Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology (original) (raw)
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WITTGENSTEINIAN HINGE EPISTEMOLOGY AND DEEP DISAGREEMENT
TOPOI, 2018
Deep disagreements concern our most basic and fundamental commitments. Such disagreements seem to be problematic because they appear to manifest epistemic incommensurability in our epistemic systems, and thereby lead to epistemic relativism. This problem is confronted via consideration of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology. On the face of it, this proposal exacerbates the problem of deep disagreements by granting that our most fundamental commitments are essentially arationally held. It is argued, however, that a hinge epistemology, properly understood, does not licence epistemic incommensurability or epistemic relativism at all. On the contrary, such an epistemology in fact shows us how to rationally respond to deep disagreements. It is claimed that if we can resist these consequences even from the perspective of a hinge epistemology, then we should be very suspicious of the idea that deep disagreements in general are as epistemologically problematic as has been widely supposed.
The Wittgensteinian Theory of Deep Disagreement
The epistemic problem of deep disagreement is whether deep disagreements are subject to rational resolution. Pessimists about deep disagreement argue that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, while optimists deny this. In this paper, I consider the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions. I argue that while several varieties of this view do provide adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement, not all of them do. [Please see my Synthese paper 'Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology' and my Topoi SI paper 'What is Deep Disagreement?' for the successors to this draft]
Skepsis
Hinge epistemology is concerned with a particular approach to certain central epistemological questions that is inspired by Wittgenstein's remarks on knowledge, certainty, and related notions in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. I here describe the version of hinge epistemology that I have articulated in recent work, along with its relevance to some fundamental epistemological topics. These topics include the problem of radical scepticism, the nature of epistemic vertigo and its relationship to Wittgensteinian quietism, epistemic relativism, and quasi-fideism regarding the epistemology of religious belief.
Hinge Epistemology is a special issue devoted to the relevance of Wittgenstein's conception of certainty in epistemology. This special issue, edited by A. Coliva & D. Moyal-Sharrock, is forthcoming (2015) in the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Contributions by Yves Bouchard, Annalisa Coliva, Pascal Engel, H.-J. Glock, John Greco, Allan Hazlett, Martin Kusch, Michael Lynch. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Luigi Perissinotto, Duncan Pritchard, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, and Claudine Tiercelin.
Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge-commitments
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2018
In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge-commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard's version of non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge-commitments (NBT). One of the main reasons in favour of NBT over rival anti-sceptical Wittgensteinian views is that it has less theoretical costs and revisionary consequences than its rivals. In this paper, I argue that NBT fairs at least as bad as its rivals in terms of its theoretical costs and revisionism. In particular, I argue that NBT is inconsistent with certain kinds of philosophical disagreement; that it faces worries with mental-state scepticism; and that it faces difficulties in explaining how we can represent ourselves as committed to hinge-commitments.
The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement
Episteme , 2024
Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured by our pre-theoretical intuitions. Since the literature on deep disagreement is subject to this fundamental confusion and deep disagreement is not a helpful umbrella term either, I propose eliminating the notion of deep disagreement from the philosophical discourse. Instead of analyzing the nature of deep disagreement, we should develop theories about different forms of disagreement, including disagreement about hinge propositions and disagreement about epistemic principles, and, in particular, a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement.
Closure, Credence and Rationality: a Problem for Non-Belief Hinge Epistemology
Synthese, 2019
Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments. In order to do this, it appeals to a Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluation, the overarching theme of which is that it neither makes sense to doubt nor to believe in our anti-sceptical hinge commitments. The purpose of this paper is to show that the argument for the claim that there can be no rational basis to believe our anti-sceptical hinge commitments relies upon an implicit assumption about rational support that I label The Pritchensteinian Rational Grounds Principle. I argue that, insofar as this principle is intended to apply to closure-style inferences, it leads to irrational doxastic attitudes. I consider a seemingly plausible modification of the principle that would avoid this result but show that this modified principle faces serious problems of its own.
Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility
Episteme, 2021
Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the appropriate way to handle such disagreements, especially concerning matters about which there are important practical and political needs for us to come to a consensus? In this paper, I consider an explanation of the apparent intractability of deep disagreement offered by hinge epistemology. According to this explanation, at least some deep disagreements are rationally unresolvable because they concern 'hinge' commitments that are unresponsive to rational considerations. This explanation, if correct, seems to have troubling implications for how we should respond to deep disagreement. If my position on a topic is not responsive to rational considerations, then what choice have I but to dogmatically hold to that position, and simply dismiss the views of those with whom I disagree? I address this problem by identifying an attitude of intellectual humility that is appropriate to have towards one's hinge commitments, and suggest that this attitude provides the basis for a non-rational, constructive way to resolve deep disagreement.
Topoi (special issue on disagreement and argumentation) , 2018
What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments, and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and I argue that while the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian theory on this score, the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement.
Routledge Handbook to Philosophy of Disagreement
An examination is offered of the nature of deep disagreements, culminating in a tripartite theoretical account of their nature. The relationship between deep disagreements and hinge epistemology is then explored. It is argued that disagreements over one’s hinge commitments would seem to be a paradigm case of deep disagreement, though it is also pointed out that the very idea of hinge disagreement may be hard to make sense of on some versions of hinge epistemology. Nonetheless, insofar as there can be hinge disagreements, it is plausible that they count as deep disagreements. It is further claimed that deep hinge disagreements may be open to resolution—i.e., that accepting the existence of deep hinge disagreements doesn’t entail a commitment to there being epistemically incommensurable epistemic systems. It is finally argued that even if all hinge disagreements are deep disagreements, it is not obvious that all deep disagreements are hinge disagreements.