Review of "Israel and Its Palestinian Citizens: Ethnic Privileges in the Jewish State" edited by Nadim N. Rouhana, (original) (raw)
Introduction: PALESTINE IN A TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT
Social Text, 2003
In the three years since the outbreak of the second Intifada in October 2000, the policy making of the U.S. government has been haunted by the question of Palestine. The Intifada made briefly visible the consequences of Israel's continued occupation and expanded colonization of the West Bank and Gaza, an expansion facilitated by the Oslo accords of 1993 and disguised under the name of "the peace process." Within a year, however, the launching of the worldwide war on terror provided Washington with a new way to misrepresent the nature of Israel's war against the Palestinians. A century-long history of dispossession, expulsion, occupation, and resistance was reduced, once again, to a series of Palestinian acts of terror. A people's loss of their homes and homeland, of their freedom of movement and human dignity, of their personal security and political future, could instead be framed as a battle of civilization against terror, of democracy against hatred, of the West against Islam. Under the banner of the war on terror, the United States then announced its plans for a war against Iraq as the cornerstone of an unapologetic project to remake the political order of the Middle East. Yet the question of Palestine refused to disappear. From the protests of up to half a million people in several cities of Europe to the revived antiwar activism of the campuses of North American universities (see Vincent Lloyd and Zia Mian's essay in this issue), an emergent peace movement in the West placed the issue of Palestinian rights, alongside the right of the Iraqi people to be spared the devastation of war, at the center of its politics. The importance attached to the Palestine question was a response to the obvious discrepancy between Washington's use of U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iraq, its disregard for council resolutions against Israel, and its vetoing of any international intervention on behalf of the Palestinians. But the importance reflected something larger. The injustice against the Palestinians has always been carried out in the name of the West. Washington supports, funds, and arms many forms of injustice in the Middle East. But only in the case of Israel is the injustice disguised and defended as a moral struggle of the West against the rest. The Palestine question now haunts the West, much as the question of apartheid haunted a previous generation. We draw the analogy with apartheid not to make any simplistic historical comparison between Israel and South
Introduction-Tracing History, Politics and Law as a Vindication of Palestinian Liberation.pdf
New Middle Eastern Studies, 2018
Today, the Zionist occupation of Palestine and the continued dislocation of Palestinians for nearly a hundred years through brute force -combined with the former's discursive hegemony over its victimsremain as major obstacles to the construction of a peaceful and stable international political order in the Middle East. The so-called Palestinian problem remains the key to understand the failure of the Middle Eastern sub-system to produce sustainable peace in the region. This brief introduction to the special issue seeks to explain the general perspective and summarise main arguments of the contributors who have approached the issue of Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the lenses of various fields of study such as international law, foreign policy analysis and discourse analysis. As will be seen, all the authors offer notable critical reflections that challenge established understandings of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the mainstream Western media and scholarly literature.
