Who joins counter-hegemonic IGOs? Early and late members of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (original) (raw)
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From Rule-‐Taker to Rule-‐Maker: China and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
A key element of America’s strategy for managing China’s rise has been the effort to draw China into deep engagement as a “responsible stakeholder” within the existing rules-based, multilateral and liberal international order (LIO). While China has indeed come to play a growing role within the legacy institutions of the LIO, China has also, over the past decade, attempted to move from a rule-taker to a rule-maker through the creation of a new set of China-centered multilateral institutions, most having a regional focus. A key question is whether this parallel set of China-centered international institutions will serve to challenge and undermine or complement and support the pre-existing LIO. The new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) provides a key test, as its mission overlaps with those of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Moreover, while the AIIB has attracted a broad range of member countries, including many Western states, the United States and Japan have declined to join the Bank. This paper will offer a preliminary assessment of the compatibility of the AIIB and the LIO against the background of competing theoretical expectations associated with realism, liberal institutionalism, constructivism and social order models.
AIIB is a very recent Multilateral Development Banks which aims at to support the building of infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region in a context of century of urbanization. However, the transformation of the AIIB into Chinese-centric institution is rasing concerns in Washington. In fact, AIIB could become one of the essential component of China's soft power during the 21st century. In fact, the New Strategy on Financing Operations in Non-Regional Members could directly challenge existing Development Banks. In other words, if it succeeds and regarded to current demand of Infrastructure spending due to the current century of urbanization, AIIB could challenge directly the WB and why not accelerate its rapid decline. Furthermore, Zhongzhou Peng and Sow Keat Tok (2016) examine the role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in China’s emerging normative power in international financial governance area. Based on the existing framework of normative power concept, the AIIB’s role in China’s normative power is examined from three angles: normative principles, norm diffusion, and external perception. They found that with the endorsement of 57 member states, the AIIB will significantly enhance China’s normative power in the international society. Furthermore, they found that some other international institutions have changed their policies to adapt Chinese norms. Moreover, they found that the cooperation between the AIIB and the other financial institutions is a chance to improve the external perceptions of China’s normative power in western society, including European states and the United States. In fact, throughout the AIIB, China is suggesting a « Fair Governance Structure » where the voting rights in the international institutions such as IMF and WB will be consistent with the current New Geography of economic activities and wealth. Accordingly Zhongzhou Peng and Sow Keat Tok (2016) found that a side from the norms of foreign aid and foreign investment, the AIIB is also a manifestation of China’s normative appeals regarding the financial governance structure. In recent years, China has been actively promoting the reform of governance structure in major multilateral financial institutions. In Chinese rhetoric, the aim is to establish a fair governance structure in multilateral organizations (Lu, 2011:89). The key point of this reform is the redistribution of voting rights. As a result, AIIB has started to be viewed as threat to US 21st century order. Therefore, Council on Foreign Relations (2018) found that despite U.S. efforts to convince other major donor countries to shy away from the AIIB, none did, except for Japan. Furthermore, Wu Zhenglong (2014) found that the United States has applied pressure behind the scenes on South Korea to refrain from joining the AIIB. And Japan has expressed its reluctance to accept an invitation to be one of the founding members of the AIIB on the excuse that Tokyo is “not convinced” of the necessity of launching a new bank. It seems that the United States and Japan view the AIIB as a threat, claiming that it would not only undermine the ADB but also marginalize American and Japanese influence in the region. The underlying assumption is simply a reflection of zero-sum mentality and obsession to dominate international financial organizations. However, several arguments are showing that AIIB will compliment existing Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) such as IMF and WB on the one hand and won't be a threat to US 21st century global leadership on the second hand. For example, Robert J. Hanlon (2017) offers three arguments outlining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank's significance and to help policy planners navigate the complex relationship between China, the Bank and themes on sustainability : First, there is little uncertainty that China is serious about development and sustainability. