Jordan's Protests and Neoliberal Reforms: Walking on Thin Ice (original) (raw)
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Handbook on Contemporary Jordan, 2019
Jordan offers us a very interesting case study of the ways in which modern global political and economic processes interact with local political economy to shape individual states. This chapter argues that Jordan, as a small state by most interpretations, faces immense structural limitations, yet under King Abdullah II, it has endured and its political economy has evolved in response to the dynamic set of challenges the country faces. This chapter first explores the most prevalent challenges and limitations to Jordan’s economic development and contextualizes the key features of Jordan’s political economy in the 21st century. This chapter also outlines the ways in which the political and economic issues that the kingdom faces shape national economic policy-making. Any discussion of the political economy of Jordan needs to consider energy insecurity and freshwater scarcity – two issues that are explored in detail in this chapter. Energy insecurity and freshwater scarcity reveal a great deal about the nature of Jordan’s political economy, representing Jordan’s most pressing security concerns and demonstrating the state’s pragmatism in its policy responses to developmental challenges. The chapter then explores the embedding of economic neoliberalism, led by the government and King Abdullah II in particular. Neoliberal policies have become prevalent in Jordanian decision-making circles and have transformed Jordan’s political economy – but are not particularly popular on the street. The chapter concludes that given the challenges facing Jordan’s political economy in the 21st century, it is safe to say that Jordan will remain a small state that will have to continue to respond to processes that are largely out of its control. Budgetary insecurity, poverty, high unemployment, energy insecurity, freshwater scarcity, and the polarising effects of economic neoliberalism all pose serious challenges to Jordan’s development and stability. Yet with all of these considerations in mind, the story of Jordan’s political economy is one of resilience as much as it is one of challenges, and the kingdom is likely to continue to develop, albeit somewhat unevenly.
Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund
Middle East Policy, 1998
more recent instability the king stood behind the government, offered no concessions and, to the contrary, threatened to use any means necessary to quell the disturbances. This paper analyzes the connections between economic adjustment and political instability in the Jordanian context, with particular emphasis on the startling differences in Hashemite regime responses to the upheavals of 1989 and 1996.(1) Drawing on field research and interviews with Jordanian policy makers (conducted in 1992, 1993 and 1997), I argue that the key difference is that Jordan has undergone a wholesale domestic and international realignment since 1989. The 1989 and 1996 austerity measures, in short, are part of the same broad program of economic and even political restructuring in Jordan since the late eighties. But since this is a cumulative process of political as well as economic adjustment, the domestic and international circumstances for the regime had changed considerably between 1989 and 1996. Economicadjustment measures, therefore, must be seen as intricately linked to Jordan's domestic political changes as well as to its foreign-policy shifts (including peace with Israel). Taken together, these policies are intended to ensure the long-term survival of the Hashemite regime in a post-Cold War, post-Gulf War, and even post-King Hussein world. It is the very success of this comprehensive "realignment" process, then, that explains the different government reactions to unrest in 1989 and 1996.
The Political Economy of Energy Subsidy Reform Gabriela Inchauste and David G. Victor, Editors The World Bank Group
Jordan: Strategy for Adjustment and Growth
International Monetary Fund eBooks, 1996
The papers presented in this study were prepared by staff members who have participated in cooperative exchanges between Jordan and the IMF over the past three years. The authors acknowledge the excellent research assistance provided by Use-Marie Fayad and secretarial support by Irene Carpenter, Susan Jones, and Mary Ann Miles. The authors are also grateful to Elisa Diehl of the External Relations Department, who edited the paper for publication and coordinated production. The views expressed here, as well as any errors, are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Government of Jordan, the Executive Directors of the IMF, or other members of the IMF staff. The study was completed in August 1995 and is based on information available at that time. vii ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution This page intentionally left blank ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution 3 Based on the revised sectoral classification recommended by the IMF's Statistics Department; because of reclassification, the changes shown under this column may not be meaningful. 4 Consists of central government operations: net general budget and net own budget. 5 Also includes claims on municipalities and local governments and on the Social Security Corporation. includes claims on specialized credit institutions (for the period up to 1993 under the old classification) and financial institutions. 7 Excluding grants from the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group and transfers of workers' savings. 8 Readily usable foreign exchange of the Central Bank of Jordan; excluding foreign exchange deposits by residents at the Central Bank of Jordan, gold, and claims on the Central Bank of Iraq; data are for end of period. 9 Period averages.
Journal of Democracy, 2013
Why has Jordan’s authoritarianism remained so stubborn? What makes the country’s Hashemite monarchy exceptional is that virtually no constituency apart from domestic oppositionists and international human-rights organizations puts consistent pressure on the kingdom to democratize. Western policy makers and Jordanian officials have successfully cultivated the kingdom’s image as a “moderate” Arab state, an oasis of stability and key ally in the world’s most strategic and turbulent region. Foreign aid from the United States and its allies remains the kingdom’s economic lifeline, and thus the best means by which to encourage the regime to actually take popular demands into account in its next reform gambit. With stability on the line, the next five years will prove to be the crucible for the Jordanian crown.
Jordan: Restructuring Public Expenditures and Protecting the Poor
IMF Working Papers, 1991
In Jordan, a system of general food subsidies became untenable in budgetary terms, with a sharp devaluation of the dinar in the late 1980s. A shift from a general subsidy system to limited rations would greatly reduce budgetary costs and minimize adverse effects on the poor. To reduce subsidies, the authorities had taken measures, during the course of 1990, consistent with the measures suggested. To complete the safety net, a system of self-targeting public works is suggested; a reform of the social security system might also be needed in view of the increased unemployment resulting from the recent Middle East crisis.