American Journal of International Law, 1993
In 1897 Zionism emerged as a European-wide political move ment with the first World Zionist Congress held in Basle, Switzer land, where Theodor Herzl, an editor of the influential Viennese paper, Neue Freie Presse, had emerged as a leader. Herzl's 1896 pamphlet Der Judenstaat (The State of the Jews) had called for a Jewish state in Palestine, and its publication in Vienna made a great impact. Not surprisingly, Zionism had its strongest following in Russia, but even there it was only one of several nationalist currents in Jewry.2 Despite the difficult circumstances of life, most Jews remained in Eastern Europe and of those leaving most still preferred the United States. 3 In Palestine, an Arab-populated country under the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire, Zionist immigrants set up agricultural settlements on pur chased land. "From the very beginning," wrote Ariel Hecht, an Israeli analyst of land tenure in Palestine, "it was clear to the leaders of the Zionist movement that the acquisition of land was a sine qua non towards the realisation of their dream."4 Land was not acquired in a random fashion. The effort, wrote Israeli General Yigal Allon, was "to establish a chain of villages on one continuous area of Jewish land.'0 The Arabs, soon realizing that the immigrant's aim was to establish a Jewish state, began to oppose Zionism.6 As early as 1891 Zionist leader, Ahad Ha'am, wrote that the Arabs "understand very well what we are doing and what we are aiming at."7 In 1 90 1 the World Zionist Organization formed a company, the Keren Kayemeth (Jewish National Fund), to buy land for Jewish settlers.8 According to its charter, the Fund would buy land in "Pal estine, Syria, and other parts of Turkey in Asia and the Peninsula of Sinai."9 The aim of the Fund was "to redeem the land of Palestine as the inalienable possession of the Jewish people."10 Fund director, Abra ham Granovsky, called "land redemption" the "most vital operation in establishing Jewish Palestine."11 The Fund's land could not be sold to anyone and could be leased only to a Jew, an "unincorporated body of Jews," or a Jewish company that promoted Jewish settlement. A lessee was forbidden to sublease.12 Herzl considered land acquisition under a tenure system that kept it in Jewish hands as the key to establishing Zionism in Palestine. "Let the owners of immovable property believe that they are cheating us," he wrote, "selling us things for more than they are worth. But we are The British Connection 5 not going to sell them anything back."13 The Fund thus kept land as a kind of trustee for a future state.14 The Fund purchased large tracts owned by absentee landowners. Most of this land was tilled by farmers whose families had held it for generations with possessory rights recognized by customary law. Re grettably for many of these families, in the late nineteenth century Turkey had instituted a land registration system that led to wealthy absentees gaining legal title to land, often by questionable means. After this occurred, the family farmers continued in possessionas tenantsand considered themselves to retain their customary right to the land, although that was no longer legally the case.15 At the turn of the century the better farmland in Palestine was being cultivated. In 1882 a British traveler, Laurence Oliphant, reported that the Plain of Esdraelon in northern Palestine, an area in which the Fund purchased land, was "a huge green lake of waving wheat."16 This meant that the Fund could not acquire land without displacing Arab farmers. A delegate to a 1905 Zionist congress, Yitzhak Epstein, warned: "Can it be that the dispossessed will keep silent and calmly accept what is being done to them? Will they not ultimately arise to regain, with physical force, that which they were deprived of through the power of gold? Will they not seek justice from the strangers that placed themselves over their land?"17 An element of the Zionist concept of "land redemption" was that the land should be worked by Jews. This meant that Arabs should not be hired as farm laborers. While this policy was not uniformly implemented, it gained adherence. In 191 3 Ha'am objected to it. "I can't put up with the idea that our brethren are morally capable of behaving in such a way to men of another people ... if it is so now, what will be our relation to the others if in truth we shall achieve power?"18 But Herzl viewed the taking of land and expulsion of Arabs as complementary aspects of Zionism. It would be necessary, he thought, to get the Arabs out of Palestine. "We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country.. .. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly."19 Some Zion ist leaders advocated moving Palestine Arabs to neighboring coun Israel as a Fact 89 draw its support for Israel's membership in the United Nations and warned against any further idf offensives.20 Under that pressure Ben-Gurion withdrew the idf from Egyptian territory and canceled plans to take Gaza and the Sinai.21 At the same time Ben-Gurion withdrew the idf from southern Lebanon, where it had penetrated. The Litani River, an important water source, flowed through southern Lebanon. General Yigal Allon criticized Ben-Gurion's decision to withdraw, complaining that the Index Aaland Islands, Abdiilhamid II (sultan of the Ottoman Empire), 7 Abdullah (emir of Transjordan, King of
Journal of Palestine Studies, 2017
This paper reexamines the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and the extent to which a viable two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was ever truly possible. Such a reexamination seems all the more pertinent today on the hundredth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. It is also seventy years since the United Nations Partition Plan to divide historic Palestine and fifty years since UN Security Council Resolution 242, which has been the basis for every peace agreement between Israel and its neighbors but makes no mention of or reference to the Palestinian people. The paper argues that the history of the past fifty years reinforces the claim that a State is central to any attempt to fight Palestinian erasure and ensure "the right to have rights," as Hannah Arendt put it, but it argues that such an entity needs to be elevated above the nation, rather than made subservient to it if it is to protect the rights of Palestinians and all those living on the land of Palestine.
