Hungary: The State of Liberal Democracy (original) (raw)
The Rule of Law, democracy, and human rights in Hungary
2020
This chapter provides an overview of the constitutional developments that have taken place in Hungary over the last 30 years. To understand the background, it starts with a short history of Hungarian constitutional law, including the democratic transition in 1989-1990, and then describes the transition of 2010-2012. The chapter primarily focuses on the current state of the Hungarian constitutional system, which is analysed in the light of the essential constitutional values that represent the basis of Western constitutional states (the Rule of Law, democracy, and fundamental rights). Finally, the last part of the chapter concentrates on the social and cultural context and sets out the actual practices and narratives behind the formal rules of the constitutional system. 4.2. A short history of Hungarian constitutional law Until the mid-20th century, Hungary did not have a constitutional charter but instead had a so-called historical constitution which, similarly to the traditional English constitution, consisted of doctrines and several important (substantively important but formally ordinary) statutes. The frst attempt to create a written constitution was made during the short period of the Hungarian Soviet Republic after World War I, but it did not infuence subsequent constitution-making processes. After World War II, the foundations of a new democratic and republican regime were regulated in Act I of 1946 on the Form of the State of Hungary, the provisions of which also reappeared in later constitutional texts. However, this was not a proper constitutional charter, but only the settlement of a few staterelated matters at the level of an ordinary statute, and the constitutional system was soon changed by a Soviet-type socialist dictatorship.
Playing with Democracy: Hungary 101
2021
One can ask why and how Hungary’s Viktor Orban extends his dominance on the universities by passing a law that radically alters the structure of the universities and how they are run. You may not be in great shock after hearing the recent events in the country due to what has been happening for quite some time; that is, this university reform contradicts European values as the other previous acts of the Hungarian leader. However, I would like to mention that this illiberal turn, labeled by the Freedom House, from one of the member states of the European Union, which has increased its succession, especially since the outbreak of the pandemic, is actually a situation that needs to be questioned.
Democracy in Hungary: The Alliance of State Autocracy and Neoliberal Capitalism
Public Seminar, 2019
By the time we political scientists started discussing the “in-between” nature of the Hungarian political regime, by the time we began niggling over whether it is still a democracy or whether it is already something else, a modern autocracy had been built up in the heart of the EU. It has been proposed by political scientists that the illiberalism of Hungary’s “illiberal democracy” was aimed against social liberalism – against free speech, individual rights, etc. But it is not. The unique aspect of Hungarian illiberalism lies in the alliance between autocracy and neoliberal capitalism it has produced. This is why it is a clear and present danger to democracy.
Hungarian Constitutional Reform. The Fundamental Law in Hungary's Democratic Framework
The constitutional changes involving Hungary have followed, in the country’s history and more prominently from 1956, a common fil rouge in their development. We do not face, in point of fact, a nation going through a political or constitutional revolution; and yet, the Magyar constitutional ground has changed to a remarkable extent three times between the end of the Second World War and now. These gradual transformations have been described as “revolutions under the rule of law”, in order to underline the exceptionally systematic use of the existent legislative tools in order to enact a factual transition. In 2010, in the middle of an economic and financial crisis by which, for various reasons, Hungary was strongly hit, Fidesz party (Young Democrats’ Alliance-Hungarian Civic Union), guided by Viktor Orbàn, who had been one of the young leaders in the ‘treated revolution’ from communism, won the parliamentary elections, gaining, together with its ally, KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party), a two-thirds supermajority of the MPs and relegating the oppositions – the socialist party, MSZP, and the extreme right party Jobbik in primis – to an inedited irrelevance. As soon as Prime Minister Orbàn announced his will to approve a new Fundamental Law, many criticisms were raised by some of the most authoritative voices on the national and international political and constitutional context. The main concern focused on the method adopted by reformers, whose supermajority allowed to exclude minority parties from the process of constitutional reform, without formally spoiling the legal bindingness of the reformed Fundamental Law. And yet, the announcement was followed by a Proclamation of the Parliament, which stated that “after 46 years of occupation, and 20 confused years of transition, Hungary has regained the right and power of self-determination [...]. In spring 2010, the Hungarian nation gathered its strength once again, and brought about a successful revolution in the polling booth. Parliament declares that it recognizes and will respect this constitutional revolution. [...] Parliament declares that in April’s election a new social contract was born. [...] The pillars of our common future will be work, home, family, health and order”1. When, in 2011, the National Assembly eventually approved the new Constitution, the merit appeared to be at least as ambiguous as the method. A lower protection of human rights, a reform of justice and constitutional justice which delegates to the government an increased number of designations with a decrease in judges’ autonomy, a symbolic but impressive refusal of the former Constitution: a further analysis of the new Fundamental Law and its five Amendments – occurred between 2012 and 2013 -, which this paper aims at providing, reveals how de facto a less inclusive mentality drove the last years’ change.
0 The rise and fall of constitutionalism in Hungary
In this chapter, I describe the elements and possible reasons for Hungary’s recent transition from a liberal to an illiberal democratic system, and will attempt to explain both the unique and the more typical features of this change. I use the term ‘constitutional counter-revolution’ to describe the Hungarian constitutional restoration. At the same time, my view is that the illiberal turn, which significantly weakened the rule of law safeguards instituted by the 1989–1990 constitutional process, has not resulted in the restoration of either the single-party state or police state structures. I think that the Hungarian constitutional system after 2010 is better characterized as a kind of ‘democradura’, rather than as a dictatorship.
