Beastly contractarianism? A contractarian analysis of the possibility of animal rights (original) (raw)
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A discussion on the philosophy of rights and interests of animals
Theories of rights are many and engaging in a detailed discussion of those theories is beyond the scope of this essay. However, here we shall start with the views of the 17th century philosopher Rene Descartes, which informed attitudes towards animals well into the 20th century. Descartes based his rights arguments on cogito, ergo sum: I think, therefore I am 1. Therefore consciousness and thought were central to his views on humans and animals. In part five of Discourse on Method published in 1637, he examined the nature of animals and how they were distinguished from humans. Mind, for Descartes, was not part of the physical universe; it was a separate substance and a link between humans and the mind of God. This link to God i.e. mind was unique to humans and non-humans had no mind and therefore no link to the mind of God. 2 His views suggest that the use of language is a sign of rationality and only beings that possess minds and souls are rational and argues that animals do not have immaterial minds or souls and are therefore not rational. It therefore follows that animals do not have sensations like pain, thirst or hunger. Animals for Descartes, were therefore nothing more than a "complex automata" and the squeals of pain, were mechanical reactions of the animal to external stimuli and not evidence of any sensation of pain. Humans on the other hand have minds or rational souls hence their capacity to use language and feel sensations like hunger, thirst and pain and this justifies their entitlement to holding rights. Furthermore, philosophers such as Locke and Grotius attached great emphasis on the ability of humans to reason, which for them justified their equal access to rights. However, the basis proposed by Descartes, Locke, and Grotius and defended by modern philosophers such as Georodie Duckler is being increasingly questioned. Questions are being asked about the moral standing of animals and whether their interests should also be considered. Amongst the commentators who have increasingly questioned the justification for focusing exclusively on human interests to the exclusion of all other species is Peter Singer who has attacked the basis of the theories of natural law. Singer is an advocate of utilitarianism and in Animal Liberation Movement, he refers to the proposals of equality of consideration by many philosophers, but points to their failure to recognize that this principle also applies to members of other species and not only humans. 3
Animal Rights as an Extension of Self-Value
A number of theories have been put forward from the days of the pre-Socratic philosophers through modern times attempting to determine how the relationship between the animal species and the human species ought to function in regards to how humans treat animals. These theories have generated numerous ideas, but often rely on claims that animals are living creatures and thus deserve a set of rights, or, that animals are an inferior species to humans but are living creatures capable of feeling pain and thus a superior human species has a duty to keep the pain inflicted upon animals at the lowest level possible it not eliminate it all together. In this essay, I will argue that neither a rights based approach nor a duty to the animals based approach to how humans ought to treat animals are correct, but that humans possess a duty to our humanity to treat animals in a way that is commensurate with how we treat fellow humans. I will distinguish the difference between animals and humans regarding each set of species capabilities of performing moral actions and explain why these differences disqualify animals from being owed a set of inherent rights. I will then offer a thought experiment, "how we treat non-moral agents" to show how even without providing creatures capable of moral actions a set of inherent rights humans still have a duty to ensure animals are not mistreated. This duty will challenge the idea that we have a duty to animals for animal's sake, and I will show why a duty to animals for humans will still allow for animals to be treated in ways humans would not wish upon other humans. I will then put forward my theory on why humans owe it to humanity to treat animals with a basic respect.
Journal of Social Philosophy, 2014
I argue that non-human animals are claimants of justice, using an interest-based approach to theorizing about justice. I critique two liberal defenses of animals, and then offer an alternative view that appeals to the principle of equal consideration, a principle which should appeal to consequentialists and deontologists alike. I demonstrate that this principle, when applied at the level of social structures rather than particular actions, compels us to conclude that animal commodification is an injustice that is remediable only through the adoption of a view I refer to as “radical abolitionism,” which requires the abolition of humans’ use of non-human animals as resources. In the course of this argument, I reply to the arguments of Robert Garner and Alasdair Cochrane which purport to demonstrate that the commodification of animals is compatible with humans’ moral duties to animals.
Justification of Animal Rights Claim
2009
The objective of the paper is to justify the claim for animals" rights. For years, it is one of the most debated questions in the field of applied ethics whether animals" have rights or not. There are a number of philosophers who hold that animals are neither moral agent nor rational being and hence animals have no rights because the concept of rights is applicable only to the rational beings. On the other hand the proponents of animals" rights contend that the standard for having rights is not active rationality but sentience and animals have sentience as they feel pain. So they are also subject to have rights. The main questions to be justified in this essay are, what is it to say that animals have rights? Can animals have any rights at all, if yes, how far? Is it the moral obligation of the human being to ensure animals rights? Considering the questions, in this essay, it will be shown that animals have limited rights and not all animals are subject to having the same rights. It depends on the proportion of their having capacity and capability for the same. It will be tried to make a consensus between the two groups by the way that there are some aspects where we are to acknowledge the rights of animal. It will be shown that not all animals are subject to equal rights.
Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative Normative Guidance
Between the Species: An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals, 2003
Singer rejects the notion that ethics is "an ideal system which is all very noble in theory but no good in practice." [2] Singer identifies deontological approaches to ethics, such as rights theories, as impractical and as having to "rescue" themselves from their inapplicability to moral issues in the real world through the introduction of "complexities" such as formulating very detailed rules or establishing ranking structures for rules. He argues that utilitarianism does not start with rules but with goals, and thus has greater normative specificity because actions are prescribed or proscribed based on "the extent to which they further these goals." [3] Utilitarianism, Singer argues, is "untouched by the complexities" required to make deontological moral theories-including rights theory-applicable in concrete moral situations.[4] According to Singer, "[t]he classical utilitarian regards an action as right if it produces as much or more of an increase in the happiness of all affected by it than any alternative action, and wrong if it does not." [5] Singer's views about the nature of rights theory have had a profound impact on the animal rights movement. In the past five or so years, an increasing number of animal advocates have eschewed rights theory for precisely the reason that rights theory is supposedly incapable of providing determinate normative guidance. The concern articulated by these animal advocates is that rights theory demands the immediate abolition of animal exploitation, and that immediate abolition is simply unrealistic. Instead, these animal advocates support the pursuit of incremental animal welfare reform as a "realistic" means of reducing suffering and eventually achieving abolition. The animal welfare approach requires that we treat animals in a more "humane" way, and that we prohibit "unnecessary" suffering. For example, Ingrid Newkirk of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) ostensibly endorses a rights position and ultimately seeks the abolition of animal exploitation, but she argues that "total victory, like checkmate, cannot be achieved in one move" and that we must endorse the moral