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is but one extension of China's increasing commitment to sustainability and should therefore be embraced by development stakeholders. Second, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank's commitment to infrastructure development complements other multilateral development banks and should not be considered a challenger to the existing order of development lending practices. Rather, China's interest in establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank points to competitive pluralism and poses no threat to the existing international order. He found for example that the AIIB is a China-led development agency set to compliment the longstanding Bretton Woods system includingWorld Bank and International Monetary Fund. Yet unlike its Western counterparts, the AIIB offers an alternative approach to development by offering loans for infrastructure that steers clear of the domestic political controversies often raised by other donor agencies. Finally, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank's sustainability guidelines are not unique and fall in line with similar policy of other large development banks. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank therefore reinforces sustainability norms while posturing itself as a partner fordevelopment. Then, this complementary within AIIB and existing Development Banks such as WB and IMF could temper any further tensions and destructive competition within them.Furthermore, before the emergence of the AIIB in December 2015, James Michael Walker (2014) did the creation of « Bank of Cities » that will lower the cost of borrowing money for cities and make it easier for them to support their « Upstream Infrastructures » spending. Secondly, he did suggest that the TTIP helps support the adoption of Smart Transportation and ICT-related Infrastructure. Thirdly, he did suggest the creation of the US Department of Twin Cities Project that will help develp Infrastructure Spending Bonds Markets that could include the one of STEM bonds and Healthcare Facilities Bonds Market. Fourthly, he found that regarded to the current global structural deficit, it could be relevant for the US to use an « Infrastructure spending » as geopolitics and geo-economics tools and strategies to support and strengthen its 21st century « Global Competitiveness and Leadership ». Therefore, the AIIB could be considered as personalization of the “Bank of Cities” at the Asian's level under the leadership of China. It's (AIIB) made to work with existing Multilateral Development Banks not to compete or eradicate them. Empirically, the current BRIs summit (April 25-27 2019) led by the IMF is providing the evidence of such cooperation. Furthermore, according to Robert J. Hanlon (2017), questions remain on how China will influence the intergovernmental organization. One concern that has increasingly been raised is how the AIIB will integrate themes of sustainable development and human rights within its framework. Furthermore, even if AIIB is an essential component of China's Soft Power, remain that China is a Soft Power Revisionist. Therefore, AIIB needs to make it easier for China to accelerate its democratisation if it wants to be credible and continue to lead the organization. By so doing, like all the democratic nations in the west, China won't cross the red line and declare a war to US even if they will be a significant competition within them. However, Germany and France were already some democratic nations when their rivalry did create the condition of WWI and WWII. So we need to temper our optimism and continue to work hard to build more cooperative and cooperative framework within US and China. This cooperative and collaborative framework could make it easier for the AIIB and other existing Multilateral Development Banks to become the drivers of the current : - Century of urbanization. - Global Value Chains Revolution and Trade and Prosperity Age. - Sustainability-driven Economy Era. Key Words: Chinese-led and Easternization of the Globalization; Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); New Global Governance Economic Order; New Regional Order; Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs); World Bank and International Monetary Fund; US 21st century global leadership.
This paper assesses whether the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank（AIIB）signals China's reformist intention in the area of international development. I use both descriptive and inferential statistics to compare power distribution in the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank（ADB）, and the AIIB, and the composition of the AIIB membership. Evidence shows that there is no obvious structural difference in voting power among the three banks. The major difference between them is that China is the most powerful state in the AIIB. For the time being, at least, the AIIB does not signal Beijing's intention to reform the current system. Instead, the bank seems to be an instrument for China to compete with established international financial institutions. However, Beijing may be faced with several challenges. First, dissatisfied members of the World Bank will not find a remedy for the organization's shortcomings in the AIIB. The problem of unequal representation structure remains. Second, the AIIB is unlikely to facilitate formation of a China-led alliance, nor is it likely to adopt global best practice due to disparity of interests among its members. Third, Washington and Tokyo are probably right to refuse to join the AIIB and to devote more attention to strengthening the World Bank and the ADB instead. Greater competition among the three is likely to reduce the AIIB's influence. To sum up, it is difficult to detect any reformist intention behind the AIIB, and it is still too weak an organization to facilitate formation of a strong alliance by means of which China can carry out its international agenda.
