The United States' Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: Challenges for India and Japan 1 A Free and Open Indo-Pacific (original) (raw)

The United States' Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: Challenges for India and Japan

ISAS Insights, 2018

Executive Summary The Donald Trump administration in the United States (US) has expanded its articulation of a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) region by announcing strategic investments and economic cooperation. India and Japan are fundamental to the realisation of the US vision of the region. For India and Japan, however, a deeper commitment to the US vision would depend on several factors. These include the prospects of the FOIP becoming a security-oriented strategy to counter China, as opposed to a regional connectivity programme; avoiding the legitimacy issues encountered by China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and acquiring an inclusive character. The BRI has been inviting considerable criticism for pushing countries into debt traps and extracting strategic concessions for infrastructure funds. Coupled with developments like the revival of the 'Quad' Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the US, the FOIP has the possibility of becoming a security-centric anti-China initiative. This would be to the discomfort of India and Japan, which would hesitate to take sides. Both countries would also wish for greater economic legitimacy and vision of a broader regional economic order from the FOIP, as opposed to it being an initiative for expanding US commercial presence in the region. Notwithstanding announcements of regional infrastructure investments and cooperation efforts, India's repeated emphasis on an 'inclusive' FOIP, Japan's decision to selectively engage with the BRI and their respective geopolitical approaches to the region and strategies towards China, will decide their commitment to the FOIP. However, staying engaged in the FOIP can give both an opportunity of enhancing geo-political and geo-economic contribution through an agenda of regional connectivity.

FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy

Asia-Pacific Review, 2019

The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) is the most important feature of Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe Administration. One of the most important questions is whether this vision aims to contain a rapidly rising China. Along with the amelioration of the relationship between Japan and China, this diplomatic strategy has been evolved from the quadrilateral security cooperation among leading democracies in this region, namely the US, Japan, Australia, and India, to a more comprehensive regional cooperation. This article regards the latter diplomatic strategic as the “FOIP 2.0” and that there emerges a possible harmony between Japan’s FOIP and China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The Clash of Japan’s FOIP and China’s BRI?

The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development, 2021

Since the late 2010s, the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” has been becoming increasingly significant in the international political arena. In August 2016, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed a policy of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) as Japan’s new diplomatic vision at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) VI held in Kenya. The FOIP strategy was supported by the Donald Trump administration followed by the renaming of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. However, China has viewed the FOIP as a containment strategy against the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The FOIP vision is unclear for general observers, and it might cause a security dilemma with the Chinese BRI. Is it possible for the FOIP vision to coexist with China’s BRI, or are these two strategic visions destined to clash with each other? In an attempt to answer these questions, the article aims to provide multiple perspectives of the FOIP concept by applying international relations (IR) theory. This article warns that the FOIP and the BRI are likely to bring about diplomatic tension that could be escalated into a military skirmish over the territorial dispute. In order to avoid the possible military clash, it finally seeks to explore possible future pathways of the peaceful coexistence of the two visions in the Indo-Pacific region.

India-Japan Vision 2025: Deciphering the Indo-Pacific Strategy

Indian Foreign Affairs Journal , 2018

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his conceptualisation of ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ and founded on the principle of concert of democracies, has created space for India in Japan’s Grand Strategy. India has been identified as a key variable in the geopolitical churning that is shaping the Indo-Pacific discourse both in Japan and the US. However, as policy positions are articulated by respective leaders, ambiguities around the Indo-Pacific puzzle demands more clarity. While President Trump and Prime Minister Abe are aligned in terms of pursuing the Indo-Pacific strategy with the objective of managing the US-led strategic order amidst Chinese attempts in claiming equity in international affairs with alternative ideas and institutions, Prime Minister Modi has articulated India’s Indo-Pacific vision as a free, open and ‘inclusive’ construct. India’s approach toward geopolitical realities is guided by a balance between engagement and autonomy. While there is alignment of interests which has led India to develop an ‘action oriented partnership’ for its Indo-Pacific Vision 2025 with Japan and pursue robust security and economic engagement with the US but containment of China has not been the objective of India’s foreign policy approach. Meanwhile, Japan’s strategy is shaped by the complex interplay of security and economic interests within the Japan-US-China triangle. Although there are certain gaps in each country’s nuanced interpretation of the Indo-Pacific construct, a few common elements define India-Japan ‘winning combination’ in the Indo-Pacific such as upholding ASEAN centrality; the objective of securing strategic stability and economic prosperity based on the pillars of shared universal values; facilitating infrastructure and connectivity between the sub-regions including Bay of Bengal, Mekong region and the Indian Ocean for better economic integration and leveraging regional production networks and value chains; and securing maritime global commons by strengthening security cooperation with like-minded partners. India-Japan Vision 2025 is rooted on ‘action oriented partnership’ advancing universal values and furthering rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific. As regional fluidity both in terms of geopolitics and geo-economics are unfolding greater uncertainty, India and Japan as two major Asian powers and economies have coordinated in forward thinking while steering the challenges and realising the opportunities that this maritime super-region has to offer.

Japan's Connectivity Projects in the Indo-Pacific Region: Balancing China's BRI

isara solutions, 2022

As power shifts has occurred in the 21 st century specifically with the rise of China and its growing ambitions to project power and economic influence, Connectivity projects and industrial corridors have gained traction in recent times as contest between the major powers intensified, attempting to extend their geopolitical and economic influence. At the heart of this economic and geopolitical influence is Asia and very recently its further southward push towards India and Africa. In the light of this major power competition, the analysis would focus on the rationale of Japan's connectivity projects in Southeast Asia and its gradual shift towards South Asia and Africa. The paper would try to outline the main drivers or factors behind Japan's connectivity projects that include the Japan-China rivalry, security alliance with the U.S. and growing ties with India. The article will attempt to answer the rationale behind Japan's expanding its influence southwards and the nature of Japan's connectivity projects within the ambit of the Indo-Pacific concept.

Redirecting Strategic Focus in the Age of the Indo-Pacific

Comparative Connections, 2018

Japan and Southeast Asia faced a new regional dynamic in 2017 following the inauguration of President Donald Trump in the United States and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s accommodative foreign policy toward China. US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Philippines’ unwillingness to discuss the 2016 South China Sea arbitration award forced Japan and some Southeast Asian states to redirect their strategic focus. Most Southeast Asian states increasingly welcome Japan’s regional initiatives in trade, security, and development to fill the vacuum created by these policy shifts. Japan has actively emphasized the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” the geographic scope of which goes well beyond East Asia and covers the entire Pacific Ocean to East Africa. This new strategic focus has revitalized Japan’s cooperation with Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, there are serious challenges that Japan needs to overcome, particularly in clarifying ASEAN’s roles in the strategy.