Plato and the Reform of Athenian Law: Forthcoming in the (original) (raw)
The chapter explores Plato's views about Athenian laws, and his proposal for their reform, advanced in The Laws, in the form of new legislation for the city of Magnesia. After introducing the date and structure of the dialogue, as well as its aims and place in the context of Plato's thought and production, the chapter examines, with a constant comparison with Athens, the constitutional arrangement of the new city, its officials, the judicial system, and the substantive laws on matters of persons and property, citizenship, family law, women, slaves and freedmen, theft, as well as homicide, assault, and wounding. The chapter highlights how Plato's legislative project constitutes a reasoned criticism of contemporary Athenian law.
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