NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE THE STATE OF PLAY supported by International Atomic Energy Agency (original) (raw)
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Nuclear Security Culture: From Concept to Practice
Emerged as a concept at the turn of the century, nuclear security culture has evolved into a widely recognized and multi-functional discipline in support of nuclear security. Being a subset of organizational culture and drawing on its experience, it is designed to improve the performance of the human component and make its interface with security technologies and regulations more effective and smooth. The visibility achieved so far as a pillar of nuclear security is attributed to the emphasis on it in documents of the Nuclear Security Summits and the dedicated program implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The reports in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series—both produced and under development lay the groundwork for practicing security culture alongside other fundamental principles. Future challenges to further advancement of nuclear security culture make it necessary to orient it toward multidisciplinary application, closely integrate it into national culture of individual countries, raise security culture to the level of a societal value and adopt a multi-stakeholder approach.
Nuclear security culture: a generic model for universal application
International journal of nuclear governance, economy and ecology, 2006
Nuclear security culture found its way into professional parlance several years ago, but still lacks an agreed-upon definition and description. Clearly, there is a need for a generic model of nuclear security culture with universal applicability. Internationally acceptable standards in this area would be invaluable for evaluation, comparison, cooperation and assistance. They would also help international bodies to better manage their relations with the nuclear sectors in various countries. This paper develops such a model. It uses the IAEA definition of nuclear security, and then applies Edgar Schein's model of organisational culture to security culture at a generic nuclear facility.
2016
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA ISBN 978–92–0–107808–7 ISSN 1816–9317 This Implementing Guide defines the basic concepts and elements of nuclear security culture. It will assist States in planning and implementing a programme to improve nuclear security culture, with particular emphasis on areas such as regulation, government institutions and general public awareness. It provides an overview of the attributes of an effective nuclear security culture and emphasizes that nuclear security is ultimately dependent on individuals — policy makers, regulators, managers, individual employees and, to a certain extent, members of the general public. It also offers practical ways to assess and improve the effectiveness of security culture.
NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE FOR USERS OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES: MODEL, SELF- ASSESSMENT, ENHANCEMENT
This is a report submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the IAEA-UGA (University of Georgia in Athens) Agreement on Coordinated Research Projects for Enhancement of Nuclear Security Culture. CITS/UGA staff and graduate students contributed to this report. Its objective is to tailor the IAEA generic methodology for nuclear security culture to specific security needs for users of radioactive sources. It can serve as a guidance for self-assessment and enhancement of security culture at diverse organizations which manufacture, operate and store radioactive sources.
A Roadmap for Nuclear Security Culture
Post-Nuclear Security Summit challenges require a coordinated long-term strategy for promotion of nuclear security culture and making this process sustainable.
Security Culture and Its Self-Assessment as Supplementary Tools for Nuclear Security Training
Nuclear security culture – an emerging and widely recognized practice – serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security. In fact, many International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publications and the Nuclear Security Summits have highlighted the vital role of nuclear security culture and raised its status to the same level as physical protection and material accountancy. Consequently, there is a great need to include the concept of nuclear security culture and its self-assessment methodology in existing nuclear security education and training programs as a cross-cutting topic and as a means to improve the efficiency of the currently applied learning methods. This paper outlines the importance of including training modules on nuclear security culture and its self-assessment as a way in which to improve and complement existing nuclear security education and training programs.
ESARDA Bulletin, 2017
In 2008, the IAEA published Nuclear Security Culture guidelines to serve as a tool for countries on building an effective nuclear security culture. Although the guidelines provide an adequate apparatus to help establish nuclear security culture at facilities, some limitations to them need to be carefully addressed. Here, by using empirical data, possible pitfalls on the way to achieving strong nuclear security culture are examined. In particular, those identified deal with: 1) Recognition of the credibility of the threat to nuclear facilities and nuclear materials in use, storage and in transport. 2) Appreciation of the influence of national cultural differences and subcultures when building nuclear security culture. It is believed that taking these factors into account and correcting shortcomings will not require substantial financial resources. Customising approaches to the application of nuclear security culture concept will help fill the gaps where they exist.
2017
This paper is focused on the interface between nuclear safety and security regime. An effort is being made to highlight the conflict areas that could create problems in achieving synergy between the two interrelated areas. Nuclear safety and security culture has been considered central to crea ng a sustainable regime for the safe and secure opera onal environment of nuclear power industry. Differences have been highlighted along with the areas of achieving synergy within the two cultures, in order to create a comprehensive picture of safety and security culture.
International Journal of Nuclear Security, 2019
The current emphasis on the need to protect radioactive sources from being used for malicious purposes makes it imperative to explore and shape an appropriate culture-based response. Promoting a robust security culture is consistent with the international legal instruments and standards, including the Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and IAEA guidance publications. This promotion would be dependent upon the successful implementation of relevant self-assessment tools and a series of culture indicators, both of which would serve as benchmarks to take a culture's measure and identify practical ways to improve security. This approach must adjust the generic IAEA model and self-assessment methodology for nuclear security culture in order to accommodate the specific requirements in operation when using radioactive sources. Though the IAEA's concept of security culture and its self-assessment recommendations are designed to be generic in order to apply to a wide range of facilities and activities, the modifications proposed in this paper are needed to make those recommendations more user friendly and consistent with the security risks and requirements. The distinct features of the proposed recommendations, to be reflected in the new design of security culture, can be summarized as: continued prevalence of safety orientation, application in diverse work environments, multiple and intermodal transport, integration of host organizations into overall security regime, mobile and portable operation, limited security awareness and resources, and disposal challenges. These special features also justify a differentiated approach to security culture inside organizations licensed to use radioactive sources. More frequent and more concerted efforts, including training and self-assessment, are expected to focus on a select group of employees who have direct relationships with radioactive sources (e.g. management teams, security personnel, operational staff, technicians and others). For other employees, efforts would be made concurrently to engage them in the process of raising security awareness, a less proactive endeavor than the development of security culture. The proposed differentiation is a targeted approach designed to make time and resource investment in training and culture assessment commensurate with specific roles and responsibilities of individuals. This risk-based approach can facilitate a more robust and sustainable security regime for radioactive sources throughout their life cycle, i.e. from cradle to grave.