Psychology_of_Intelligence_Analisys.pdf.pdf (original) (raw)

Positivism, Postpositivism and Intelligence Analysis

Both doctors and intelligence analysts engage in fact gathering in hopes of clarifying a situation, attaching a label to the situation and moving towards resolution of the situation. However, the process of diagnosis is neither as neutral or objective as it has been portrayed. In reading the memoirs of diagnosticians themselves, we can draw lessons from the mistakes which doctors make, in hopes of not repeating them in intelligence analysis.

Change the analyst and not the system: A different approach to intelligence reform

2008

Recent intelligence failures, including first and foremost the mistaken estimate of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prior to the war, show that a prime source of such failures is the adherence by analysts to preconceptions (or mind-sets) which entail the rejection of new information that contradicts it. The source of this kind of problem lies in well known psychological mechanisms. Yet official investigations into intelligence blunders have typically ignored this problem or have not suggested an appropriate solution thus far. Our paper suggests an original approach based on the fact that certain types of personalities are more likely than others to fall victim to these biased judgments. Existing psychological tests can help determine individual susceptibility to such tendencies. Therefore we suggest that intelligence organizations should pay far more attention to these personality characteristics, especially an analyst's level of openness, in recruitment, training, and promotion. Such attention would help create more effective reforms in intelligence than organizational models which advocate ''devil's advocate'' kind of solutions.

How Psychological Biases Affect Intelligence Analysis

Bezpečnostní teorie a praxe 1/2019 přehledový článek, 2019

20th and 21st centuries’ intelligence failures put an emphasis on the requirement of evaluating the influence of psychological biases on intelligence analysis. The aim of this study is to provide a discussion on how psychological biases affect intelligence analysis. Accordingly, conceptual discussion upon the notions of analysis and psychological bias is presented, and the biases that could have impacts on the intelligence analysis are defined in the study. By doing this, it is aimed to raise a clear understanding on the article topic through analyzing prominent sources and official reports in the literature. United Kingdom’s failure to foresee Falkland’s crisis in 1980s and United States’ intelligence analysis onWeapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq in the beginning of 2000s is selected as case studies in order to discuss how psychological biases affected intelligence analysis and accordingly caused intelligence failure. In conclusion, recommendations are presented in order to overcome the impact of psychological biases in intelligence analysis. Keywords: Intelligence analysis, psychological bias, Falkland’s crisis, weapons of mass destruction

Criticism Against the Intelligence Cycle

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN THE AIR FORCE, 2018

The cycle of intelligence, as a systematic and permanent process, is meant to reveal the essence, by analysis of data and information, which is subsequently communicated to decision-makers, so that they could make substantiated decisions, of an adaptive action nature, in regard to threats (risks, vulnerabilities) or opportunities. Nowadays more than ever, intelligence and even more so, intelligence analysis have become the object of study and discourse, both in civil society and in structures that traditionally deal with this field; intelligence is no longer a prerogative of governments and intelligence organizations, but it became a must for successful strategies carried out by all social players, be it multinational corporations, interest groups, etc., whereas the knowledge paradigm is submitted to azimuth shifts, from the need-to-know orientation, to the need-to-share orientation. In this sense, the practicality of the intelligence cycle as work tool and modus operandi must be revalidated and, if necessary, adapted to the new knowledge environment.

Training Analysts in the Proper Use of Ignorance in Intelligence

ITEC 2018, 2018

The right information must be balanced by the right ignorance to avoid overloading intelligence work. Analysts are therefore trained in mechanical simplifications-such as hatching out areas on maps-that are appropriate to particular circumstances but fail catastrophically in others. The solution is not to throw out the simplifications but to train in awareness of their limitations and the ability to adapt as required.

The Crucial Role of Intelligence Analysis: Navigating Misperception and Bias

Intelligence Security , 2025

Intelligence analysis underpins national security by transforming raw data into actionable insights, yet it is vulnerable to cognitive, cultural, and organizational biases that distort assessments and lead to strategic misperceptions. Drawing on the NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook (November 2001), this paper examines sixteen biases-such as confirmation bias, mirror imaging, and image and self-image biasthrough three historical case studies: the 2002-2003 Iraq WMD assessment, Russia's 2014 Crimea annexation, and the 2001 9/11 attacks. These cases serve as evidence of how biases undermine analytical accuracy, resulting in costly intelligence failures. By proposing structured analytic techniques, cultural training, organizational reforms, and technology integration, the paper outlines a path to mitigate biases, ensuring intelligence analysis fulfills its critical role in informed policymaking.