Tahir Abbas. Contemporary Turkey in Conflict: Ethnicity, Islam and Politics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017, xv + 200 pages. (original) (raw)
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Review of Tahir Abbas, Contemporary Turkey in Conflict: Ethnicity, Islam and Politics
New Middle Eastern Studies
Since the rise of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 2002, the country has been at the forefront of events in the region and beyond, even more so in the wake of the 15 July 2016 failed coup attempt. The party’s initial pro-EU, pro-democratic posture has given way to an illiberal authoritarianism since 2010, a process that has yet to reach its denouement. Tahir Abbas’ worthy ambition in Contemporary Turkey in Conflict: Ethnicity, Islam and Politics is to chart the path of sociopolitical transformation Turkey has undergone over the last decade or so, by surveying some of the key ideas and actors shaping contemporary Turkish politics...
Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey
Turkey is 99% Muslim, its ruling party, Justice and Development Party (JDP), comes from but denies its Islamist pedigree and has a very secular feel. However, the deeply secular regime distrusts the JDP with regard to its 'true' colours. This book tries to make sense of these paradoxical perceptions which have characterized Turkey's politics since the JDP came to power in 2002.
Oxford Bibliographies Online Datasets
Since 1937, Turkey has been officially defined as a secular state, albeit with a Muslim-majority population. However, secularism in the Turkish context is distinctive, a product of its particular historical experience and development. Both the Ottoman heritage and contemporary Turkey’s Kemalist founding fathers’ apprehension were decisive factors in the evolution of Turkish secularism (laiklik) and set Turkey’s experience apart from that of other modern secular states. Turkish understanding of secularism itself has never had one single, unambiguous interpretation in Turkey, but in general it is widely understood that it reflects a sense that the state should not be totally blind to religious issues, but also should never favor one particular religion over another. Thus, Islamic practice was carried over in the society from the Ottoman state to the new Turkish Republic and allowed republican elites to declare a new structural order, without losing hegemonic power over religion. At th...
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