Palestine in Flux From search For state to search For tactics
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016
Official Palestinian institutions and leaders have lost their moral legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian people who view them as ineffective or even co-opted by Israel. A new generation of grassroots activists is shifting the focus from the goal of Palestinian statehood to the pursuit of new tactics to resist the Israeli occupation. To improve the lives of Palestinians, this new moral vanguard will need to transform and revive existing Palestinian institutions or build new ones.
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2015
Depending on who is speaking, the tipping point beyond which a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict becomes impossible is approaching, imminent, or passed. Raja Khalidi, in the opening to his chapter in One Land Two States, writes "[it] does not take an expert to recognize that a partition of territory and sovereignty on the basis of geo-demographic realities today is most likely not a viable solution." A binational or civic one-state democracy seems remote and undesirable, or else a formula for entrenched apartheid. As a result, those who believe the conflict must be resolved and not just managed are increasingly exploring ideas that acknowledge both the need for separation, but accept that the land is small and the populations increasingly inextricable. One Land Two States is one of the only book-length works to explore a specific separate-buttogether model in theoretical and practical depth. It adds to a slow but steady growth of academic literature considering confederal proposals for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One Land Two States grew out of the "Parallel States Project," a group of prescient academics who began their discussions in 2008; the chapters in this edited collection were written by participants in that project. The academic interest complements a similar flurry of activity on the ground. Local civil society efforts have yielded confederal projects with similar names, such as Two States, One Homeland and Two States, One Space. Benjamin Netanyahu's recent re-election in March gives the issue new urgency. The fallacy of a status quo has been shattered by a trio of wars in Gaza and Netanyahu's election-eve rejection of the two-state concept, as well as more aggressive Palestinian activity in the international arena. Israel is deepening its grip on "Area C"-60 percent of the West Bank-and coalition partner Naftali Bennett, among others, has called openly for annexation. Strict two-staters have argued that confederal approaches are unrealistic slogans. But radical political changes can indeed start as broad ideas, fleshed out over time by new proponents. This book advances that process, through theoretical discussions of sovereignty, elaborate proposals for security and economy, law, and even the role of religion. It is comprehensive, detailed, and confronts problems at every step; accusations of sloganism or naiveté do not apply. Several chapters are devoted to disaggregating the elements of sovereignty and putting them together again differently. Jens Bartelson summarizes the main criticisms of traditional sovereignty, then ups the ante: if we accept that classic territorial inviolability has been breached over history, if political ownership is increasingly delinked from land, then what? That's when the authors take the leap, in proposing sovereignty based on identity, rights, individuals, and law. The result is a tantalizing proposal for "parallel states" (which could more accurately be called layered states, since "parallel" implies side-by-side but never touching). The two states would be defined by citizenship rather than geography or borders. "Heartland" areas dominated by one of the national groups would be small and limited-all the rest is open season: "Two parallel state structures, both covering the whole territory, with one answering to Palestinians and one to Israelis regardless of where they live" (p. 2). What can this putatively simple formulation mean? Can two different governments on the same land be a fair and functional way of managing life for two integrated but hostile populations? The authors do not underestimate the theoretical challenge, calling it "conceptually demanding." Mossberg, a former diplomat, proposes that sovereign powers can be divided between shared and
The Political and Legal Underpinnings of the Palestine-Israel Conflict
New Politics, 2023
This paper starts with the historical background to the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023 on Israel and the Israeli response of bombing the Gaza Strip while blocking all food, water, medicines and fuel from reaching its population of 2.3 million people. It attempts to explain the responses of world leaders, which in the case of Western countries contrast sharply with the responses of their people, especially on the issue of a ceasefire. It ends by looking at ways of supporting the human and democratic rights of Palestinians while also combating antisemitism, a task made easier by the pivotal role played by Jewish scholars and activists in the struggle for truth and justice in Palestine.