Beat or Join? The Challenges of China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to the US and Japan
China and WTO Review, 2016
On January 16, 2016, AIIB declared its opening for business. Ever since its announcement by Chinese leaders in 2013, AIIB has been warmly embraced by most countries of the world. But still, neither the US nor Japan have become the AIIB members. Both of them take a rather cautious approach, viewing AIIB more as a challenge to the existing international financial order. By comparison, this paper finds that each country casts similar doubts. The US places its focal point more on 'China-led' rather than 'new MDB.' Japan focuses more on 'new MDB' instead of 'China-led,' meanwhile considering how to cope with the dilemma between the US and China. Orienting itself towards a more balanced international economic order, this paper attempts to seek a kind of positive cooperation based on the coordination of trilateral interests, thus suggesting the US and Japan to join AIIB as an external supervisor and internal member respectively.
China’s AIIB, America’s Pivot to Asia & the Geopolitics of Infrastructure Investments
Revue Analyse Financière, Q4 2015 (n° 57), 2015
The establishment of a new supranational financial institution based in Beijing needn’t trigger vain geopolitical rivalries. Hawkish elements within the Obama administration initially viewed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as an unacceptable challenge to the IMF and World Bank, the Washington-based twin pillars of the sacrosanct “Bretton Woods system” and thus lobbied actively against Beijing’s project - without success. China and the West can work successfully together to build a more prosperous, equitable economic order across the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
China's new multilateral statement: The Asian infrastructure and Investment Bank |
Revista Digital Mundo Asia Pacífico
The creation of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) was one of the lasts movements that confirmed the new found place of People’s Republic of China not only as major exporter, but as a new pillar of the world economy. This instalment comes at a time where Asia and other powers come to terms not only of trove of opportunity out of incredibly robust economic ties, but the anxiousness from facing a new found rival for other powers, or the revival of old disputes in the eyes of neighbours. Beijing has ensured that its dominance upon the bank’s structure and decisions since this bodies often need a major power as guarantor of its functionality. Plus, other similar institutions have been relatively successful but no immune to criticisms and risks like decision-making deadlock out of diverging interests from constituents. To prevent this, the AIIB must be able to produce tangible results, grant a membership worthy of being universal, develop a set of core specific policies ...
2022
Since the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) there have been a lot of debates amongst politicians and academics on the Bank's objectives. Although these debates inform a lot about the AIIB, they lack a theoretical support and therefore sequential explanation. This is to say those criticizing the AIIB as a China's tool to carry out relative gains anchored on China's great institutional power assumption cannot demonstrate evidence that it is really funneling its objectives through the AIIB. In turn, those praising China's initiative of creating the AIIB as an indication of its willingness to participate in the international system under the current rules as a way to ensure absolute gains, also present shortcomings to explain why China controls the organization more than would be expected if it really wanted to be constrained. Then, both the accusations against the AIIB and praises to it do not stand up to close scrutiny. This article finds out that there is an alternative offshoot of realism, here called realism institutional that narrow this gap by handling a very important concept-institutional power-, which is neglected by the mainstream theories, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. From this theoretical account, China possesses the institutional power in the AIIB contrary to the neoliberal institutionalism prospect, albeit is not using it in the way would be expected by neorealism assumptions. This finding throws some theoretical light on the apparent contradiction on why China is seeking for bigger institutional power and at the same time is embracing self-constraint in the AIIB. In fact, the AIIB makes part of China's charm policy of backing the absolute gains while seeks for relative gains.