The Effective Altruist's Political Problem (original) (raw)
Related papers
Philanthropy in Democratic Societies: History, Institutions, Values Edited by Rob Reich, Lucy Bernholz, and Chiara Cordelli http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo23530413.html Philanthropy is everywhere. In 2013, in the United States alone, some $330 billion was recorded in giving, from large donations by the wealthy all the way down to informal giving circles. We tend to think of philanthropy as unequivocally good, but as the contributors to this book show, philanthropy is also an exercise of power. And like all forms of power, especially in a democratic society, it deserves scrutiny. Yet it rarely has been given serious attention. This book fills that gap, bringing together expert philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and legal scholars to ask fundamental and pressing questions about philanthropy’s role in democratic societies. The contributors balance empirical and normative approaches, exploring both the roles philanthropy has actually played in societies and the roles it should play. They ask a multitude of questions: When is philanthropy good or bad for democracy? How does, and should, philanthropic power interact with expectations of equal citizenship and democratic political voice? What makes the exercise of philanthropic power legitimate? What forms of private activity in the public interest should democracy promote, and what forms should it resist? Examining these and many other topics, the contributors offer a vital assessment of philanthropy at a time when its power to affect public outcomes has never been greater. Contributors: Eric Beerbhom (Harvard), Lucy Bernholz (Stanford), Paul Brest (Stanford) Chiara Cordelli (Chicago), Aaron Horvath (Stanford) Jonathan Levy (Chicago), Ray Madoff (Boston College), Ryan Pevnick (NYU), Walter Powell (Stanford), Rob Reich (Stanford), Olivier Zunz (Virginia)
Institutional Short-Circuits: When Should Philanthropy be Incentivised
In the non-ideal circumstances of concrete public institutional action, public institutions may fail, and philanthropic initiatives might inject valuable skills and resources thus compensating for some institutional failures. Insofar as philanthropy can play this remedial function, the state seems to be justified to incentivise it in non-ideal conditions. But when these incentives occur through taxation, they may have the adverse effect of draining resources from the state, thus further undercutting its action. An institutional short-circuit may thus occur by which public institutional action risks being entangled in a vicious and self-defeating circularity. This paper discusses such institutional short-circuits within the normative framework of a public ethics of institutional action grounded in the idea of “office accountability.” This framework serves as a basis for exploring the boundaries of the justification of tax incentives for philanthropy as a means to uphold public institutional action from the outside an institution when the interrelated action of officeholders fails to sustaining it from the inside
working paper #4: Charitable Foundations and Advocacy Reimagining the Doctrine of Political Purposes
By Adam Parachin What role do we want grant making foundations to play within the charitable sector specifically and society generally? Does current law enable or frustrate that role? These are the core questions I aim to consider in this discussion paper, focussing on rules of law restricting advocacy by charities. The first step is to identify how grant making foundations differ legally and practically from other charities. Current income tax law essentially categorizes charities based on the familiar distinction between charities that fund charitable programming, e.g., grant making foundations, and charities that directly carry out such programming. It achieves this by recognizing a distinction between charitable foundations and charitable organizations. The Income Tax Act statutorily defines “charitable foundations” as institutions established for exclusively charitable purposes (which is specifically defined to include the disbursement of funds to other registered charities) and “charitable organizations” as institutions established for exclusively charitable activities.1 At the risk of oversimplifying, charitable foundations further their charitable purposes by funding other charities and charitable organizations further their charitable activities by directly supplying charitable goods and services. Therefore, in income tax law the “funding versus doing” distinction takes expression as, and corresponds with, a distinction between “charitable purposes” and “charitable activities”, respectively. This distinction – that between charitable purposes and charitable activities – has been widely criticized for contributing ongoing confusion to the law of charity. That it is so central to the regulatory treatment of grant making foundations reveals a fault line in the foundation of the regulatory infrastructure within which grant making foundations operate. This is not to suggest that the “funding versus doing” distinction altogether lacks regulatory significance. It is merely to invite critical reflection on what this distinction ultimately reveals to us about the nature of grant making foundations and the regulatory treatment of these foundations. In my view, one reason why the “funding versus doing” distinction ultimately matters from a regulatory perspective is because it is representative of the “convening role” played by grant making foundations within the charitable sector. This role is most obvious in the sense that grant making foundations are mobilizers of capital within the sector through the provision of grants. But foundations also play a convening role in the sense that they provide the context, infrastructure and platform for discussion within and about the sector. Foundations frame discussion and debate on all matters charitable. They also speak on behalf of the sector to government and the public at large. Of course, none of these convening functions are exclusive to grant making foundations, as these functions are also performed from time to time by operating charities directly carrying out charitable programming. These functions are, though, defining features of the role played by foundations as convenors, thought leaders and advocates within and on behalf of the sector. When grant making foundations are viewed in this light, it becomes apparent that rules of law restricting advocacy by charities, though they apply with like force to all charities, have a unique impact the mission of charitable foundations. A cynical response is that this goes no further than making the banal observation that those who advocate are more impacted by rules restricting advocacy than those who do not. Obviously, if advocacy and convening along the lines alluded to above are part of what qualify charitable foundations as charitable foundations, then the rules of law restricting