The Sino-Russian Partnership and the East Asian Order (original) (raw)
Related papers
Asian Politics & Policy, 2018
This article takes stock of the advances in research on the implications of China's rise for regional order in East Asia. Together, the four books discussed in this essay contribute to scholarly debates thus far by and large informed by power transition theory. Specifically, the books' main contribution is to return interactions and relationships to the mainstream of International Relations whilst also making China central to theorizing in the field. They draw on constructivist and critical approaches and contribute refreshing theoretical insights, thoughtfully blended with sociological and historical reflections. The authors also discuss a wide range of empirical issues relating to the changes in East Asian regional order, from financial and economic governance to China's various strategic interactions and the Sino-Russian relationship. As power transition theory has received considerable attention of late, this author calls on scholars to pay more attention to other theoretical approaches and to new empirical issues that illustrate China's approach to regional and global affairs.
Chinese Perspectives on the US Alliances in East Asia: A New Type of Great Power Folly
East Asia Strategic Review: China's Rising Strategic Ambitions in Asia , 2019
The changes in China's foreign policy, from prioritising relations with the US to peripheral diplomacy, have their underpinnings in its economic stability and the availability of surplus. There is no doubt that China has yearned to return to the glorious days of its past, a desire more visible in its foreign and defence policies of the last decade. Since 2008, China has transitioned from a tier two power to a challenger of the status quo. In this context, China sees the alliance system as a threat, a bid for containment, restricting its expansion into the seas. While the Chinese approach towards the region is in keeping with the tenets of realism, the strategy in the long term could prove counter-intuitive. Chinese belligerency has pushed nations into internally balancing themselves against China. The lack of credible assurance from the US projects China, with its credible nuclear capabilities, as the next real threat.
George W. Bush’s post-9/11 East Asia policy: enabling China’s contemporary assertiveness
International Politics, 2023
It is commonly argued that China's foreign policy and behaviour have become increasingly assertive since Xi Jinping took the reins of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This strategic transformation is seen as paving the way for a direct confrontation between China and the USA since the Trump presidency. Drawing on the logic of international order-building, however, this article argues that the groundwork for this strategic change was laid when Hu Jintao was leading the CCP and that what made it possible was George W. Bush's China and East Asia policy after 9/11. Bush's subsequent reduced interest in East Asia enabled China to fill the void left by an absence of US presence and influence in the region. This article asserts that American policy-makers may need to ponder what their order-building project to weaken and exclude an illiberal China should include.
OUT OF THE SHADOWS Xi Jinping and Peaceful Order in post-hegemonic Asia
Since assuming power in 2012 Xi Jinping has stale-dated Deng Xiaoping's strictures on biding time and concealing strength. Instead Xi Jinping has unabashedly asserted China's maritime claims and served notice that China seeks to become a maritime power with global reach. In tandem he has reiterated the doctrine of " peaceful development " and renounced Great Power confrontation by seeking bilateral equality with the US. Is there a coherent win-win logic behind a strategy of challenging the primacy of the US in Asia and demanding deference to China's core interests from China's neighbors? What is China's current thinking surrounding the avoidance of security dilemmas? What is the Chinese formula for reconciling hierarchy and competition regionally and globally? The paper looks at the mix of assertiveness and incentivized inducements to a China-centered system of interdependence in current Chinese foreign policy to ask whether this mixture can promote a new structural equilibrium. The outlines of contemporary policy suggest reliance on material incentives to participate in new distribution of regional and global power.
After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of US Decline
International Security, 2011
The post-Cold War era was a brief and uncertain period. As Condoleezza Rice observes, "We knew better where we had been than where we were going." 1 Whereas the sudden peace that broke out in the late 1980s had been unexpected, the exuberant idealism that followed was all too predictable. Realism was pronounced dead, and the future of international politics became legalized, cosmopolitanized, and network globalized. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the world does not appear so easily transformed, or history so easily escaped. 3 Even unipolarity, which seemed strangely durable only a few years ago, appears today as a "passing moment"-one that most realists predicted. 4 Although the United States remains the lone superpower, it is no longer a hyperpower towering over poten-After Unipolarity govern the international system, the nature of that order (its social purpose), and how that order will be provided (whether by means of coercive or legitimate authority). 8 The main causal driver of Robert Gilpin's theory of hegemonic war and international change is the law of uneven rates of growth among states, which redistributes power in the international system. Hegemonic wars concentrate power in the hands of one victorious state, in whose interests a new international order is established. For a time, roughly twenty-ªve years, there is little disjuncture between actual power and prestige, and so the international order remains stable and legitimate. Over time, however, the law of uneven growth diffuses power throughout the system. As the hegemon's competitors grow more powerful, their dissatisfaction with the status quo, ambitions, and demands for prestige and inºuence grow as well. Prestige, however, tends to be sticky: reputations for power, divisions of territory, and the institutional architecture of the international order do not move in lockstep with changes in power. When a large enough disjuncture arises, the system enters a state of disequilibrium. 9 Eventually, serious international crises ensue, as spectacular growth in the economic and military capabilities of rising powers triggers "intense competition among countries for resources and markets, military power, political inºuence, and prestige." 10 Dramatic shifts in power also engender security dilemmas. Whatever their true intentions, rapidly growing states often appear as threats to their neighbors, as well as to the hegemon and its allies. 11
This paper is marked by four sections which build upon an understanding of the strategic interaction of the US and Japan in light of Chinese aspirations to lead the East Asian region. The first section briefly discusses US foreign policy in East Asia under different presidential administrations with the second section focusing on recent US military security initiatives in the region under the Obama administration's rebalancing. The third section examines Japan's balancing role between China and the US under various Japanese administrations and argues that Japan for the present is clearly in Washington's orbit. The final section argues that US efforts to counter a power swing in China's favor will not succeed in preventing China from steadily filling the role of the primary player in the region.
Russia and China A New Model of Great Power Relations
The Ukraine crisis and the downturn in Russia-West relations that came in its wake have compelled Russia to turn decisively towards China. Deprived of other options, Moscow has found itself in the position of demandeur visà-vis Beijing, creating an increasingly imbalanced bilateral relationship.
Examining the Possibility of an Eastphalian International Order
2017
This study provides insight into whether an Eastphalian international legal order is possible, and examines the role of China in particular, basing its arguments on concrete issues, rather than theoretical ones. This paper will first discuss the Eastphalian proposal, initially illustrating the main arguments for the Eastphalian order, and then discussing the possibility of an Eastphalia era. This study stresses that, as a growing international actor, China has the potential to affect the current international order in certain ways. However, these effects will not be enough to cause a transformation of that order, because there other determinative factors exist. This study identifies and assesses these determinative factors for Asia, and in particular China, seeing them as offering new autogenous principles and minimizing the problem of coherence in foreign policy, as well as helping establish a strong regional organization. While autogenous principles are an important way to distinguish a new era from the preceding one, there are several considerations that are equally vital for global acceptance and adoption of these autogenous principles that China would develop. This paper first discusses existing concerns with regard to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, on which China has based its foreign policy. Then, we will highlight coherence issues that have been raised with regard to China's strategies and practices. Finally, we will emphasize the importance of founding an organization that will facilitate regional cooperation in Asia. It is currently unclear whether an Eastphalian world order will manifest itself based on choices made by leading Asian powers, and we must ascertain how far this ideal is from being achieved. The current study contributes to the literature by providing more insight into this largely ignored topic.