Review in English of the book Derechos humanos, migración y conflicto: hacia una justicia global descolonizada de Ariadna Estévez (UNAM-CISAN, 2014). (original) (raw)
Related papers
2021
Dame. They both work as consultants for the Special Rappor teurship on Migrant Workers and Their Families at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. A previous version of this article appears in Neve Gordon (ed), 2004, From the Margins of Globalization: Critical Perspectives on Human Rights (Lanham: Lexington Books). The authors wish to express their gratitude to Neve Gordon and Lynne Hinojosa for the valuable help they provided in preparing this article, and to Juan E. Méndez for his mentorship. The opinions expressed in this article only reflect those of the authors and not those of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).
Revista Relaciones Internacionales, 2019
Desde la crisis de refugiados en el 2015, los discursos de odio contra refugiados y migrantes han aumentado significativamente, generando preocupación en las Naciones Unidas. A pesar de que no existe una definición en el derecho internacional para los conceptos de discurso de odio o xenofobia, disposiciones en tratados de derechos humanos y en derecho blando indican un deber de los Estados de proteger a migrantes frente a discursos de odio. Haciendo una revisión de tratados de derechos humanos, documentos de organismos emanados de dichos tratados y otros instrumentos de derecho blando, este artículo busca demostrar que el discurso de odio contra migrantes debería ser sancionado por ley, ya que no entra dentro del espectro del derecho a la libertad de expresión.
Deportation, harms, and human rights
Ethics & Global Politics, 2021
In Justice for People on the Move, Gillian Brock constructs an elaborate normative framework, based on human rights practice, to assess how states must treat international migrants in order to legitimate exclusionary claims to self-determination. In this discussion piece, I argue that this framework cannot always satisfactorily explain when and why it is impermissible for legitimate states to remove irregular migrants from their territory (i.e. deport them). I show that Brock's intuitions about at least one of her own paradigm cases-the removal of long-settled immigrants whose irregular immigration was tacitly approved at the time-are not accommodated by her own framework. However, Brock also acknowledges that deportation is often harmful to persons and that this is morally problematic. Although this concern with harm is not systematically elaborated in Brock's discussion, I think it should be. I suggest that a purely harm-based framework is fully able to negotiate Brock's moral worries about deportation and outline the cornerstones of such a framework, stressing that harm in deportation may count as permissible only if it satisfies the joint desiderata of necessity and proportionality. I conclude by giving a sense of how one of Brock's paradigm cases-the tacitapproval case-could be assessed within this framework, arguing that such an analysis would likely bolster Brock's intuitions about this case whilst satisfactorily explaining if and why exactly the deportation practice in question cannot permissibly be pursued by legitimate states.
This article questions whether the presentation of the return and deportation of irregular migrants as a solution to the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ is ethical. Legally, the return of irregular migrants may be a legitimate activity by the state, but the current pressure by the European Commission on member-states to increase the current 40 percent rate of effective returns can lead them to operate returns below minimal human rights standards in a bid to increase the rate. Detailed knowledge of the impact of returns – including deportation from and to different countries – on migrants’ welfare and human rights is scarce. Based on studies on returns from EU member-states to different countries, I make three arguments. First, due to the complexity of the return process, statistics need to be unpacked better. Second, there are key conceptual problems underpinning current EU returns policy. Third, research strongly indicates that returns can render people vulnerable. In the absence of in-depth knowledge on the effects of return on migrants, I conclude with an appeal for returns to be treated with caution and their linking to the refugee crisis to be avoided. Retornando y deportando migrantes irregulares: no es una solución a la “crisis de refugiados” Este articulo cuestiona si la presentación del retorno y de la deportación de los migrantes irregulares como una solución a la llamada “crisis de refugiados” es ética. Legalmente, el retorno de los migrantes irregulares puede ser una actividad legítima por parte del Estado, pero la presión actual por la Comisión Europea sobre los Estados miembros de aumentar la tasa actual del 40 por ciento de retornos efectivos puede conducirlos a que operen retornos por debajo de los estándares mínimos de derechos humanos en un intento de aumentar la tasa. El conocimiento detallado del impacto de los retornos – incluyendo la deportación desde y hacia diferentes países – sobre el bienestar de los migrantes y los derechos humanos es escaso. Basado en estudios sobre retornos desde Estados miembros de la UE hacia diferentes países, presento tres argumentos. En primer lugar, debido a la complejidad del proceso de retorno, las estadísticas deben de ser analizadas con más profundidad. En segundo lugar, hay problemas conceptuales claves que sustentan la política actual de los retornos en la UE. En tercer lugar, la investigación indica fuertemente que los retornos pueden rendir vulnerables a las personas. En ausencia de un conocimiento profundo sobre los efectos del retorno de los migrantes, concluyo con un llamado para que los retornos sean tratados con precaución y que su vinculación con la crisis de refugiados sea evitada.
América Latina en Movimiento, 2020
Against the background of changing capital/labour relations, extractivism, climate change, warfare and generalised violence across the globe, contemporary migratory movements have increasingly been characterised by specific processes of violence, exclusion and subordination, such as the virtual sealing of borders and transit corridors across the world, the criminalisation of undocumented migrants and refugees, and the sheer deaths and disappearances of uncountable people, particularly at the US-Mexican borders and in the Mediterranean. We'd like to ask you some questions relating to the specific mechanisms of this violence as you have framed it within your own academic work. The first question we'd like to ask you relates to a theoretical proposition that has been crucial for you own work in-between anthropology and geography, that is to say the understanding of borders not merely as geographical lines but rather as processes of political, legal and social production. What is the relationship between the productivity of borders and the spaces of death crossed by undocumented migrants and refugees on both sides of the Atlantic in which you have conducted research? Not only do I reject the simplistic and superficial cartographic notion of borders as geographical lines, I contend that we cannot think of borders as things (De Genova 2016). The common assumption is to imagine that the border is an objective place, a site, and in that sense, a kind of real thing. Consequently, we begin to associate the border with the other things that populate such a space-things such as border fences and checkpoints, but also therefore border guards. This latter detail is instructive, because once we recognize that Search