Revisiting the religion of the early Greek philosophers.pdf (original) (raw)

2016, Keynote paper 10th London Ancient Science Conference, Institute of Classical Studies, University College London, Inst

There is a striking passage in Plato’s Laws that claims “it’s a risk to appeal to prayer, if you lack intelligence” (euchêi chrêsthai sphaleron einai noun mê kektêmenon, 688b6-7). In other words, what you wish for in your prayers should be supported by your rational judgement (phronêsei, 687e7-8). This was, I believe, axiomatic for Plato from his youth, and it seems that Socrates held the same position from his youth: he claims in the Crito (46b) that he is the kind of man who has always been (ou monon nun, alla kai aei) persuaded by the argument (logôi) that on reflection seemed best to him (logizomenôi beltistos phainêtai). Although Socrates claims in the Apology that God has instructed him by means of oracles, dreams, and other forms of divine manifestation that he should practise philosophy (Apology 33c; 29d; 38a), there is nothing in this or other Socratic encounters with the divine to suggest that he believed “supernatural” beings could or would counter the laws of nature. For both Plato and Socrates, the gods are by nature good (Republic 379b) and perfect (381b), and thus, like “natural” laws, they do not change. Prayers and sacrifices offered up with the aim of changing a god’s behavior are thus useless. The position of Plato and Socrates thus accords with the standard naturalist interpretation of the Presocratics—that they believed the world functioned entirely according to natural laws. I agree with this interpretation, but I am nonetheless intrigued by the question of what the early Greek philosophers thought they were doing when they entered a temple to pray and/or sacrifice to the gods. We must consider it more than probable that they did so, notwithstanding their bold and revolutionary thesis. It is highly unlikely that the early Greek philosophers (before 450 BC) would have even entertained notions that we associate with atheism. In this regard, I tend to agree with Andrew Gregory’s claim in his recent book The Presocratics and the Supernatural (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) that “not only could presocratic intellectuals devise their own theologies apart from the Greek religious tradition, they could devise their own means of prayer and notions of piety as well, entirely in accord with their naturalistic theologies” (109). But what were those means of prayer and notions of piety? In this paper I’ll argue that the answer lies in the strong similarity between the Presocratics and the Platonic texts cited above. In both instances, it is by seeing the connection of phusis with the divine that we gain both a nous of our own and a model to follow—and thus the capacity to act rationally and piously, by conforming our actions to the divine order of the universe. I’ll thus be examining in context a number of the early Greek natural philosophers, but also, in context, Socrates famous “autobiographical” passage in the Phaedo (96a-99d) in which Socrates describes his enthusiasm for natural philosophy (peri phuseôs historia) when he was young (neos ôn, 96a6). We’ll see that in many respects the natural philosophers were all engaged in a kind of theologia naturalis, but perhaps closer to what Thomas Nagel calls natural teleology. Finally, I’ll examine in context the notion and roles of hymns.