Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Violent Conflict (original) (raw)
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Synthesis Paper: Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Violent Conflict
2018
This report seeks to inform UK and international policy and practice that has the objective of reducing levels of armed conflict and building sustainable post-war transitions. The report synthesizes the findings of 21 desk-based case studies, commissioned by the Stabilisation Unit and written by country experts. This provides an evidence base for examining the relationship between elite bargaining, the dynamics of armed conflict and the effects of external interventions on these processes. It demonstrates that interventions can be ineffectual, or counter-productive, when interveners fail to analyse and engage effectively with underlying configurations of power and processes of elite bargaining in conflict-affected states. Addressing this concern, the report provides a framework to guide analysts and policymakers in deciphering patterns of elite authority, trajectories of transition, and the effects of external interventions on these dynamics.
Conflict Research Programme; London School of Economics and Political Science, 2020
This paper summarises research from four years of the DFID-funded and LSE-led Conflict Research Programme, which provides comparative research on the drivers of conflict and ‘what works’ to reduce violence in five of the world’s most affected countries: Syria, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan and the DRC. The findings are relevant for other conflicts, for example, Afghanistan, Yemen or the Sahel. The paper is written to inform the UK Integrated Review and the creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. The paper argues that the UK can only reduce global conflict unilaterally by working with partners, including through the multilateral system. This requires a decade-long, joined-up strategic approach focused on reducing conflict by applying the best diplomatic, development and defence resources available. Adopting such an approach would enable policymakers to continuously assess how UK and partner interventions interact with conflict at regional, national and local levels and to adapt them accordingly.
Is it possible to envisage the use of political incentives as bargaining chips when negotiating with organised crime networks, youth gangs and other “non-conventional” violent actors? What types of political incentives could be provided and what challenges might they represent for democracy? What pitfalls do national and international actors willing to consider new engagement options with non-conventional actors need to consider? This report discusses the opportunities for and dilemmas of using political incentives as a means to respond to organised violence outside the conventional arena of armed conflict. It suggests refraining from “blacklisting” actors on the basis of their “criminal”, “apolitical” or “non-conflict” nature and turning instead to other possible options for engagement. While the report argues that many principles of engagement with conflict parties can be fruitfully transferred to the ambit of non-conventional armed actors, offering incentives for political conversion or reconversion must be approached with great care. This can be done by addressing the particularities of the actors in question, such as their level of social legitimacy and the coherence of their political agenda, as well as the specificities of the context in which they operate, including whether a formal peace process is under way.
Untangling Conflict: Local Peace Agreements in Contemporary Armed Conflict
ASPR Report No 5, 2020
This research draws on discussions held at two Joint Analysis Workshops in October and November 2019 organised by the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP). The workshops were held in cooperation with The British Academy (BA) and the Rift Valley Institute (RVI). In total, over 100 participants from 25 countries involved with or researching on local peace agreements contributed to thematic discussions. The research also draws on the PA-X Peace Agreements Database (www.peaceagreements.org), a database of all peace agreements at any stage of the peace process from 1990 to 2019. The database is fully searchable and supports both qualitative and quantitative examination of peace agreements.
Bargaining in intrastate conflicts: The shifting role of ceasefires
Journal of Peace Research
Research shows that conflict parties engage in ceasefires in pursuit of a variety of objectives, some of which reduce while others fuel violent conflict. This article provides a framework that links these objectives to a larger process. Building on bargaining theory, three distinct bargaining contexts are specified for intrastate conflicts. In the Diminishing Opponent context, leaders believe that a military solution yields a better outcome than a political settlement. In the Forcing Concessions context, they recognize the benefit of conflict settlement, but expectations about a mutually acceptable agreement still widely diverge. In the Enabling Agreement context, expectations converge, and leaders seek to pursue settlement without incurring further costs. In line with these readings, conflict party leaders adapt their strategic goal, from seeking to set up a military advantage, to boosting their bargaining power, to increasing the chances of a negotiated settlement. They may use ce...
For whom do local peace processes function? Maintaining control through conflict management
Recent peacebuilding literature provides a sustained critique of externally designed conflict management processes and promotes instead local mechanisms. Such mechanisms, it is argued, will provide more ownership and agency to local actors and, thus, a more sustainable peace. But while there are many examples of local conflict management institutions, and many discussions of the hybrid outcomes of interaction between the global and local, the literature rarely explores exactly what transpires on the ground when international actors influence the operation of local peace processes; this article provides exactly this insight. The data presented illustrate how local conflict management institutions in rural Sierra Leone are subtly manipulated by actors – both international and local – to maintain and enhance existing relations of power. The article illustrates, therefore, the problems that arise when local conflict management institutions become interlaced with new forms of power and start themselves to serve as sites of contestation and resistance.