Can India Balance Between Beijing and Washington, by Tridivesh Singh Maini, Modern Diplomacy - South Asia, October 18, 2018 (original) (raw)

Foreign Policy- Adapting India, Accommodating United States: A case of Iranian sanctions

In the last decade India has firmly maintained its opposition to unilateral sanctions on several occasions. Recently, however, when White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest acknowledged India’s “substantial sacrifice” in implementing US sanctions against Iran, New Delhi’s resistance to unilateral sanctions appeared shallow. India’s opposition as well as contended support to the sanctions cannot be understood without taking into account Washington’s efforts to garner New Delhi’s cooperation. Interactions between the two governments on the Iranian issue are not an exercise of persuasion-resistance and subsequent compliance, as media reports seemingly suggest. They are indicative of an involved bilateral process whereby a responsive New Delhi adapted to US-led sanctions regime, and in turn Washington accommodated Indian interests.

Rising US-Iran Hostilities and Challenges for India

IDSA Issue Brief, 2019

US withdrawal from JCPOA, its imposition of unilateral sanctions on Iran and the recent war of words between the countries have led to a rapid rise in tensions in the Persian Gulf. India has also been affected by the US sanctions, especially on imports of Iranian oil. While India is unlikely to risk ties with the US to please Iran, it should, nonetheless, explore options such as buying Iranian oil through unconventional channels and enhance its investments in Chabahar in order to placate Tehran.

India -US Relations : The China Factor

isara solutions, 2021

(Raj) It is important to bear in mind that since India-China, and US-China relations are becoming extremely tense over bilateral, regional and international issues, India and the United States have enormous opportunities to come much closer to each other to deal with China's increasingly threatening posture, be it in the South China Sea or in the Ladakh region where India and China are locked in a military stand off for last more than six months. This warranted Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Donald Trump to cooperate with each other to halt China's expansionist designs. For this, both Washington and New Delhi have undertaken a series of measures on several fronts such as putting restrictions on imports from China, the closure of China's internet sources and telecommunication links.

US Sanctions against Iran and Their Implications for the Indo-Pacific

2021

India’s relationship with the United States within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) framework is complicated as India has a strong strategic partnership with Iran, which is an US adversary. US sanctions against Iran pose a dilemma for India. In 2019, India was the third largest buyer of Iranian oil, with 258,000 barrels per day, and in the same year, Iran was India’s third largest supplier of oil, after Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Allowing Iran to sell its oil unhindered to India would give the former additional resources to continue its activities inimical to US interests, such as missile development, funding proxy militias, and its nuclear programme. However, US sanctions on Iran have significant effects on India and its ability to be a reliable member of the Quad, with further security implications for the Indo-Pacific region.

New Potential for US–India Relations Under Obama

The International Spectator, 2009

Speaking soon after his inauguration in January this year, President Barack Obama said that relations with India would be a priority for his administration: ''Our rapidly growing and deepening friendship with India offers benefits to all the world's citizens. .. (the people of India) should know they have no better friend and partner than the people of the United States.'' 1 But it took eight months into his administration for the contours of Obama's India policy to emerge, and until recently it was unclear whether it would be a continuation of the Bush administration policy (widely described as the move from estranged to engaged democracies), or depart from it in significant ways. In the early months of his administration, many in India feared that the burgeoning US-India relationship would slip under President Obama, despite his high-sounding words. An off-the-cuff remark on the need for US mediation on Kashmir, made in an interview with Time magazine, was the first to raise Indian hackles. Then there was the threat of the landmark 2005 US-India civil nuclear energy agreement becoming no more than a piece of paper, given the Democrats' strong commitment to non-proliferation. Finally, persistent US lobbies for Obama's AfPak policy to be an AfPakInd policy, placing India in the same 'problem' basket as Pakistan, seemed to set the seal on India's dismay. These fears were assuaged one by one. There have been no US attempts to mediate on Kashmir. AfPak remained AfPak, despite the lobbies. And Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's July visit to India began to operationalise the US-India civil nuclear energy agreement, with both sides agreeing to the terms of end user certification.