Public Policy for Philanthropy: Catching the Wave or Creating a Backwater, Routledge Companion to Philanthropy. London: Routledge, 2016. (original) (raw)
Related papers
Did tax incentives play any part in increased giving?
Australian Journal of …, 2006
Since 2000, increased taxation incentives along with other measures have been used by the government to encourage philanthropy in Australia. Since the new incentives were introduced, claimed gift tax deductions have increased. However, generally, donors are not aware of the new tax incentives for giving and in any case they report that their motivation for giving is not primarily, if at all, to obtain tax incentives. This article examines this paradox and seeks some possible explanations.
Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, 2014
2 contributions may be deducted, 4 replacing the deduction with a credit, 5 or converting the credit with a matching grant program. 6 And in Canada, where a deduction for specific charitable contributions was included in the income tax introduced in 1917, 7 the deduction was converted into a non-refundable credit in 1988, 8 while more recent reforms have encouraged gifts of capital assets by exempting certain gifts of property from tax on capital gains and increasing income-related ceilings on the amount that individual taxpayers may claim in respect of charitable gifts. 9 This chapter considers the tax treatment of charitable contributions in a personal income tax,. The next section reviews and evaluates alternative rationales for tax recognition of charitable gifts and the implications of these rationales for the form that tax recognition should take. The section titled 'The Canadian Experience' examines recent experience in 4 As a revenue-raising provision, for example, President Obama has proposed limiting the tax benefit of various deductions and exclusions (including the charitable contributions deduction) to 28 per cent: Department of the Treasury (US), General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals (2012) 73-4. 5 See, eg, Our Fiscal Security, Investing in America's Economy: A Budget Blueprint for Economic Recovery and Fiscal Responsibility (2010) 32 (proposing that the charitable contributions deduction be replaced by a 25 per cent refundable credit).
Crowding-Out Charitable Contributions in Canada: New Knowledge from the North
2011
Using data from charitable organizations in the US, authors have established that government grants to charities largely crowd out giving from other sources, but that this reduction is due mostly to reduced fundraising activities of the charity itself. We use much more detailed data from over 6000 charities in Canada, measured for up to 15 years, to provide valuable new insights into this phenomenon. In particular, dollars received from individuals is largely unchanged by government grants. Instead, the crowding out is attributable to two other sources of donations not differentiated in US data: giving from other charities and charitable foundations, and donations gained from special fundraising activities, like galas or sponsorships. Only the latter-which is about half of the measured crowding out-represents a potential loss of dollars to the charitable sector as a result of government grants.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The charitable deduction has enjoyed relatively little support in the legal academy. Many commentators have asked what it adds to the tax system and, as critics have observed, the deduction obviously does not itself collect tax revenue. Defenders respond that the deduction helps measure income and keeps taxpayers from inefficiently substituting leisure for work, but these points are, of course, contested. Instead of revisiting debates about what the deduction adds to the tax system, this Article focuses on the broader question of what it adds to the pursuit of public goals. The deductionand any other government subsidy that matches charitable contributions through the tax system (here called "subsidized charity") -enlists private individuals to pursue public goals in a somewhat unique manner. While in other settings the government delegates implementation but still specifies the goal to be pursued, charitable donors are allowed to select the goal as well. Is it desirable to pursue public goals in this way?
ISRN Economics, 2012
The effectiveness of tax incentives on charitable donation expenditures in Canada is explored, and the analysis is extended to compare the effectiveness across different donation sectors. Price elasticities are estimated with data from the 2007 Canada Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating. Results suggest that specific charitable sectors are affected differently by Canada’s tax credit system. The findings have implications for public policy.