The rise and fall of constitutionalism in Hungary
2017
In this chapter, I describe the elements and possible reasons for Hungary’s recent transition from a liberal to an illiberal democratic system, and will attempt to explain both the unique and the more typical features of this change. I use the term ‘constitutional counter-revolution’ to describe the Hungarian constitutional restoration.1 At the same time, my view is that the illiberal turn, which significantly weakened the rule of law safeguards instituted by the 1989–1990 constitutional process, has not resulted in the restoration of either the singleparty state or police state structures. I think that the Hungarian constitutional system after 2010 is better characterized as a kind of ‘democradura’, rather than as a dictatorship.2 Let us first discuss the characteristics of the constitution-making process both in 1989 and in 2010.
Challenges of the Illiberal Democracy in Hungary. Some Aspects to the 2018 Elections
Polish Political Science Review
Political transformation reached Hungary in parallel with other Central and Eastern European countries at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. The core of the events, the year of 1989, the so called “annus mirabilis” when, within one year almost the entire Central and Eastern European region stepped onto the path of changes. The actors adopted Western patterns within a short period, institutions of new political systems were established, and a new political power verified and consolidated its legitimacy by free elections. As a final proof of transformation, most of former socialist bloc member states joined both the NATO and the European Union. Hungary had the chance to enter in the 21st century under radically changed and much more favourable conditions than it ever had before. This smooth transformation interrupted by political and economic crisis that finally led to the victory of the opposition that managed to repeat the next elections and implemented the Programme of National Coope...
The Crisis of the Rule of Law, Democracy and Fundamental Rights in Hungary (Paper I
The Crisis of the Rule of Law, Democracy and Fundamental Rights in Hungary, 2022
The EU is harboring a Member State which, through a method of abusive constitutionalism, is not a constitutional democracy anymore. Systemic violations of the Rule of Law are part of its governance, to the detriment of democracy and the well-being of its citizens. Crucially, this Member State could not join the EU, was it to apply today. This reality has dire consequences not only for the well-being of Hungarian citizens, but also for the entire European project. Accordingly, reinforcing existing constitutional principles within the EU, as well as formulating new ones, is paramount: i.e. to be able to respond effectively to Rule of Law violations and improve EU's enforcement.
31. The triple crisis in Hungary: The “Backsliding” of Hungarian Democracy after Twenty Years
This paper tries to point out that the three subsequent crises (the triple crisis) in the New Member States (NMS) have produced their heavy social price that has been responsible for the drastic "backsliding of the new democracies". These countries underwent a transformation recession in the early nineties and with the EU entry they fell into the post-accession crisis, followed immediately by the global crisis. Originally, their populations reacted to the collapse of the authoritarian rule with a "revolution of high expectations", so under the label of democracy they expected a Western welfare state "overnight", thus after Twenty Years the disappointment has been tragic. This paper approaches the crisis of the democracy in NMS from the side of the triple crisis in general and from that of Hungary in particular. Although it would be very tempting to generalize on the NMS backsliding, the focus of this paper is on "the country I know best", i.e. on Hungary with its idiosyncrasies.
Orbán, il/liberalism and Democracy in Hungary
Tensões Mundiais / World Tensions, 2024
The article presents a historical, political and ideological overview of Viktor Orbán's rule in Hungary, which started in 2010 and which shows no signs of weakening. Specifically, the study seeks to ascertain the relations between Orbán's ostensible ideology - illiberalism - liberalism, and democracy. The article also explains how Orbán's antimigrant measures are linked to the infringement of more general democratic guarantees.
The paper deals with recent deviations from the shared values of constitutionalism towards a kind of 'populist, illiberal constitutionalism' introduced by Hungary's new constitution in 2011. The populism of FIDESZ was directed against all elites, including the ones that designed the 1989 constitutional system (in which FIDESZ also participated), claiming that it was time for a new revolution. This is why PM Viktor Orbán characterized the results of the 2010 elections as a 'revolution of the ballot boxes'. His intention with this revolution was to eliminate all checks and balances, and even the parliamentary rotation of governing parties. His vision for a new constitutional order-one in which his political party occupies the centre stage of Hungarian political life and puts an end to debates over values-has now been entrenched in the new constitution. The paper argues that this current Hungarian constitutional system was made possible by FIDESZ' anti-pluralist nationalist populism, but is not necessarily based on a true commitment to expressing the will of the people via 'illiberal constitutionalism'. The populist government rather misuses the country's lack of constitutional culture. Adherence to constitutional patriotism would mean that FIDESZ would have to endorse what John Rawls once called 'constitutional essentials'. The core of this kind of constitutional patriotism is a constitutional culture centred on universalist liberal-democratic norms and values. Instead, the current Hungarian constitutional system is confronted with unconstitutional patriotism, a kind of nationalism that violates constitutional essentials in the name of 'national constitutional identity'.
The decline of liberal democracy in Europe’s midst
2016
Hungary’s illiberal turn, which has significantly weakened the rule of law safeguards instituted by the 1989-1990 constitutional process, can be described as a ‘constitutional counter-revolution’. [1] At the same time, it has not resulted in the restoration of either a single-party or police state structures. Rather, the Hungarian system since 2010 is better characterized as a ‘democradura’. [2] In the following, I describe the elements and possible reasons for Hungary’s political transformation. [3] The failure of the elite (myself included) that built liberal democracy in Hungary is one of the issues discussed. Another is why the first twenty years of regime transition did not see the emergence of greater respect for constitutional values. This would have prevented the rapid deconstruction of democracy or, at the very least, have made the collapse more difficult.
Hungary (2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law)
2019
Eszter Bodnár - Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz - Zoltán Pozsár-Szentmiklósy: Hungary, in Albert, Richard and Landau, David and Faraguna, Pietro and Drugda, Šimon, I·CONnect-Clough Center 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law (October 18, 2019). The I·CONnect-Clough Center 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law. ISBN: 978-0-692-15916-3