Relativism and Hinge Epistemology - forthcoming in M. Kusch (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Relativism (original) (raw)
Related papers
Skepsis
Hinge epistemology is concerned with a particular approach to certain central epistemological questions that is inspired by Wittgenstein's remarks on knowledge, certainty, and related notions in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. I here describe the version of hinge epistemology that I have articulated in recent work, along with its relevance to some fundamental epistemological topics. These topics include the problem of radical scepticism, the nature of epistemic vertigo and its relationship to Wittgensteinian quietism, epistemic relativism, and quasi-fideism regarding the epistemology of religious belief.
Hinge Epistemology is a special issue devoted to the relevance of Wittgenstein's conception of certainty in epistemology. This special issue, edited by A. Coliva & D. Moyal-Sharrock, is forthcoming (2015) in the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Contributions by Yves Bouchard, Annalisa Coliva, Pascal Engel, H.-J. Glock, John Greco, Allan Hazlett, Martin Kusch, Michael Lynch. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Luigi Perissinotto, Duncan Pritchard, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, and Claudine Tiercelin.
In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology
Looking at things from the point of view of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, N. Da Costa and S. Wuppuluri (eds.), Springer, 2019
Hinge epistemology is a family of theories about justification (and knowledge) which give centre-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of a “hinge”. In the following, I will first put forward some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on, in particular, Wittgenstein’s texts, and more theoretically committed work, which aims at developing suggestions that can be found in the texts, even though they are not clearly attributable as such to their author (§1). I will then summarize the main tenets of what, to date, is still the most widespread reading of On Certainty (§2) – the so-called “framework reading”. In light of the initial methodological considerations and of this exegesis of On Certainty, I will then review some contemporary attempts at developing Wittgenstein’s ideas in an anti-skeptical direction, such as Crispin Wright’s, Michael Williams’ and Duncan Pritchard’s (§3). I will argue that, their intrinsic merits notwithstanding, they fail to take proper measure of Wittgenstein’s own position. I will then close by sketching my own version of hinge epistemology and by highlighting points of contact and disagreement with Wittgenstein’s own views as portrayed by the framework reading (§4).
Epistemic Pluralism, Epistemic Relativism and 'Hinge' Epistemology
According to Paul Boghossian (2006, 73) a core tenet of epistemic relativism is what he calls epistemic pluralism, according to which (i) 'there are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems' , but (ii) 'no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than any of the others'. Embracing the former claim is more or less uncontroversial– viz., a descriptive fact about epistemic diversity. The latter claim by contrast is very controversial. Interestingly, the Wittgenstenian 'hinge' epistemologist, in virtue of maintaining that rational evaluation is essentially local, will (arguably, at least) be committed to the more controversial leg of the epistemic pluralist thesis, simply in virtue of countenancing the descriptive leg. This paper does three central things. First, it is shown that this 'relativistic' reading of Wittgenstein's epis-temology is plausible only if the locality of rational evaluation (in conjunction with a reasonable appreciation of epistemic diversity) commits the Wittgenstenian to a further epistemic incom-mensurability thesis. Next, Duncan Pritchard's (e.g., 2009; 2015) novel attempt to save the hinge epistemologist from a commitment to epistemic incommensurability is canvassed and critiqued. Finally, it is suggested how, regardless of whether Pritchard's strategy is successful, there might be another very different way—drawing from recent work by John MacFarlane (2014)—for the hinge epistemologist to embrace epistemic pluralism while steering clear of epistemic relativism, understood in a very specific way.
WITTGENSTEINIAN HINGE EPISTEMOLOGY AND DEEP DISAGREEMENT
TOPOI, 2018
Deep disagreements concern our most basic and fundamental commitments. Such disagreements seem to be problematic because they appear to manifest epistemic incommensurability in our epistemic systems, and thereby lead to epistemic relativism. This problem is confronted via consideration of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology. On the face of it, this proposal exacerbates the problem of deep disagreements by granting that our most fundamental commitments are essentially arationally held. It is argued, however, that a hinge epistemology, properly understood, does not licence epistemic incommensurability or epistemic relativism at all. On the contrary, such an epistemology in fact shows us how to rationally respond to deep disagreements. It is claimed that if we can resist these consequences even from the perspective of a hinge epistemology, then we should be very suspicious of the idea that deep disagreements in general are as epistemologically problematic as has been widely supposed.
Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability and Wittgensteinian Epistemology
A certain conception of a specifically epistemic form of relativism is discussed, one that is brought to the fore by a particular problem that arises in the epistemology of disagreement. Such relativism turns on a form of epistemic incommensurability whereby a dispute between truth-seekers with opposing beliefs cannot satisfactorily be resolved by (epistemically) rational means. Wittgenstein’s writings on epistemology—particularly in his final work, On Certainty—are of relevance to this problem. On the one hand, one can read him as putting forward an epistemological proposal, one that has the notion of a “hinge proposition” at its heart, which actually licences epistemic incommensurability, and hence epistemic relativism. On the other hand, there are also suggestions in Wittgenstein’s writings on this topic that may offer a resolution to this problem.
On Certainty, Epistemic Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism
Wittgenstein Studien
In this paper, I present Wittgenstein's remarks on the structure of reason , drawing on the notions of " hinges " he developed in On Certainty. I then outline some of the unpalatable relativistic consequences that can be extracted by Wittgenstein's epistemological views. Then, developing the similarities between Wittgenstein's treatment of " hinges " and his views on metrology and religious beliefs, I aim to show that his remarks on the structure of reason, once correctly understood and developed, can help us to block rather than license relativistic conclusions. I argue that following Wittgenstein's views on epistemology, we should be able to dismiss all the cases of apparent unsolvable disagreement between communities committed to radically different worldviews; this is so because , once seen in the light of his conception of the structure of reason, these disagreements are either solvable, as they are based on lack of knowledge and can thus be solved through education and training, or are mere pseudo-problems that stem from misguided comparisons between constitutively different language games and are thus the result of a misleading way of representing the nature and aim of our epistemic practices.
(2018) Why epistemic pluralism does not entail relativism: Collingwood's hinge epistemology
Karim Dharamsi, Giuseppina D'Oro and Stephen Leach (Eds.) Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology Palgrave. Philosophers in Depth series
There is a widespread view according to which the denial that the conditions of knowledge are truth-evaluable inevitably leads to a form of epistemic pluralism that is both quietist and internally incoherent. It is quietist because it undermines the possibility of genuine epistemic disagreement. It is internally incoherent because it simultaneously denies the existence of universal knowledge claims and makes the universal claim that there is no such knowledge. The goal of this paper is to show that denying that the conditions of knowledge are truth-evaluable does not necessarily entail a commitment to a form of epistemic relativism that is both quietist and internally incoherent. To undermine the view that the denial that the conditions of knowledge have truth-values leads down the blind alley of epistemic relativism I mobilize a version of “hinge epistemology” which distinguishes between epistemic pluralism and epistemic relativism. This form of hinge epistemology is to be found in Collingwood’s account of absolute presuppositions (Collingwood, 1940). By teasing apart epistemic pluralism from epistemic relativism, the paper exposes the view that the denial that the conditions of knowledge have truth-values inevitably leads to a malignant form of epistemic relativism as a form of philosophical scaremongering.
What would a 'Hinge Epistemology' look like
'Hinge Epistemology' consists on the thought that Wittgenstein's notion of hinge propositions can be the core of a plausible epistemological theory. The very idea of what a hinge is, though, is highly controversial. There are different interpretations of hinges in the scholarship of " On Certainty " resulting in differing theories of their role in knowledge. In this work, I contemplate Moyal-Sharrock's anti-epistemic reading of hinges and argue that it is unclear what role they play in epistemic endeavours. This is due to her claim that hinges do not do any work in the language-game, as they do not have any meaning in them. Rather, the role of hinges is foundational; they support the language-game from "outside" , in a non-epistemic fashion; hinges are what we need to trust or believe in in order to have knowledge. I criticise her foundationalist reading, as it is not clear on close inspection that there are two different spheres identifiable with ground and grounded, something I take to be the minimal requirement for any kind of foundationalism. If the idea of foundationalist hinges is rightly rejected, I fail to see why they may have a role in epistemological considerations.