Multiple Realization: A Thesis with Identity Issues (original) (raw)

It is commonly held that the multiple realizability of the mental rules out a potential strict identity relation between the physical and the psychological. In recent years, important new work has been done on the subject of the relation between multiple realization and identity theory. Nevertheless, what remains overlooked by these newer accounts is that the argument from multiple realization against identity is founded on an ambiguity. At the heart of the multiple realization argument lies an entanglement of two very different notions of identity, notions which need to be understood in light of two distinct ways of identifying objects. As I will hope to show, properly evaluating the argument from multiple realization against strict identity requires first of all untangling these two notions of identity. The disentanglement leaves the argument from multiple realization facing a dilemma: either be a deductively valid argument, but give up on empirical aspirations; or be an empirically substantiated argument, but accept compatibility with a strict identity thesis.