Syntactic Features of Proper Names: The Generativist Approach(es) to Properhood (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Property-theoretical, Performative-nominalistic Theory of Proper Names
Dialectica, 2000
This paper embeds a theory of proper names in a general approach to singular reference based on type-free property theory. It is proposed that a proper name “N” is a sortal common noun whose meaning is essentially tied to the linguistic type “N”. Moreover, “N” can be singularly referring insofar as it is elliptical for a definite description of the form the “N” Following Montague, the meaning of a definite description is taken to be a property of properties. The proposed theory fulfils the major desiderata stemming from Kripke's works on proper names.
Form and Function of Proper Names
Proper names (PN) are presumably a universal class of expressions which comprise prototypically anthroponyms and toponyms. There is a long standing tradition of scientific research of PN particularly in philosophy and onomastics. Philosophers were mostly interested in PN as referential expressions and in the nature of this kind of reference vis-à-vis definite descriptions. On the other hand, onomastics as a sub-discipline of linguistics was mostly interested in the etymology of PN and the implications for historical linguistics and the historical reconstruction of languages. General linguistics and in particular linguistic typology has almost completely neglected the study of PN (some exceptions are recent publications such as VAN LANGENDONCK 2007 und ANDERSON 2007). There is no systematic comparative study of the internal and external morphosyntax of PN or proper name phrases (PNP). The same lack of research holds for the usage of PN in discourse (exceptions are recent publications by DOWNING 1996; SCHWITALLA 1995; PEPIN & ELWYS (eds.) 2010). Although anthroponyms and toponyms are prototypical classes of PNs, they are so different in functional and formal respects that they are better treated separately. Therefore, the present paper deals with the grammatical properties of anthroponyms leaving aside toponyms for later research. The goal of this paper is to present a typologically informed systematic overview of the essential functional and formal properties of anthroponyms. Anthroponyms are not only terms of address and reference. They often encode certain semantic and social meanings that go beyond the pure referential function. The dimensions of these secondary meanings/ functions will be explicated in this paper. Formally, anthroponyms are not only simple words, but show an enormous internal and external complexity. Especially the external syntax of anthroponyms, i.e. the phrase structure and the usage of anthroponyms as argument of the clause will be dealt with. A proper name phrase will be postulated that is different form a classical NP. Further dimensions of typological variation such as anthroponyms and the problem of parts of speech, and anthroponyms within the Animacy Hierarchy will be discussed. The data for this study are taken from grammatical descriptions of a wide array of languages.
Form, meaning and reference in natural language. A phenomenological account of proper names (2000)
In my book Eigenname und Bedeutung (1996) I started from the observation that modem theories of proper names fail to do justice to the specific and complex semantic nature of proper names. Since the 1960's and 1970's, theorizing about proper names has been dominated largely by scholars working in the traditions of analytic philosophy and logic, in particular John R. Searle and Saul Kripke. I urged, therefore , that the highly specific kind of meaning characteristic of proper names should be studied within a theory more in touch with general linguistics proper. The main philosophical (especially referential) and logical (especially formal) accounts start from the assumption that a proper name is "backed up" by encyclopedic information held by speakers of the referents (Searle), or that a proper name is a meaningless , yet rigidly designating sign (Kripke). In contrast to these views, I argue that a general linguistic definition of proper names must focus, not only on logical and philosophical issues, but upon the intra-linguistic semantic function of the proper name as " a part of speech" in actual utterances. This approach has nothing to do with "discourse analysis", but aims at describing proper names and appellative nouns as categories of speech in language use, bringing into play afunctional focus on proper names that has largely been lacking in definitions so far. An outline of a semantic theory of proper names is then proposed based on some aspects of a "phenomenology of language and linguis-tics" as found in the work of Edmund Husserl and Eugenio Coseriu. Roughly speaking, Husserl represents the general epistemological implications of the paper, Coseriu its specifically linguistic aspects.
Between Singularity and Generality: The Semantic Life of Proper Names
Although the view that sees proper names as referential singular terms is widely considered orthodoxy, there is a growing popularity to the view that proper names are predicates. This is partly because the orthodoxy faces two anomalies that Predicativism can solve: on the one hand, proper names can have multiple bearers. But multiple bearerhood is (prima facie) a problem to the idea that proper names have just one individual as referent. On the other hand, as Burge (1973) noted, proper names can have predicative uses. But the view that proper names are singular terms arguably does not have the resources to deal with Burge's cases. In this paper I argue that the predicate view of proper names is mistaken. I first argue against the syntactic evidence used to support the view and against the predicativist's methodology of inferring a semantic account for proper names based on incomplete syntactic data. I also show that Predicativism can neither explain the behaviour of proper names in full generality, nor claim the fundamentality of predicative names. In developing my own view, however, I accept the insight that proper names in some sense express generality. Hence I propose that proper names - albeit fundamentally singular referential terms - express generality in two senses. First, by being used as predicates, since then they are true of many individuals; and second, by being referentially related to many individuals. I respond to the problem of multiple bearerhood by proposing that proper names are polyreferential, and also explain the behaviour of proper names in light of the wider phenomenon I called category change, and shown how Polyreferentialism can account for all uses of proper names.
