Hungary: The State of Liberal Democracy (original) (raw)

The Rule of Law, democracy, and human rights in Hungary

2020

This chapter provides an overview of the constitutional developments that have taken place in Hungary over the last 30 years. To understand the background, it starts with a short history of Hungarian constitutional law, including the democratic transition in 1989-1990, and then describes the transition of 2010-2012. The chapter primarily focuses on the current state of the Hungarian constitutional system, which is analysed in the light of the essential constitutional values that represent the basis of Western constitutional states (the Rule of Law, democracy, and fundamental rights). Finally, the last part of the chapter concentrates on the social and cultural context and sets out the actual practices and narratives behind the formal rules of the constitutional system. 4.2. A short history of Hungarian constitutional law Until the mid-20th century, Hungary did not have a constitutional charter but instead had a so-called historical constitution which, similarly to the traditional English constitution, consisted of doctrines and several important (substantively important but formally ordinary) statutes. The frst attempt to create a written constitution was made during the short period of the Hungarian Soviet Republic after World War I, but it did not infuence subsequent constitution-making processes. After World War II, the foundations of a new democratic and republican regime were regulated in Act I of 1946 on the Form of the State of Hungary, the provisions of which also reappeared in later constitutional texts. However, this was not a proper constitutional charter, but only the settlement of a few staterelated matters at the level of an ordinary statute, and the constitutional system was soon changed by a Soviet-type socialist dictatorship.

Playing with Democracy: Hungary 101

2021

One can ask why and how Hungary’s Viktor Orban extends his dominance on the universities by passing a law that radically alters the structure of the universities and how they are run. You may not be in great shock after hearing the recent events in the country due to what has been happening for quite some time; that is, this university reform contradicts European values as the other previous acts of the Hungarian leader. However, I would like to mention that this illiberal turn, labeled by the Freedom House, from one of the member states of the European Union, which has increased its succession, especially since the outbreak of the pandemic, is actually a situation that needs to be questioned.

Democracy in Hungary: The Alliance of State Autocracy and Neoliberal Capitalism

Public Seminar, 2019

By the time we political scientists started discussing the “in-between” nature of the Hungarian political regime, by the time we began niggling over whether it is still a democracy or whether it is already something else, a modern autocracy had been built up in the heart of the EU. It has been proposed by political scientists that the illiberalism of Hungary’s “illiberal democracy” was aimed against social liberalism – against free speech, individual rights, etc. But it is not. The unique aspect of Hungarian illiberalism lies in the alliance between autocracy and neoliberal capitalism it has produced. This is why it is a clear and present danger to democracy.

Hungarian Constitutional Reform. The Fundamental Law in Hungary's Democratic Framework

The constitutional changes involving Hungary have followed, in the country’s history and more prominently from 1956, a common fil rouge in their development. We do not face, in point of fact, a nation going through a political or constitutional revolution; and yet, the Magyar constitutional ground has changed to a remarkable extent three times between the end of the Second World War and now. These gradual transformations have been described as “revolutions under the rule of law”, in order to underline the exceptionally systematic use of the existent legislative tools in order to enact a factual transition. In 2010, in the middle of an economic and financial crisis by which, for various reasons, Hungary was strongly hit, Fidesz party (Young Democrats’ Alliance-Hungarian Civic Union), guided by Viktor Orbàn, who had been one of the young leaders in the ‘treated revolution’ from communism, won the parliamentary elections, gaining, together with its ally, KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party), a two-thirds supermajority of the MPs and relegating the oppositions – the socialist party, MSZP, and the extreme right party Jobbik in primis – to an inedited irrelevance. As soon as Prime Minister Orbàn announced his will to approve a new Fundamental Law, many criticisms were raised by some of the most authoritative voices on the national and international political and constitutional context. The main concern focused on the method adopted by reformers, whose supermajority allowed to exclude minority parties from the process of constitutional reform, without formally spoiling the legal bindingness of the reformed Fundamental Law. And yet, the announcement was followed by a Proclamation of the Parliament, which stated that “after 46 years of occupation, and 20 confused years of transition, Hungary has regained the right and power of self-determination [...]. In spring 2010, the Hungarian nation gathered its strength once again, and brought about a successful revolution in the polling booth. Parliament declares that it recognizes and will respect this constitutional revolution. [...] Parliament declares that in April’s election a new social contract was born. [...] The pillars of our common future will be work, home, family, health and order”1. When, in 2011, the National Assembly eventually approved the new Constitution, the merit appeared to be at least as ambiguous as the method. A lower protection of human rights, a reform of justice and constitutional justice which delegates to the government an increased number of designations with a decrease in judges’ autonomy, a symbolic but impressive refusal of the former Constitution: a further analysis of the new Fundamental Law and its five Amendments – occurred between 2012 and 2013 -, which this paper aims at providing, reveals how de facto a less inclusive mentality drove the last years’ change.

0 The rise and fall of constitutionalism in Hungary

In this chapter, I describe the elements and possible reasons for Hungary’s recent transition from a liberal to an illiberal democratic system, and will attempt to explain both the unique and the more typical features of this change. I use the term ‘constitutional counter-revolution’ to describe the Hungarian constitutional restoration. At the same time, my view is that the illiberal turn, which significantly weakened the rule of law safeguards instituted by the 1989–1990 constitutional process, has not resulted in the restoration of either the single-party state or police state structures. I think that the Hungarian constitutional system after 2010 is better characterized as a kind of ‘democradura’, rather than as a dictatorship.