Synthesis and Comment to Aristotle's Metaphysics (A) (original) (raw)

Metaphysics and Theory: A Close Reading of Aristotle

Among scholars of classic philosophy in the West, it is not uncommon to deny the existence of non-Western metaphysics. This seems due largely to culture-specific ideas or standards about what metaphysics is or how it should be done. In addition, there is a general unfamiliarity with methods and approaches of divergent philosophical traditions. Such a scenario occasions the need to ask once again what metaphysics is. This paper seeks to rediscover an original conceptualization of this science in the West: that which Aristotle tackles in the introductory chapters of his Metaphysics. In the introductory sections of said treatise, Aristotle takes metaphysics to be the kind of knowledge that the wise have. As wisdom, it is the highest exercise of theory.

The Socratic Arc of Aristotle, "Metaphysics" 3

The Review of Metaphysics, 2019

Scholars have typically viewed book 3 of Aristotle’s "Metaphysics" as an unsystematic array of different metaphysical problems. In this article, the author argues that Aristotle organizes them with great care. The principle behind his ordering of the problems stems from Aristotle’s concern with impressing upon his audience the difficulty of becoming thoroughly perplexed. This principle is found to make sense of the discrepancies between Aristotle’s list of the problems in 3.1 and his discussion of them in 3.2–6. In short, Aristotle’s primary concern in Metaphysics 3 is to temper the ambitions of his audience of enterprising physicists, a concern that takes him from the aim of metaphysics to the tension between theology and philosophy. Borrowed as this concern is from the Platonic Socrates, the author shows that the arc of "Metaphysics" 3 is Socratic, and how it is Socratic.

The Aristotelian Method and Aristotelian Metaphysics

Patricia Hanna (ed.), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies (Athens: ATINER), pp. 53-63, 2008.

In this paper I examine what exactly is ‘Aristotelian metaphysics’. My inquiry into Aristotelian metaphysics should not be understood to be so much concerned with the details of Aristotle's metaphysics. I am are rather concerned with his methodology of metaphysics, although a lot of the details of his metaphysics survive in contemporary discussion as well. This warrants an investigation into the methodological aspects of Aristotle's metaphysics. The key works that we will be looking at are his Physics, Metaphysics, Categories and De Interpretatione. Perhaps the most crucial features of the Aristotelian method of philosophising are the relationship between science and metaphysics, and his defence of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). For Aristotle, natural science is the second philosophy, but this is so only because there is something more fundamental in the world, something that natural science – a science of movement – cannot study. Furthermore, Aristotle demonstrates that metaphysics enters the picture at a fundamental level, as he argues that PNC is a metaphysical rather than a logical principle. The upshot of all this is that the Aristotelian method and his metaphysics are not threatened by modern science, quite the opposite. Moreover, we have in our hands a methodology which is very rigorous indeed and worthwhile for any metaphysician to have a closer look at.

Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics

2012

Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) metaphysics is currently undergoing something of a renaissance. This volume brings together fourteen new essays from leading philosophers who are sympathetic to this conception of metaphysics, which takes its cue from the idea that metaphysics is the first philosophy. The primary input from Aristotle is methodological, but many themes familiar from his metaphysics will be discussed, including ontological categories, the role and interpretation of the existential quantifier, essence, substance, natural kinds, powers, potential, and the development of life. The volume mounts a strong challenge to the type of ontological deflationism which has recently gained a strong foothold in analytic metaphysics. It will be a useful resource for scholars and advanced students who are interested in the foundations and development of philosophy.

The Origin of Aristotle\u27s Metaphysical Aporiae

1985

That the fifteen aporiae to whose exposition Aristotle devotes all of Metaphysics B originate from Platonism is widely accepted. However, the text provides no account of how Aristotle constructed these aporiae, and the exact path by which they developed remains shrouded by our lack of knowledge of Aristotle\u27s contemporaries and of the discussions in Plato\u27s Academy. Book B has been a focal point for various, conflicting accounts of Aristotle\u27s development, for scholars assume that the aporiae presented here are problems that troubled Aristotle and remained unsolved when he wrote Metaphysics B. In this paper I shall present an alternative account of the origin of Aristotle\u27s aporiae

In Defence of Aristotelian Metaphysics

T. E. Tahko (Ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 26–43., 2012

The so called 'Aristotelian' conception of metaphysics is often ridiculed because it takes certain notions as fundamental, or appears to require some sort of mysterious rational insight to establish epistemic access to metaphysical truths. In this paper I examine the methodology of this conception of metaphysics, contrast it with the predominant Quinean conception of metaphysics and ontological commitment, and make some suggestions regarding the methodology of Aristotelian metaphysics. Specifically, I argue that the Quinean idea of viewing all ontological questions as existence questions is flawed, and that the proper understanding of (many) ontological questions views them as questions concerning the natures or essences of the entities under investigation. Another way to put this might be to say that Aristotelian metaphysics is interested in explaining entities in virtue of others rather than reducing entities to other entities. I also examine the relationship between metaphysics and natural science and argue that Aristotelian metaphysics is in fact continous, or parallel, to natural science.