On the Idea and Ideology of Analytic Philosophy (original) (raw)
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In Search of Analytic Philosophy 1
Festschrift in Honour of Panu Raatikainen on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday, 2024
This is my take on the question of how 'analytic philosophy' ought to be defined. I consider the approach that seeks to capture 'analytic tradition' by means of an analytic definition (necessary and sufficient conditions), and point out a number of defects. I argue that not even a modestly revisionary definition of 'analytic philosophy' (as in some works by Panu Raatikainen) will do the job in a satisfactory way, basically because it inevitably misrepresents the phenomenon that it seeks to capture. I also outline an alternative, which is an historical approach. This is not unlike what Hans-Johann Glock argued for in his 'What is Analytic Philosophy+* (2008); on his view, 'analytic philosophy' is a family resemblance and genetic-historical category. But even this won't do as such, basically because it fails to do justice to the 'features' that supposedly characterize the analytic tradition (even when this characterization is construed in terms of family-resemblance). We have to see the analytic tradition as an historically extended, socially embodied argument (MacIntyre). I make some remarks on what is involved here, using 'linguistic philosophy' as an example. Finally, it is argued that the primary job of the 'features' that we use to understand the analytic tradition is not typological at all but explanatory.
The Preoccupation and Crisis of Analytic Philosophy
2014
generations, who themselves begin their own agendas that are equally overcome, and so on. This suggestion is helpful only if we are able to individuate some unifying features of the starting agenda and then also identify some principles that allow us to trace the proper trails philosophy, there are trails that lead out of it. For example, there is a trail that leads from Frege to Husserl and there is a trail that leads from Austin to Derrida (Derrida 1988, 38 and 130-1). If we are trying to determine the historical identity of analytic philosophy, we need to understand why some trails keep us in and others take us out of the analytic tradition. a history of reception and succession in terms of tutors, teachers, students, departments, institutes, journals, books, textbooks, and so forth. The latter would be a naturalized, emin Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy offers several brief but fascinating and enlight-Hacker, however, is an exception. Analytic philosophers typically are not interested in such naturalistic histories of their own philosophy. Accordingly, my strategy will be intensional, that is, I aim to identify, in Soames' words, the "underlying themes or tendencies that characterize" analytic philosophy (Soames 2003, 1:xiii). Even if there are no unifying doctrines, there may be a set of concepts and attitudes that characterize analytic philosophy and distinguish it from other kinds of philosophy. I hope to characterize this content my characterization instructive. Accordingly, I aim to avoid tendentious or 'churchy' charrigor, and argumentation" and that it aims at "truth and knowledge, as opposed to moral or spiritual improvement" (Soames 2003, 1:xiv). 3. Ryle's Thesis My point of departure is Ryle's characterization of analytic philosophy in 1956 in his introduction to the publication of a series of eight lectures from BBC's Third Programme with the title The Revolution in Philosophy. An aim of this collection, Ryle writes, is to "trace our proximate origins" and to let the essays in this collection be like "memoirs" that "supply the future historian with those considered and marshalled reminiscences which they will need" (Ryle 1956, 1). This is exactly how I want to use this collection. In this introduction Ryle distinguishes between "the vehicle and what it conveys," where vehicles are meaningful psychological or linguistic entities, and what they convey is their sense or meaning. It is in virtue of their meaning that the vehicles are "capable of being true or false...and capable of implying and being incompatible with other judgments." Ryle 6
Analytic Philosophy: An Introductory Essay
Over a period of some years, chiefly before 2000, I wrote this for my students. Quite a few other people have found it useful. I should like to call attention to the thesis that analytic philosophy has two wings: one descended from Russell, the other from Moore. Standard accounts of analytic philosophy (for instance the history by Soames) are, at the least, heavily biased toward the Russellian (today the dominant) variant. As will become evident, the original plan was much more extensive than this, with essays on major figures and movements. That plan fell victim to other projects. Only an essay on Moore and a partial one on Russell were ever completed – they are included here as sequels to this introduction.
Innovations in the History of Analytic Philosophy, Sandra Lapointe and Chris Pincock, editors, 2017
What—if anything—is analytic philosophy? Many people have addressed this difficult question, but I will not attempt to answer it here. Rather, I tackle a smaller, and hopefully more manageable, set of questions: when and how did people begin attaching the label ‘analytic philosophy’ to philosophical work, and using the term ‘analytic philosopher’ to describe themselves and others? These questions can also be framed in terms of actors’ categories: when and how did ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY become an actors’ category? This paper also examines the shifting contrast classes for ‘analytic philosophy’: interestingly, ‘continental philosophy’ is a relative newcomer to the scene; earlier contrasting labels included ‘speculative,’ ‘metaphysical,’ and ‘traditional’ philosophy.