A simple theory of proper names
In this essay, I address the following question posed by Glezakos (after Kaplan): What determines the form of a name-containing identity statement? I argue that uses of names are determined by the specific names uttered and the presence (or absence) of coco-referential intentions of the speaker. This explains why utterances of the form a=a are uninformative or knowable a priori, more generally than utterances of the form a=b. My approach has the additional benefit of providing an account of empty names.
Proper Names: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives
Erkenntnis, 2014
Proper names play an important role in our understanding of linguistic 'aboutness' or reference. For instance, the name-bearer relation is a good candidate for the paradigm of the reference relation: it provides us with our initial grip on this relation and controls our thinking about it. For this and other reasons proper names have been at the center of philosophical attention. However, proper names are as controversial as they are conceptually fundamental. Since Kripke's seminal lectures Naming and Necessity the controversy about proper names has taken the form of a debate between two main camps, descriptivists and non-descriptivists like Kripke himself. 1 Descriptivists hold that there is a close connection between proper names and definite descriptions: the meaning or sense of a proper name can be given by a (bundle of) definite description(s). The satisfier, if any, of the definite description(s) that provide(s) the meaning of a proper name is its referent. Descriptivists can allow for empty proper names that are meaningful. They also have an initially plausible account of true informative identity statements ('Marilyn Monroe is no one other person than Norma Jean Baker'). Their informativity is grounded in a difference in meaning-giving descriptions.
On the linguistic complexity of proper names
Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009
Ionin for the discussion and suggestions, to various linguists who provided data on various more or less exotic languages and will be individually named (though not called or baptized) below. I would also like to thank the audiences at NELS 35, Sinn und Bedeutung 9, UCLA syntax and semantics seminar, MIT syntax-semantics reading group, and seminars of volet VP de la Fédération TUL (CNRS/Université Paris 8), Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main, Institut Jean Nicod, PALMYR and CRISSP for their attention and helpful comments, and, last but not the least, the three anonymous reviewers of Linguistics and Philosophy, whose detailed comments greatly improved this paper.
Proper Names as Demonstratives
C. Penco, A. Negro (eds.), Proceedings of the 2021 Workshop on Context, 21-22 June 2021, online at https://www.finophd.eu/WOC2021/, 2021
The paper considers the hypothesis that proper names are simple demonstratives. In the first part, I provide the general motivation for an indexical treatment of proper names as well as assess the strengths and weaknesses of existing indexical accounts. The second part is devoted to proposing a new account that treats proper names as simple demonstratives which referents are determined by the speaker's referential intention. In my proposal, I use the hybrid approach towards indexical expressions developed e.g. by Wolfgang Künne (1992) and Stefano Predelli (2006). I argue that this approach allows countering many of the problems haunting existing indexical accounts of proper names. I also consider the Humpty-Dumpty objection to intentionalism regarding demonstrative reference (Gorvett 2005) and show, how the proposed approach may counter it. The considerations concerning this problem also demonstrate, how the treatment of proper names as hybrid demonstratives may allow solving the problems posed by the "Madagascar argument" to the causal-chain theory of proper name reference (Evans, Altham 1973) as well as explain the cases of slips-of-tongue and intention-convention reference mismatch.
2008
This book is not just a synthesis of previous work but provides a number of insights and claims that are either entirely new or result from substantially reworked and extended existing papers of mine in such a way that the content of this publication hopefully constitutes a consistent and coherent piece of work. I would also like to mention that this work has interdisciplinary traits in that not only language philosophical but also psychoand neurolinguistic studies have been made use of. In addition, dialinguistic, i.e. diatopic, diachronic and sociolinguistic (socio-onomastic) insights have been provided. (p. vii) This volume, in fact, represents the first comprehensive analysis in English of the proper name since the publication of Algeo's (1973) On Defining the Proper Name. The data in the present volume, however, derive from both Dutch and English (p. 119). In his brief general introduction (pp. 1-5), VL reinforces the commitment noted in his foreword that this research project is an interdisciplinary analysis of names that starts from the point of view of linguistics, but which also includes philosophical, neurolinguistic, psycholinguistic, and dialinguistic perspectives (p. 1). Furthermore, this volume considers an amplified domain of proper names that goes beyond the more traditional prototypical names such as first names, surnames, and place names. Rather, it includes a discussion of building names, trade names, and brand names (Carroll, 1985; Stewart, 1953; Eichler et al., 1995, 1996) to name but a few. The ambitious agenda of this comprehensive descriptive, theoretical, and primarily synchronic study of names includes the following significant points: (1) the semantic and syntactic status of proper names; (2) an attempt to establish a boundary between proper names and personal pronouns, and appellatives (common nouns); (3) a typology of proper names on the basis of semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic considerations; and (4) a presentation of socioonomastic theories and descriptions (p. 1). In the first chapter ('Nominal and referential semantic status of proper names', pp. 6-118), the longest of the entire book, VL seeks to provide a unified theory of proper names through an integrated semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic account, which is not an easy task, as evidenced by www.elsevier.com/locate/lingua