UNINTENTIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION (original) (raw)

The Logic of Collective Action Revisited The Logic of Collective Action Revisited

2018

Since Mancur Olson's "Logic of collective action" it is common conviction in social sciences that in large groups the prospects of a successful organization of collective actions are rather bad. Following Olson's logic, the impact of an individual's costly contribution becomes smaller if the group gets larger and, consequently, the incentive to cooperate decreases with group size. Conducting a series of laboratory experiments with large groups of up to 100 subjects, we demonstrate that Olson's logic does not generally account for observed behavior. Large groups in which the impact of an individual contribution is almost negligible are still able to provide a public good in the same way as small groups in which the impact of an individual contribution is much higher. Nevertheless, we find that small variations of the MPCR in large groups have a strong effect on contributions. We develop a hypothesis concerning the interplay of MPCR and group size, which is b...

THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: SOME EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS'

The results of an experiment to test hypotheses derived from Oleon's theory of collective action at the group level are reported. Strong evidence in favor of the theory is found with respect to the effects of group size on the amount of the collective good provided and on the degree of suboptimality associated with noncooperative provision of the good. For reasons discussed in the paper, the experimental results do not support the exploitation hypothesis.

Collective Intentionality and Individual Action

People often do things together and form groups in order to get things done that they cannot do alone. In short they form a collectivity of some kind or a group, for short. But if we consider a group on the one hand and the persons that constitute the group on the other hand, how does it happen that these persons work together and finish a common task with a common goal? In the philosophy of action this problem is often solved by saying that there is a kind of collective intention that the group members have in mind and that guides their actions. Does such a collective intention really exist? In this article I'll show that the answer is " no ". In order to substantiate my view I'll discuss the approaches of Bratman, Gilbert and Searle on collective intention. I'll put forward four kinds of criticism that undermine the idea of collective intention. They apply mainly to Bratman and Gilbert. First, it is basically difficult to mark off smaller groups from bigger unities. Second, most groups change in membership composition over time. Third, as a rule, on the one hand groups are internally structured and on the other hand they belong to a larger structure. It makes that generally it cannot be a collective intention that moves the actions of the members of a group. Fourth, conversely, most individual actions cannot be performed without the existence of a wider context of agents who support these actions and make them possible. My critique on Searle mainly involves that in his approach his idea of collective intention is superfluous and that he is not radical enough in his idea that collective action is based on coordinated individual intentions and actions. However, it is a good starting point for showing how collective action actually functions, especially when combined with Giddens's structuration theory. Every agent in a group executes his or her own individual intentions , relying on what the group offers to this agent and asks from him or her. In this way individual actions of the members of a group are coordinated and it makes that the group can function and that its goals can be performed. And in this way the group is produced and reproduced by fitting individual actions together. An individual agent who belongs to a group only needs to know what s/he wants and what s/he has to do in the group, even if s/he has no knowledge of the intentions and commitments of the other members. Then he or she can do things together with others in a group without supposing that there is something like a collective intention.

Collective Action : On Theory and Praxis

2011

1. Related to the introduction of the editors, we propose to treat the following questions. Which is the context of the development of the new domain of theoretical thinking, namely "collective action". Why do people talk about "collective action" and in what context do they do so? What is the meaning of "the theory of collective action", and the "mathematics of collective action"? And finally, what is meant by "collective action" and "theory of collective action" ? It seems reasonable to answer the former questions, which relate to the context, after one has given some specifications on the latter ones, which relate both to the meaning of "collective action" and of "theory". Collective action is a process enabling several actors to influence social reality, or enabling them to change social reality in correspondance with their definite purposes and interests. If one intends to treat the subject more pre...

First and Second Generation Theories of Collective Action

"Modern Dilemmas: Understanding Collective Action in the 21st Century", Dylan Kissane and Alexandru Volacu (eds.), Ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2015

In this chapter we provide a general introduction to collective action theory. Following Ostrom and Ahn (2009) we differentiate between first and second generation theories of collective action and we divide the chapter into two major sections according to this delineation. In section (1.2.1) we provide an overview of Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action, which represents the paradigmatic case of theories belonging to the first generation. In this section we provide both the standard view of a collective action problem, as proposed by Olson, the free riding hypothesis, his definition of a public good, his taxonomy of groups and the implications of this taxonomy for collective action, as well as some of the main critiques and refinements of his theory. In section (1.2.2) we describe the standard taxonomy of goods, as used in the bulk of contemporary literature on collective action. This taxonomy departs from Olson’s own classification of goods and draws on a combination of the works of Samuelson (1954) and Musgrave (1959), which is developed into a coherent view by Ostrom and Ostrom (1977), and is particularly important for understanding what types of goods are susceptible to generate collective action problems. In section (1.2.3) we provide an introductory explanation to the standard conceptualization of collective action problems, within a game theoretical framework. In order to do this, we use the classical prisoner’s dilemma game with one individual and one collective player, showing that (at least) in the one-shot game, first generation theories of collective action will predict that the result of the game will be non-cooperation from all players, since that is both the dominant strategy for each player and the Nash Equilibrium. In section (1.3.1) we provide an introduction to some of the main ideas which characterize the Ostromian theory of collective action, a paradigmatic case for second generation theories, which was developed as a response to the puzzles presented by experimental and empirical evidence of cooperation in collective action dilemmas. In section (1.3.2) we outline the experimental approach to collective action problems, used both as a testing ground for theories belonging to both generations and for theory-building. We describe a classical version of a public goods experiment , as constructed by Andreoni (1995) and summarize the major results obtained in the experimental literature, following Ledyard (1995) and Ostrom (2000). In section (1.3.3) we describe another mechanism for testing and theory-building, used exclusively by second generation theorists, i.e. empirical case studies. We provide some of the main collections of such studies and we gloss over some of the main results obtained. In the final section (1.4) we provide concluding remarks.

Individual Responsibility for Collective Action

2020

This chapter will develop standards for assessing individual moral responsibility for collective action. In some cases, these standards expand a person’s responsibility beyond what she or he would be responsible for if performing the same physical behavior outside of a group setting. I will argue that structural diff erences between two ideal types of groups— organizations and goaloriented collectives— largely determine the baseline moral responsibility of group members for the group’s collective action. (Group members can be more or less responsible for collective action beyond that baseline due to personal qualities like knowledge of the intended collective outcome.) The same individual physical behavior can make the member of a goaloriented collective responsible for the entire collective action to an equal degree with her fellow group members, whereas the typical organization member is only responsible for his contributory action. I will proceed with a culpability standard of re...