advocacy will impact charitable foundations differently (perhaps more severely) than other charities. But I think there is a bigger point at stake here. If current law works at cross purposes with the kind of advocacy that falls within the “convening role” of charitable foundations, then we might treat this as prima facie evidence of regulatory overreach. Although all of these issues have been previously considered, they have taken on a renewed timeliness given the earmarked funding the Charities Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency has received for audits of political advocacy by charities. In addition, courts in other jurisdictions have in recent years liberalized the rules relating to political advocacy by charities. In Aid/Watch Incorporated and Commissioner of Taxation, the High Court of Australia concluded that advocacy related to a charitable end (the relief of poverty in that case) can itself be a discrete charitable purpose.2 Shortly thereafter, the New Zealand Supreme Court in Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated expressly concluded that “political and charitable purposes are not mutually exclusive in all cases”.3 More recently, the UK First-Tier Tribunal (Charity) in Human Dignity Trust v The Charity Commission reasoned that human rights based advocacy can be altogether immune to the rules restricting political advocacy.4 All of these developments point to a need to revisit the Canadian approach to regulating political advocacy by charities. Employing a case law and policy analysis, this paper explores the thesis that the doctrine imposes an artificial constraint on the boundaries of legal charity. Part II reveals the strange duality posed by the rules restricting political advocacy by charities. Though the charitable sector is premised on idealism, the law is selective in the extent to which that idealism can take expression in charitable works. Part III provides a primer on the legal meaning of charity. Part IV discusses the impact of the doctrine on the operations of charities. Part V reveals the superficial rationales articulated by courts in support of the doctrine. Part VI links the doctrine with the rise of fiscal considerations in the legal definition and regulation of charity. Part VII proposes reforms to the doctrine designed to preserve a principled distinction between charity and politics, while ridding the law of the excessive restraints it currently poses against political advocacy by charities.
Civil Society, Philanthropy, and Institutions of Care
(PEGS) The Political Economy of the Good Society, 2006
The word “philanthropy” elicits images of the wealthy using their bounty establishing scholarships or contributing to institutions helping the poor to assist the less fortunate. Or perhaps employing their riches to endow art museums, libraries, museums and public art, enabling others to enjoy values otherwise undersupplied. These philanthropic examples are certainly appropriate, but by themselves they are misleading. I will offer a different analysis of philanthropy, one that by no means rejects the great merit of actions such as these, but pointing towards a larger, more liberal vision of philanthropy and its place in our world today. In the process I hope to demonstrate philanthropy’s under appreciated potential in promoting liberty, equality, environmental sustainability, and even democracy.
Philanthropy's Role in Liberal Democracy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 2010
Here is a contemporary social paradox: Modern liberal democracy rests upon a platform of a pluralistic civil society. Philanthropy, by providing vital resources, is an essential feature of that civil society. Yet philanthropy also plays an ambiguous role in democracy. Therefore philanthropy potentially both supports and detracts from democracy. This essay explores the nature of this paradox and its implications for the practice of contemporary philanthropy. Defi nitional Issues Neither "civil society" nor "democracy" has a single, universally accepted meaning in the contemporary world. In differing historical and philosophical contexts, civil society has been used to describe a broad spectrum of social phenomena-the realm of social activity separate from the family, state, and economy; a private sphere of action defended against the state; the collectivity of nonprofi t and nongovernmental organizations; the arena in which social movements take place; and a society governed by norms of civility, among others.
Nonprofit Policy Forum, 2019
For more than ten years, Prof. Rob Reich has lamented that foundations have been allowed to be “subsidized,” unaccountable, opaque, and powerful -- as he and others conceive of foundations and their environment. This lament is presented in his recent book, which positions its purposes on five pillars: (1) philanthropy is repugnant to democracy as described; (2) philanthropy is an “artifact” of the State; (3) foundations are opaque and unaccountable; (4) donor intent and perpetuity are subversive; and (5) the charitable deduction is a “subsidy” with no redeeming value except possibly as a tool to justify reining in foundations and philanthropy. However, each pillar leaves out critical elements and analysis, and the vacillation between theory and practice without noting the switches or fully presenting either creates confusion. Those pillars are intended to support two possible roles – and only two roles -- as acceptable for foundations in democracy: discovery and advancing pluralism. However, their positioning neglects important chronologies and histories and suffers from other missing substantive analysis that also does not sufficiently support restricting foundations to these and only these functions. Finally, there seems to be a disconnect between overt objectives, actual presentation, and implicit purposes, which contribute to substantial concerns about critical gaps and missing information and perspective about foundations, philanthropy, and democracy. Ultimately, the theory and its presentation are too confusing, incomplete, and nuanced in part because they neglect substantive ways in which foundations and philanthropy are not only not repugnant to and not failing American representative democracy but are actually consistent with it and even exemplars of it, which is a topic for another day.
American philanthropy plays an integral role in public life. In 2015, individuals, estates, foundations, and corporations contributed a national record-setting $373 billion (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2016) to scouting, education, theaters, libraries, parks, religious and medical institutions, and much more. This trend has largely been hailed as a sign of American's generosity and a boon for the nonprofits that benefit, but critical dialogue about the nature of philanthropy's public role has been limited. Despite philanthropy's continued growth, its role in public policy and administration remains a marginal aspect of nonprofit scholarship and public debate.