Psychology_of_Intelligence_Analisys.pdf.pdf (original) (raw)
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The paper discusses Jack Davis's insights on improving intelligence analysis at the CIA, particularly emphasizing the work of Richards J. Heuer, Jr. It explores how human cognitive limitations and biases impact the evaluation of intelligence and the generation of forecasts, and it challenges conventional beliefs that increasing expertise will mitigate these issues. Davis stresses the importance of reassessing the premises of analytic models rather than simply relying on expert knowledge.
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