Coming to Terms: The prospects and policies for (re)unifying Cyprus under a New Constitution (original) (raw)

Cyprus, a small island in the Mediterranean, with a presence of Greek and Turkish populations, has been struggling ever since 1974 to reunify its two communities under one constitution. As a former British Colony, the 1960 Constitution gave independence under a Greek leadership with rights to the Turkish minority, however after an unsuccessful Greek driven coup to take over the island, the Turkish invasion of 1974 resulted in the island split de facto in half with a sovereign state under Greek leadership in the south and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the north, which however is not recognised by the International Community. Since then, unfruitful negotiations and unsuccessful attempts to reunify have been made for the island to retain its unity under one constitution. Subsequently, the first real attempt to reunify the island was made in 2004 with the UN-backed Annan Plani which was however rejected by the Greek-Cypriot side after a nation-wide referendum. Either way, one has to question what makes this long peaceful dispute, peaceful and different from other international cases. Evidently, Cyprus is a divided nation with only two ethnic communities, an EU member state and a core part of the geostrategic interests of Europe. It is situated in the eastern part of the Mediterranean and provides a source of stability in protecting European political and economic interests in the Middle East. Thus, paradoxically, Europe’s eastern part remains divided in a very unstable region and scholars have supported that the time has come to resolve one of Europe’s contemporary dispute. On the same note, the official position of the International Community remains a viable solution which will be a product of the reunification of the island under one constitution. However, over the past few years another proposal has surfaced asserting the fact that the Cyprus issue should not be resolved, and that silently and periodically the island of Cyprus should de facto host two countries rather than one. Currently, the Cyprus dispute does not only require a new Constitution, it requires coming to terms across issues in the talks that seem insoluble on their own. These include the multi-billion euro issue of compensation for restitution of Greek Cypriot properties after the Turkish invasion of 1974, involving perhaps three quarters of the territory of the Turkish Cypriot north; the future of immigrants from Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot wish (backed by Turkey) for a continued Turkish military guarantee; and the question of how much of the 37 per cent of the island now in Turkish hands will pass to the Greek Cypriots. In effect, the purpose of this paper will not be to present a solution for the latter issues but instead, by trying to take in account the interests of both sides regarding power sharing, it will assess the foundations for a viable Constitution of a reunified Cyprus which is fundamental in resolving the dispute. Moreover, it will support that the basic structural principles for a solution exist and that the Cyprus dispute can only be resolved if both negotiating sides exclude taboos from the negotiation process and agree on a quota power sharing in the executive, legislative and judicial levels of the new state.