a complexity equal to, or even higher than the cellular operator. Living is then synonymous with the dynamics of such operators and the word organism refers to a select group of operators that fit the definition of life. The minimum condition defining an organism is its existence as an operator, construction thus being more essential than metabolism, growth or reproduction. In the operator hierarchy, every organism is associated with a specific closure, for example, the nucleus in eukaryotes. This allows death to be defined as: the state in which an organism has lost its closure following irreversible deterioration of its organization. The generality of the operator hierarchy also offers a context to discuss "life as we do not know it". The paper ends with testing the definition's practical value with a range of examples.
5 Does 'life' have a definition
This paper expands upon material in the earlier paper "Defining Life". It argues for using tentative (vs. defining) criteria to search for extraterrestrial life.
ASTROBIOLOGY: The Study of the Living Universe
Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics, 2005
Astrobiology is the study of the living universe. Astronomy provides the context for the origin and evolution of life on Earth. Conversely, discoveries about the terrestrial biosphere-from extremophilic microbes to the evolution of intelligenceinform our thinking about prospects for life elsewhere. Astrobiology includes the search for extraterrestrial life via in situ exploration, spectroscopy of solar and extrasolar planetary atmospheres, and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence. This review situates astrobiology within philosophical issues of the definition of life and the biological compatibility of the universe. It reviews the habitability of the Galaxy in general and of planets and moons in particular, and summarizes current controversies in originsof-life research and in evidence for the earliest life on Earth. It critiques certain 'rare Earth' and 'anthropic' arguments, and considers four approaches to deciding whether intelligent life exists elsewhere in the Galaxy. It concludes that astrobiology must also speak to the future of human civilization.